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China is currently in the midst of an unprecedented building boom and, indeed, 
interest in Chinese contemporary architecture has been fuelled by this huge 
expansion. Through a cutting-edge theoretical discussion of Chinese architecture 
in relation to Chinese modernity, this book examines this phenomenon in detail. 
In particular, it highlights how changes in the socio-political system, the residual 
influence of Mao and the demands of the market have each shaped and determined 
style and form in recent years. Using the key case studies of Liu Jiakun, Cui 
Kai and URBANUS, it analyses the intricate details of historical pressures and 
practical strategies affecting Chinese architecture. In doing so, it demonstrates that 
Chinese architects contribute in specific ways to the international architectural 
discourse, since they are actively engaging with the complex societal 
transition of contemporary China and managing the dynamics and conflicts 
arising during the process.
China’s Architecture in a Globalizing World: Between Socialism and the 
Market offers a lens into the innovation and uniqueness of architectural design in 
China. As such, this book will be useful for students and scholars of architecture, 
Chinese culture and society and urban studies.
Jiawen Han is Lecturer in the Department of Architecture at the Xi’an Jiaotong 
Liverpool University, China.
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This book grew out of my doctoral dissertation, which I finished in Australia. It is 
noteworthy to think of how much Sydney’s beaches and the sun have nourished 
the content of this book. I would like to express my thanks to the place and people 
first: thanks to Australia, the natural and cultural environment of which made me 
naturally join in without feeling like an alien, and the spirit of which has seem-
ingly encouraged me to never act like a tame bird.
I came across a song titled “Better Me,” originally recorded by a young singer, 
Fiona Sit, which struck me while I reflected my time in Australia. I owe my deep-
est gratitude to my PhD supervisor, Dr. Harry Margalit, for his rigorous intel-
lectual guidance and continual encouragement, both of which supported me in 
becoming a “better me.” Though I am imperfect, I can always see a “better me” 
in his eyes and hear it in his words – so much so that it is difficult to count the 
changes he has gifted me. He has not only brought unique perspectives to see 
architecture, as well as ability in conducting research and skills with resolving 
problems, but he also taught me to bear a sunny heart on any intellectual jour-
ney. Our countless chats have always been enjoyable and, interestingly enough, 
turned out to be useful, for most of my ideas emerged from our chats and were 
later developed in my writing. His extensive comments on my drafts also helped 
my ideas to finally come out of their shells. When I was revising the dissertation, 
I recalled a hard time during my PhD journey: I was struggling with the academic 
standard of my dissertation and the readability and pleasure, the flow, the sense 
of reading I wanted to bring to it, yet Harry understood my intention and sup-
ported me in doing it in my own way. He is not a stereotypical scholar, yet he 
is open-minded and kind-hearted. We have been in contact since I came back to 
China. I have to say that it is not easy to have a person I am certain would always 
be with me, always be there to listen to me about research and teaching, and help 
me make my way. Yet Harry is always there. I am also quite fortunate to have had 
Professor Xing Ruan as my PhD co-supervisor, who significantly impacted the 
development of this thesis. I was impressed with his scholarship, his personality 
and his attitude towards research. I have always sought to learn the confidence 
and grace of traditional Chinese intellectuals from him, and I hope that I have 
somehow merited a little bit of that.
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There is an idiosyncratic relationship between, on the one hand, architecture and 
architects, and on the other hand, the developing market of China. Broadly speak-
ing there is a constructive tension between the centralised state and the develop-
ing market. This book examines, in detail, diverse elements of this phenomenon: 
how changes in the socio-political system, the residual influence of Mao and the 
demands of the market, have all affected Chinese architecture in recent times. 
This book argues that Chinese architects contribute in specific ways to the interna-
tional architectural discourse, since they are actively engaging with the complex 
societal transition of contemporary China, and managing the dynamics and con-
flicts arising during the process. In particular, I wish to highlight that architectural 
modernity in the work of Chinese architects’ works moves beyond the interpreta-
tion provided by existing scholarship, both in consideration of the revival of tra-
ditional features and in the domain of modern technology. In that sense, Chinese 
architecture acquired a hearing in theory in relation to Chinese modernity con-
cerning the clarity of its means and ends.
The interest in Chinese contemporary architecture has been fuelled by an 
unprecedented building boom and the novelty of some specific projects. Introduc-
ing the notion of “modernity” into this discussion permits us to include complex 
elements of Chinese society and history. The process from Mao to market cur-
rently cannot be easily situated within any overarching theory, nor is it a linear 
and systematic transition, but it has far-reaching effects in every corner of China, 
every Chinese social group, and on bureaucratic agendas and personal motives. 
Looking at architecture from this perspective provides a strategy, a fresh way 
of reading architecture and architects, and a theoretical framework constructed 
around the uncertain nature of the socialist transition in China.
The concept of modernity raises many questions: What were the dynamics in 
the complex market transition? What impact did these forces have on architec-
ture and on the opportunities available to architects? What were the interactive 
dynamics between personal goals, life experiences and the architectural designs 
of individual architects, most of whom were born into and educated by the phi-
losophy of collectivism, but who now work in a market-oriented society? How 
did their architecture address the social problems in the transitional phases of 




and contemporary architects to the international architectural discourse? It is time 
to reflect upon the new roles that architects and architecture have assumed in this 
transition, and the new values and innovations in Chinese architectural design 
based on individual personal liberation and market-driven reforms.
China is in the midst of the biggest growth spurt in its modern history, but it is 
also struggling with many transitional problems. Parallel with the endeavour of 
bestowing an abstract vision of social transformation, advancement and moder-
nity in China, that same ideal is also subject to a plethora of influences from the 
societal transformation that in turn affects the form, size, syntax, language and 
innovation of architects. There is a clear awareness of the radical transforma-
tion in architecture, and the astonishing amount of demolition occurring in China. 
During this wave of construction, the emergence of some innovative architecture 
designs by Chinese architects has given rise to hybrid identities in modern China. 
Popular terms like “experimental architecture”1 or “avant-garde architecture” 
are used to describe the new wave of architecture in China. But when one looks 
closely at these terms, it is difficult to assess whether they have any real merit in 
architecture.
It is crucial to position contemporary Chinese architecture accurately in its 
historical as well as its international context in order to clarify its relationship 
with the global system. Generally, descriptions of modern architecture in China 
are stripped of this historical and social complexity, encapsulated in the catchy 
phrase, “world construction site”. This casual description of contemporary Chi-
nese architecture reduces it to a palimpsest of modernity, which ignores the 
remarkable regional innovations and the multiplicity of solutions within unique 
architectural designs. The idea of “multiple modernities” was raised by Shmuel 
Eisenstadt, who argued, “The actual developments in modernizing societies have 
refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of the Western program of 
modernity.”2 Rather than responding to claims for or against influences of West-
ern modernity, I will discuss the trajectories of different architectural groups and 
firms in China during the process of unfolding modernity. An accurate analysis 
of Chinese architecture in the modern and historical sense serves both to enrich 
our understanding of the achievements of the architects and to engage in the dia-
logue between the popular neo-liberal understanding of modernity in China and 
opposing concepts. It is imperative to position developing architecture within the 
unique challenges presented by contemporary China: the intersection of economic 
development, political ideology, demography and culture and the profound influ-
ence they each have had on architectural designs
Arif Dirlik argued that “globalisation represents not only a further unification 
of the world through the agency of capitalism, and its attendant political and cul-
tural institutions, but also an effort to contain new forms of fragmentations.”3 This 
book presents an alternative perspective for seeing “new forms of fragmentations” 
in architecture. Therefore, this study begins with the interpretation of China’s 
struggles with various kinds of transitional problems as a key to understanding 
the new wave of innovative Chinese architecture. Most existing studies focus on 
the material side of the construction boom, missing the crucial components in the 
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development of urban landscape affected by subjective opinions from different 
quarters, implicit cultural pressures and the subjective experience and personality 
of each architect.
Necessarily, the examination presented here extends the research to an ideo-
logical level. The intricate details of historical pressures and practical strategies 
are clarified through three case studies: Liu Jiakun, Cui Kai and URBANUS. The 
study positions the designs of these architects in the historical vision of a broader 
cultural perspective. The global and domestic markets, the West, the East, the 
state, the architects themselves and the shifting perception of modernity – all 
these elements are decisive factors in shaping contemporary Chinese architecture, 
with different impacts in different cases. It should be noted that these elements 
affect architectural design at different points in time under different versions of 
socialism.
Tafuri wrote:
The interweaving of intellectual models, modes of production, and modes 
of consumption ought to lead to the “explosion” of the synthesis contained 
in the work. Wherever this synthesis is presented as a completed whole, it is 
necessary to introduce a disintegration, a fragmentation, a “dissemination” of 
its constitutive units. It will then be necessary to submit these dis-integrated 
components to a separate analysis.4
Neither praising nor criticising specific architectural design is the point of this 
exercise. Modernity is a device to interpret the seemingly “modern”, the seem-
ingly “normal” or the seemingly “absurd” Chinese architectural designs. Equal 
attention is paid to interconnecting elements drawn from literary resources, 
first-hand fieldwork observations, the history of political economics, the stylis-
tic transformation and architectural innovations. The point of the exercise is to 
address how a hegemonic position was deconstructed during the transition from 
a planned economy to a market economy and how multiple forces, including the 
individual impulses from Chinese architects, have constructed new architectural 
identities.
All the events in this transformation are initially isolated for critical review 
because of their different plots, actors, strategies and resolutions. After being 
appropriately historically positioned, these fragments are then woven together in 
a systematic analysis, which situates architecture and architects against a sweep-
ing historical and political backdrop.
Notes
1 Experimental architecture in China was first put forward by architectural activist, Min-
gxian Wang, in June 1999, at the time of the UIA Congress first to be held in Beijing.
2 Shmuel Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129, no. 1 (2000):1–29.
3 Arif Dirlik, “Modernity as History: Post-Revolutionary China, Globalization and the 
Question of Modernity,” Social History 27, no. 1 (2002): 20.
4 Manfredo Tafuri, The Sphere and the Labyrinth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 14.
A great number of books have been published on China’s transition1 with a spe-
cific focus on urban issues and the built environment. There is no doubt that for 
China, the journey from state to market socialism is a process towards a modern-
ised and urbanised nation. This has led to a focus on its successes and scandals in 
urban development. The scholars who are examining spatial questions in China 
are mostly writing from the urban perspectives concerning urban image, spatial 
transformation, new physical and economic space and cultural spaces. Yet why 
does architecture continue to be absent in the research addressing China’s tran-
sition era? Although architecture is the main subject of the built environment, 
the social impact of contemporary architecture in China, except for its aspect of 
novelty, remains largely unacknowledged. Urban researchers appear reluctant to 
canvass any specific architecture in their research, due to the fact that architecture 
is not perceived as an embodiment of the complex spatial and social phenomena 
represented by the Chinese city.
Chinese cities have been overrun by new traders, investors, brokers and cli-
ents, during the transitional era, and urban researchers are swiftly on the scent, 
since the transformation of urban space is part of capital investment, which in 
turn shapes the direction of Chinese reforms and opens the gateway to foreign 
investment. The occasional observations about architecture in urban studies tend 
to be vague and condescending. A certain degree of hostility veils the discipline 
of architecture. As a result, researchers’ attention has shifted to the urban level, 
and every discussion focuses on urban issues, which positions architecture in a 
broad landscape, but at the same time obscures an in-depth, critical analysis of 
contemporary architecture.
Historically, discourses and theories on architecture concern themselves with 
formal questions, viewing the architect as a form giver. Common sense dictates 
that such a view is outdated, describing only forms in space, and relegating 
architectural concerns to filling empty spaces with lines, but researchers are still 
hesitant to give significance to the numerous issues that influence contemporary 
architects – including social and professional networks and conflicting pressures 
from socio-political circumstances. Contemporary architecture in China has been 
a huge market for the outside investor over the last ten years since the extraor-
dinary growth surge, but this is just the surface. Chinese architecture has seen a 
1  History, ideology and Chinese 
architecture
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series of booms and busts within its overall growth story; it deserves a far closer 
scrutiny into its newly emerging identity that embraces a broader social and cul-
tural background. The process from Mao to market itself exerted considerable 
influence over architects and architecture.
In the first decade of the communist regime (1949–1959), the Chinese Com-
munist Party sought full control over the architectural profession in a strategic 
way through its operational and ideological restructurings.2 The application of 
the Soviet model in the architectural profession was associated with nationalisa-
tion of private architectural firms into state-owned enterprises. China’s economic 
reform from 1978 has been characterised by the unravelling of the traditional 
planned economic system, the shaping of the pattern of diversified sources of 
economic growth, and the increasing importance of the market mechanism. As a 
result, since the early 1980s a few private design enterprises were approved. Some 
independent architects, who used to work in the large-scale design institutes, or 
came back from overseas practices, gradually established their own design firms 
during the 1990s. In the 2000s, the private sector in the architectural industry 
flourished, including the privatisation of the state-owned design institutes and 
intensive emergence of the private design firms either small or medium scale. 
Moreover, markets have been useful for foreign visitors to China by providing 
new outlets and venues.
Consequently, the market transition and societal transformation brought oppor-
tunities to contemporary architecture in China. The reduced dependence on the 
state resourced collective working model moves towards large-scale privatised 
design institutes, and the diversified sources of growth in architectural market, 
all brought various changes to architecture in China. The pre-reform state-owned 
design institutes were characterised by a lack of enterprise autonomy because of 
the absence of market competition, or sufficient information on enterprise perfor-
mance, problems directly resulting from information asymmetry and incentive 
incompatibility under the specific historical conditions of the era. In contrast, the 
reformed design institutes have already gained financial independence and been 
allowed to pursue profit in practice. Many private architectural firms gain many 
commissions and an enhanced reputation as the city also experiences tremendous 
building activities, but they cannot obtain any kind of open or hidden subsidies 
or other types of policy protection that the state-owned or pre-state-owned design 
institute enjoyed. Meanwhile, some of the reformed design institutes are still 
plagued by a series of cultural burdens left over from the previous development 
strategy.
For architects, associated with the erosion of collectivism and diminishing 
state control, the self-expression of architects in their designs have been depoliti-
cised and become increasingly commercialised. The fact that the market-oriented 
reforms from the planned economy have eroded the state’s ability to exercise its 
guiding rule seems appealing to architects, because they assume they will have 
increasing freedom for their individual choices with the emergence of the architec-
ture market. But in practice, their attitudes towards market and individual identity 
are less straightforward. After decades of defending the autonomy of architectural 
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design against the state’s control, many architects found that vulgar designs in fact 
sometimes outsold the high-quality works in the real market. It also took time for 
architects to realise that it is the entrepreneurs who sustain them as professional 
architects, rather than the state supporting them as before, and the market has its 
own rules. Furthermore, if we attempt to categorise their pre-reform life experi-
ences into one group, their life trajectories have been totally different since the 
1980s: some of them went overseas, some of them stayed with state-owned design 
institutes, and some of them departed from collective-approved designs to a more 
independent creative way. Due to their different life experiences, their doubts in 
their pursuits of individual identity and their pursuit of private gains and private 
lives coexisted with the ideological limits in the private realm, and these tensions 
have caused diverse impacts on architectural designs from the 1990s onwards.
Xing Ruan noted that strangely, Chinese architecture in the twentieth century 
was almost given a complete miss by Western discourse.3 Since the late 1990s, 
interest in China’s modern architectural history has been partly revived. There has 
been some research gibing theoretical and historical interpretations of the archi-
tecture of modern China.4 Among such theoretical and historical studies, different 
from most of the information generating works, Jianfei Zhu and Tao Zhu’s works 
are critical in nature, offering many critical reflections on the often-confusing 
landscape of Chinese architecture. Their unreservedly expressed socio-political 
views on Chinese architecture have given a penetrating insight into the domain 
of Chinese architectural analysis. There are also many books5 and journals6 that 
have introduced new architects and their designs during the rise of novelty and 
speed in construction, especially since the 1990s; however, their focus is limited 
to the introduction of particular projects, ranging from private residences to public 
museums, with beautiful architectural photographs and brief commentaries. What 
is missing in these collections of architectural images is discussion of the sig-
nificance of buildings as cultural symbols, reflecting social and political changes. 
A misguided attitude on the part of professional researchers, combined with the 
lack of freedom of speech in China, circumvents discussion of the complex rela-
tionship between political, economic and cultural elements, evident in the domain 
of architecture as elsewhere.
Contemporary Chinese intellectuals have concealed their criticisms of contro-
versial relations between political factions since 1989, which, if expressed, could 
have contributed to a healthy debate about the future. Jianfei Zhu and Tao Zhu’s 
works indicated that the trend is turning from a focus on architecture as a special-
ised domain with actual works and the individual architect on one side, to its posi-
tion in the socio-political landscape and its direct engagement with the cultural 
movements. This book employs a shifting focus, zooming in and zooming out to 
see some actual architectural works from the ideological perspective and the indi-
vidual perspective, while positioning the works in a comprehensive big picture.
With regard to the historical periods under the communist regime, there have 
been two intensive works focusing on the architectural profession and architectural 
development respectively. Xiao Hu’s investigation of the architectural profession, 
Reorienting the Profession: Chinese Architectural Transformation Between 1949 
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and 1959,7 argued that a reconsideration of ideology in modern Chinese architec-
ture is vital in order to understand a unique pattern of professional development 
under a communist regime. Guohua Ji’s Building Under the Planned Economy: 
A History of China’s Architecture and Construction 1949–1965 provides a valu-
able source for the historical study. However, the hidden link between post-Mao 
and pre-reform China associated with the ideological transition has not been suf-
ficiently investigated in the realm of built environment. Duanfang Lu’s work has 
greatly contributed to this field. She explores urban construction under Maoist 
socialism that contributed to the particularities of Chinese cities today. The rea-
sons why it is hard to identify the legacy of the communist regime in architecture 
will be analysed in the following chapters. This study critically assesses the idi-
osyncratic relationships of post-Mao and pre-reform China in forming Chinese 
architecture.
Researchers have constructed various categories or used adjectives to catego-
rise these architectures, such as regionalism, modernism and expressionism. This 
mode of analysis is useful, as it brings out the most salient features of a type of 
architecture existing at this particular period in time. However, it also has limi-
tations, as it tends to emphasise the similarities of architecture belonging to a 
recognised architectural category, and glosses over their individual differences. 
Rather than being distracted by features that may characterise an architectural 
style, I will take note of unique stylistic transformations of modern architecture in 
China. There have been scholars who seek to characterise architectural styles into 
models, and there is no doubt that the varieties of architecture in post-Mao China 
sometimes can be categorised in terms of style, function, ownership or develop-
ment right. However, their relations to history, society, ideology and architecture, 
the most complex and obscure elements, cannot be easily categorised, and they 
are always excluded in the existing scholarship. Except for the obvious influences 
of the West and the East, strict stylistic categorising is another limited way of 
viewing the complex transitions of Chinese architecture in relation to modernity.
Mapping modernity in Chinese architecture
During 2009 when I was working in a design institute, I discovered something 
frustrating but interesting. During that period, we were always asked to deliver 
a design proposal within a few days after we got the task from the client. Over 
several days’ hard work we crafted the conceptual drawings, site plan, floor plans, 
and other drawings, and in many cases, when the client came in to our office and 
checked the design progress, they only wanted to see a bird’s-eye view drawing. 
I was confused by the clients’ request, because rendering a drawing from a bird’s-
eye view is from an imagined perspective, rather than the representation of spatial 
interaction with a human being. Moreover, I found when I showed these archi-
tectural renderings to my foreign peers in the architectural industry, they would 
identify them as “architectural renderings with Chinese characteristics”.
From the 2000s, due to the limited time given by the client, an architect would 
have multiple tasks to complete; therefore, the design institute would collaborate 
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with another architectural visualisation company to obtain architectural render-
ings. It was standard practice in the architectural industry at that time, and many 
design institutes have continued this way until now. Although the design still 
begins with the architect’s sketch, and then architects develop the sketch via com-
puter into a site plan, floor plans, elevations and sections as per conventional 
practice, at the end of the process documents are sent to a professional architec-
tural rendering company, where a professional modelling division will produce 
the 3D model according to the 2D drawings submitted to them. Depending on the 
company’s scale, architectural rendering through 3DMax or rendering software, 
and post-processing through Photoshop, might be done by the same division or by 
other independent divisions. Due to the time demands from developers, architects 
sometimes do little by hand and search for precedent images for reference, and the 
architectural visualisation company will also produce their images from a simple 
site plan, often without any detail design.8
After I passed my 2D drawings and some precedent images to the profes-
sional rendering company, I sometimes had to go to their company to explain and 
supervise the details or the atmosphere requested. During communications with 
the rendering professionals and a gradual understanding of the preference of the 
clients, I saw particular aesthetics coming out by some specific treatments. For 
example, a variation of the transparency parameter of some opaque materials and 
the increase in reflectivity for certain materials: for example, glass, ceramic and 
aluminium all enhance the image of the un-built architecture in specific ways. In 
some commercial building renderings, entire glazed façades have been stamped 
with cosmopolitan-hued reflections, even though the actual architecture is located 
in remote countryside. In the rendering industry, strategies in the exaggeration 
in the presentation of materials and fake decorative components are carefully 
developed. These drawings’ identities are dominated by the active and directed 
imagination of clients, public and private, and they have achieved effects that are 
not possible with traditional drawing instruments. The government, at all levels, 
subscribes to the temples of cosmopolitan cities intended to lure society into a 
collective imagination. Under these circumstances, a bird’s-eye view rendering 
drawing can be a much more effective tool for satisfying the developer, as their 
imagination is firmly directed towards a specific vision. Architectural rendering 
drawings, which rest on the technological transition from print-based media to 
visual and electronic media to the computer, have accelerated the process of imag-
ining forms of architectural modernity in China. It is evident that the homogenous 
dreams of the metropolis, regardless of their specific social conditions, puts the 
local culture and beauty of cultural diversity under threat.9 By investigating the 
rationale underlying the architectural rendering industry in China, we can see 
imagining modernity as incentives underlying outward appearance.
The important question is, is the contribution of this imagining of modernity in 
architecture, within the historically specific architectural culture of contemporary 
China, critical to the evolution of the distinctive formation of Chinese modernity? 
The answer is in the affirmative. Therefore, it is time to conduct a critical analysis 
of the new autonomous forms, widely overlooked in current research, that have 
played such a vital role in the distinctive formation of Chinese modernity.
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• Modernity, Chinese modernity and Chinese architecture
As a social concept, modernity is inseparably bound up with the process of mod-
ernisation of industry, urban city, science, civic society, nationalism and colo-
nialism. Modernity involves the rationality, or more accurately, the purposive 
rationality discussed by Max Weber. As David Harvey demonstrates, modernity 
refers to a whole existential, social and cultural condition that distinguishes the 
modern period from the periods before or after.10 In this culturally and politi-
cally diverse world, it is argued that there are very few categories that can with-
stand critical viewing,11 and modernity of one of them. In the nineteenth century, 
Chinese activists imported ideas of modernity to China. The Chinese Commu-
nist Revolution of 1949 introduced a major historical disjunction in its political-
economic structure and in its social organisation. Wang Hui pointed out, “Mao’s 
socialism is both an ideology of modernization and a critique of Euro-American 
capitalist modernization.”12 China’s economic reform entitled “Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics” began in 1978. In the 1980s, the term “modernity” was 
constantly raised among Chinese intellectuals in a confusing way.
For more than thirty years, China has been experiencing a major transition, as 
a consequence of the adoption of an economic paradigm commonly referred to in 
the West as “opening-up”. The emergence of the market as a central legitimising 
institution brought the public/private distinction into the core of legal discourse 
during the late nineteenth century. China’s trajectory, which started from the 
pre-reform socialist regime of production and accumulation dominated by, and 
designed solely for, the state’s extensive socialist industrialisation programme, 
moved to a more market-based and uniquely hybridised system of production 
marked by “quasi-public” and “quasi-private” forms of ownership, production 
and accumulation.13 The additional steps of reform in the 1990s created a funda-
mental break with the “collective great union” that prevailed in China from 1949 
to 1989. In the 1990s, the free flow of labour, goods and capital, as well as the 
boom in information and cultural signs and images, undoubtedly presented a vivid 
image of modernisation to the majority of Chinese people.14 There have been new 
and complex social relations and different versions of modernity associated with 
the rise of capitalism. After the 1990s, some Chinese scholars began to historicise 
or theorise modernity in a way that was unclear. They focused on how science and 
industrial technology had been engineered under the version of Mao’s socialism, 
and it has taken quite a while for Chinese scholars to appreciate that science is 
not only concerned with the understanding/manipulation of nature, it must also 
engage with the social and cultural conditions of a species. The question of how 
China as a complex culture has received and engaged with the different aspects of 
modernity needs to be investigated.
Research on architecture and modernity has undergone a remarkable renais-
sance. There has been an expansion from a narrow focus in the attempt to under-
stand modernity in architecture through scholars’ explorations in diverse cultural 
domains.15 As the thriving corpus of literature16 on modernity and Chinese archi-
tecture has emerged in recent years, the new configuration of architecture depends 
on special social factors that cannot be divorced from ideas of modernity. Berman 
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notes that modernity embraces both what he terms modernisation – the general 
process of socio-economic and technological development – and modernism: 
the various cultural and and/or “subjective” responses to this process of mod-
ernisation.17 The increasing preference for the word modernity in the architectural 
scholarship reveals a determination to set up a dialogue between “modernisa-
tion” and “modernism” in architecture. Modernism and modernist architecture 
as distinctive terms in modern Chinese contexts are plagued by ambiguity, and 
they require clarification if they are to be useful. I will be discussing these terms 
through chronological investigation and case studies in the following chapters.
“Modernity” refers to the state of being modern. In historical terms, we might 
date its precursor as the philosophical “age of enlightenment” in which clearly 
stated principles are tested against evidence, and the rational mind uses logic to 
arrive at conclusions, which allows principles to be amended in light of the evi-
dence. Zygmunt Bauman saw modern society as being largely characterised by 
a need for order – a need to domesticate, categorise and rationalise the world 
so it would be controllable, predictable and understandable. On the other hand, 
modernity is always characterised by radical changes in traditional forms of 
economy and culture.18 However, views of contemporary Chinese architecture 
omit the ordering, rationalising tendency that is supposed to be the characteristic 
force driving modernisation. The theoretical and ideological motives that drive 
modernisation have been neglected from the 1990s onward, since socialism loses 
its momentum without an articulation of its agendas, as for example, the clar-
ity of Marxist literature. The programmatic nature of modernity loses its weight. 
Therefore, when it fights with the other side of the modernity, it loses its sense 
of existence. The manifestation of modernity in architecture has moved towards 
the pursuit of progress for its own sake. Socialism can still play a vital role in the 
new China, but the lack of articulation of socialist goals has extended to all facets 
of the Chinese culture. The new wave of modernist Architecture appears to be 
motivated by purely selfish agendas.
First of all, there is a specific concern in this study that contemporary discus-
sions of Chinese modernity do not become entangled in earlier assumptions based 
on the neo-liberal understanding of modernity, which has come to dominate stud-
ies of modernity in China.19 Second, there is no intention to demonstrate that Chi-
nese new architecture is superior to other architectural forms in the world, or that 
it is fully differentiated from Western architecture. However, I confess that I am 
tired of seeing theoretical critiques based on Eurocentrism in architecture, and 
normally it leads to nothing in the end, as the viewpoint is without a solid basis. 
Since the 1980s the idea has emerged – well presented by Eisenstaedt20 – that 
modernity can take on different forms responding to social change and individual 
modernisation, so my disapproval of the Eurocentric approach is not novel. When 
it extends to the materialised realm of architecture, I do not see a degeneration 
in architecture originating from the Eurocentric ideal, but the narrowness of this 
definition creates problems when discussing “marginalised” Chinese architectural 
projects that have long married a regional hybrid modernity with broader Euro-
centric notions of modernity.
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It must be remembered that Chinese new wave innovative architecture is 
responding to a broader concept of modernity that reflects reconfigurations in 
global economic and political relationships. The Euro-American legacy has 
shaped our idea of what is “modern” for a long time, but what is “modern” in 
the West is open to question, and it sometimes makes Chinese architects feel 
unsafe. Contemporary Chinese are concerned with the problems of globalisa-
tion and modernity (if not postmodernity), and not surprisingly, with the issue of 
alternatives.21 According to the perspective of Hui Wang, if we are attempting to 
understand Chinese intellectual and cultural life in the last decade of the twenti-
eth century, we must initially understand a key transformation: although social-
ism in China did not collapse in the same way as in the Soviet Union or Eastern 
Europe, this was no barrier to China’s swift participation in the process of global 
economy in production and trade.22 Globalisation provides the common ground in 
the articulation of cultural conflicts within architecture, and it opens the way for a 
reflection on conflicting trajectories and autonomous forms of modernity. Besides 
trans-state networks, and exchange-cross-fertilisation on some specific concep-
tions of modernity, Chinese modernity can rest on China’s complex ethnicities 
and the resulting social and political forms. However, placing the conceptualisa-
tion of Chinese modernity within globalisation is crucial in order to grasp the 
reconfiguration of social fragmentation within the big family and the autonomous 
forms of modernity in architecture.
•  Modernity and the individual
Another by-product of modernity has been the arrival of the concept of individu-
alism, which might be its most ambiguous achievement. It is unclear whether the 
emergence of “the individual” in religious and philosophical traditions indigenous 
to China has provided new intellectual and institutional resources. Although the 
discussion of the “self” occupies a specific place in popular media, the necessary 
debate about the implications of individualism in relation to modernity has not 
arisen. Wang Hui argued, “The abstract concept of human subjectivity and the 
concept of man’s freedom and liberation, which were useful in the critique of 
Mao’s socialist experiment, lack vigour in the face of the social crises encountered 
in the process of marketisation and modernization.”23 In analysing the architec-
ture of Maoist China, the incompatibility between the subjectivity of architects 
according to their life experiences, the architecture they designed and the general 
history of the structures with relation to production appears to be so blatant that 
any call for reconciliation under the Maoist socialism must sound utopian. Chi-
nese architects at that time were still limited to a small portrait beside the collec-
tion of their works and an interview. How could a Chinese architect have garnered 
a strong profile?
As Peter Gay wrote,
Many historians have heard the music of the past but have transcribed for 
penny whistle. To be sure, as I have said before, the most accomplished and 
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most sensitive historical craftsmen have appreciated, and tried to capture, the 
overwhelming diversity of human conduct, man’s encounters with power, 
technology, nature – and himself.24
Is it possible to tap into Chinese new architects themselves as a possible guide to 
the mysteries of architecture in the discourse? While there may be parallel beliefs 
held by others in the field of Chinese architecture, this study does not in any way 
attempt to prove that that is, or is not, so. On the other hand, it is possible to infer 
that contemporaries of each architect would have some analogical interpretation of 
the era. This study is based on the idea that Herbert Marcus raised: formerly autono-
mous and identifiable psychical processes are being absorbed by the function of the 
individual in the state – by public existence. The individual architect is not a social 
isolate in this study. Chinese architects themselves are recipients of this social tran-
sition. Their experience and perception of modernity, and their understanding of 
Chinese people’s perception of modernity, extend to the different realms of the 
architectural industry and manifest in diverse aspects of their works. We have yet 
to detangle the complexity. Encountering the Chinese context, Kipnis pointed out,
The individual psyche has never been and never will be a domain governed 
solely by socially isolated individuals. It is the site of conflicts between 
numerous contradictory discourses, emotions, and urges, a site where the 
social contradictions of Chinese modernity manifest themselves as a particu-
lar structures of feeling, and a target of the governing actions of a wider range 
of social actors.25
The integration of an individual architect’s life experiences and their changing 
psychology with their architecture does not imply that my focus in the research 
is psychological.
Misconceptions regarding the transition era
Facing China’s newly emerged metropolises and the influx of enormous capital, 
observers and critics are divided mainly into two groups. One group questions 
the veracity of reports, as the tales of corruption, nationalism, and totalitarian-
ism easily mislead people who do not accept the fact that, increasingly, Chinese 
people are living in affluence, in contrast with previous decades of poverty. The 
other group celebrates the novelty, and outsiders are astonished with the exotica 
introduced by twenty years of prosperity, including extraordinary clothing that 
suggests Chinese people might have become intoxicated with self-satisfaction. 
In fact, all these frantic pursuits amid the continuing presence of the old cul-
tural frameworks make it more difficult to analyse China, and mask the essen-
tial movements, obfuscating an understanding of its architecture. Therefore, only 
by challenging these established opinions and popular misconceptions regarding 
contemporary China in the transition era does it become possible to analyse con-
temporary architectural developments.
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There have been several publicised books26 about contemporary China with 
the theme of “changing” in their titles. The discussions in these books on change 
and other recent reports about contemporary China share some common themes – 
dramatic economic growth in an unsynchronised political system; capitalism, 
the process of modernising production and the abuse of human rights – with 
three corresponding observations: “Money is the only language”, “China does 
not remember Mao”, and “People just want to be the individuated self”. I would 
argue that these are three crucial fallacies in the current interpretation of the social 
transformation of China. It is necessary to disentangle them, although they are 
often connected, in order to provide a clear insight into socio-economic change, 
politico-ideological conflict, and China’s cultural transformation. A clear articula-
tion of the Chinese situation is possible only in a process of challenging and then 
reconstructing some of the premises and assumptions that govern our understand-
ing of contemporary China.
• Is Money the Only Language?
The policy of reform and opening initiated in China in the past thirty years has 
proven to be both peaceful and economically successful. Since the living stand-
ards of both white-collar workers and farmers have been greatly enhanced by 
the opening-up of the market, Chinese people have begun to realise the value of 
money, how to benefit from money, and how to make money from money. Fur-
thermore, China has been vigorously attracting foreign investment. Compared to 
the situation in the planned economy, the money flowing in China has brought 
actual prosperity. “In all of its behaviours, including economic, political, and cul-
tural – even in government behaviour – China has completely conformed to the 
dictates of capital and the activities of the market.”27 The transformation of China 
into the factory of the world and the ideological shift to the policy of “Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics” have put money into the hands of more Chinese than 
ever before.28 These two developments have also seeded consumer aspirations and 
spurred spending habits that now mirror those of the capitalist West. Therefore, the 
observation “money is the only language” is usually assumed to be correct.
Looking into the majority of relevant literature, Ma summarised that much 
of the literature regarding economic restructuring after socialism automatically 
assumes that the socialist economy in the former Soviet Union, East and Cen-
tral European counties and China are moving in a linear pattern away from cen-
tral planning, production and redistribution towards market capitalism. He also 
pointed out that underlying this essentialist thinking is the assumption that capital-
ism is irresistible and that market forces are the most effective means of shaping 
national and regional economies – leaving little room for the possibility of alter-
native courses of change.29 Probably “daily becoming more intimately related to 
capital”30 is at least visually real, or in other words, imaginably true. Therefore, it 
makes sense that people assume “money at least will be the language in China”.
China’s economic transformation away from state socialism should be viewed 
as a prolonged process of change with unpredictable consequences, instead of as 
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a short transitory phase leading to a Western capitalist system of production.31 
As Francis comments, the assumption of the dominant neo-liberal ideology is 
that post-communist market transitions will lead to and require a sharpening of 
the boundaries, both legal and practical, between the state and expanding private 
sectors. However, the post-communist economic transitions belie these assump-
tions.32 There is no doubt that by the end of the 1980s, China saw the financial 
model embodied in the American Superhighway to capital as its road to riches.33 
Therefore, China’s domestic reforms in the 1990s followed a path of deregulation 
blazed by the United States.34
There have been several books and articles35 that utilised the term “red capital-
ism” or “red capitalist” in describing China’s development. However, instead of 
the pure focus on the rising private economy, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Finan-
cial Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise pointed out the real clue. In this 
book, Water and Howie argued that China is a family-run business: when ruling 
groups change, there will be an inevitable change in the balance of interests; but 
these families have one shared interest above all others: the stability of the system. 
Social stability allows their pursuit of special interests.36 Moreover, living and 
working in China for twenty-five years gave the authors a clear idea of “inside 
the system”:
China’s economic geography is not simply based on geography. There is a 
parallel economy that is geographic as well as politically strategic. This is 
commonly referred as the economy “inside the system” (tizhinei体制内) and, 
from the Communist Party’s viewpoint, it is the real political economy. All of 
the state’s financial, material and human resources, including the policies that 
have opened the country to foreign investment, have been and continue to be 
directed at the “system”.37
No one can dispute that China’s economic structure is much different from the 
West’s. But even insiders cannot disagree with Water and Howie’s observation 
that modern China’s political economy is “inside the system”. The vocabulary 
“inside the system” has actually become common coin in contemporary China, 
even among artists, taxi drivers or freelancers who would be shocked to find them-
selves in any way indebted “inside the system”, or unable to untangle this debt. 
The command structure developed over the past eighty or more years of the party’s 
existence, and especially over the half-century or more of the People’s Republic, 
remains in place, although with modifications in the way in which they are used.38
The “Party” – that is, the winning interest group – can intervene for any con-
venient reason, changing CEOs, investing in new projects or ordering merg-
ers. Due to these characteristics, the adoption of laws, accounting standards, 
markets, and other mechanisms of international capitalism are just examples 
of the formalism that characterized China today. The names are the same as 
in the West, but what things are and how they work is hidden beneath the 
surface.39
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Outsiders may easily fail to understand this fragmented structure of the country’s 
political system, how special interest groups co-exist within this political entity 
or how the whole system has some effect on every aspect of people’s lives. Con-
temporary Chinese architects are part of this scenario. Contemporary architecture 
inevitably expresses the subtle balance between the free market and the system 
inside China.
• Has China forgotten Mao?
Can we believe that people still remember Mao when they are focused on the pur-
suit of money? Or should the question be posed thus: do people want to remem-
ber Mao when they are successful in making money? Among the most telling 
instances is Porter’s 2011 book, From Mao to Market, an ambitious and well-
considered study, which attempts to trace current trends back to the first three 
decades of the People’s Republic, decades that have appeared to be ignored in 
most research. He bases his study on a deep understanding that “the issues faced 
by China all have a long pedigree; they did not simply appear when China began 
to open up in 1979.”40
Many events – including the unequal treaty system of 1840s, the foreign exploi-
tation of Chinese resources and Chinese labour, the invasion by Japan in the 1930s 
and the policy of isolation assumed by much of the world after the founding of the 
People’s Republic – all these factors have made their own historical stamp on the 
contemporary map. But to both an outsider and an insider, everything in China 
looks exhilaratingly new.
So how did it all happen? It is hard for anybody to consider or even remember 
that these brilliant achievements have any connection with the period of Mao. 
Porter’s observation on Chinese people’s relationship with the Maoist era is sharp 
and perceptive, and he writes:
Life under the People’s Republic for the first thirty years brought its own hard 
lessons: that personal rivalries and struggles for power are just as likely under 
the Communist Party as among the transitional warlords or in the Imperial 
courts of the dynastic era; that despite offers of aid from apparently friendly 
states, taken up for a while, China ultimately stands alone and must never 
abandon its quest for self-sufficiency in all things essential to its way of life; 
that ideology and political commitment cannot ultimately solve China’s 
problems, and indeed can rapidly become a blight on the discussion of policy 
alternatives, and even worse, an excuse for acts of violence and great inhu-
manity. All Chinese carried this psychological “baggage” with them into the 
latest phase of modernization.41
Socialism came into China as a trenchant ideological answer to the challenges 
of modern China. “Born of the underbelly of capitalism, socialism proposed a 
comprehensive futuristic vision of a fairer social order and offer a vastly powerful 
ideology to those who sought to change the world.”42 The disillusionment with 
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Maoism and the loss of the socialist–communist ideal after the mid-1980s has not 
changed socialism as the officially defined socio-political and economic system 
of China. Acceptance does not mean that an unpleasant thought or feeling will 
go away; it may stay awhile. Likewise, disillusionment with the reality does not 
mean forgetting the ideal; it is still present. Socialism is affecting the cultural for-
mation of modernity in China, although it does not appear like seeking to change 
the world. Chinese commercialisation as a dilution of communist ideology raised 
up by Deng is healing. But healing does not mean forgetting. Yifu Lin,43 a former 
chief economist and senior vice president at the World Bank, argued that it was 
a gradual and long process for the Chinese to recognise the role of competition, 
to understand which organisations can put it to best use and, finally, to see the 
importance of global values and ideas.44 However this gradual and long process 
from Mao to market is full of blood and sacrifice, and architecture as well has 
been splashed with blood.
• Do people just want to be the individuated self?
It is true that Chinese people were collectively disciplined and controlled in the 
Mao era. Chinese citizens gradually realised that they do not have to remain resi-
dents under the collective unit. However, with the emergence of security, prosper-
ity and stability, does individualism really matter to Chinese people? Does their 
consciousness about individual identity differ from the Western idea of individu-
ation? Before China’s transition to a market economy, the idealised public realm 
ultimately displaced private sectors. In pre-reform socialist China, the Commu-
nist party-state in its early years attempted to hijack the “social” identity and 
transform Chinese society into a massive bureaucratic structure under the rule of 
the Chinese Communist Party, where society was organised as a massive “super 
human family” under the gigantic nationwide administration of “collective house-
keeping”, and where “private interests assume public significance”.45
Prior to economic reform and the opening-up of mainland China in the 
1980s, the rights of privacy of Chinese citizens were seldom invoked, and rarely 
debated.46 In the People’s Commune, which was born in 1958, everything was 
shared. Private kitchens in the commune became redundant. Everything originally 
owned by the households – private animals, stored grains and household items – 
were contributed to the commune. The collectivism stressing collectivised work 
activities began to pervade China, and promoted no distinction between private 
and public ownership. In the liberal-economic model dominant in public-policy 
analysis, public-private distinction is primarily marked in terms of the distinc-
tion between public state administration and the private market approach. Yet the 
state-dominated public sphere in the pre-reform socialist regime, denigrates any 
attempt to identify a distinction between the collective and the individual; to some 
extent it regarded maintaining a private life, and a private identity, as merely self-
ish activities. Therefore, it is logical to think that the return of the concept of a 
private life should suggest to Chinese people a greater autonomy and eagerness 
for individuality.
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The promotion of the market can be considered as much an economic reform as 
a social reform, considering that the removal of the iron rice bowl, the privatisation 
of housing and the retrenchment of subsidies, fundamentally changes the socialist 
contract.47 The individualistic capitalist notion “to get rich is glorious” has replaced 
the socialist idea of personal sacrifice for the good of the collective, and inequal-
ity becomes a consequence of the transition from a socialist to a more market-
driven economy. However, it should be noted that the context that Western theorists 
always refer to with regard to emerging individualism is different from the con-
text of contemporary China. Western commentators always simply blame political 
freedom, but China’s problem is much more complex because of recent Chinese 
history, and also because of the specific psychological circumstance: people are 
insecure about themselves as individuals and their new positions in the collective.
Western theorists who build their theories through an examination of Euro-
pean and North American societies since the 1970s pronounce the importance 
of framing contemporary individuation in a “high” or “liquid” modernity that 
comes after first-order modernity. In doing so, they imply a particular histori-
cal metanarrative that is in many aspects inappropriate for China. They sug-
gest that first comes industrialization, urbanization, and nation-building; only 
afterwards comes globalization, the Internet, time-space compression, post-
industrial societies, heightened reflexivity, the dismantling of the welfare 
state, neoliberalism, and so on. In contemporary China, to a greater extent 
than in Europe or North America, these social processes can be seen as devel-
oping simultaneously rather than sequentially, and it is not hard to argue that 
it is the social changes named by the classic social theorists that have been 
most consequential.48
Previous research found that people of all ages are still less individualistic than 
their counterparts in Western countries.49 And they always assume that the leaders 
in China have a vision of modernity that place leaders at the centre and ignore 
ordinary people. However, such claims are unsubstantiated and too broad to be 
credible, since the relationship between the state and ordinary people is still an 
unresolved question.
It should be noted that the vision of modernity is not merely viewed by the peo-
ple as a command from the leaders, is a movement that ordinary Chinese people 
want to engage in as well, and while they are unhappy with the command struc-
ture, at the same time they sacrificed themselves to achieve this goal in the 1990s. 
For example, the research undertaken by Anne-Marie Broudehoux on the destruc-
tion of Yuanmingyuan50 tells the story that with the launch of the reconstruction 
of Yuanmingyuan, originally called the Imperial Gardens, the local residents were 
permitted to continue living in their houses only until replacement accommoda-
tion was provided outside Yuanmingyuan. However, Broudehoux found,
Anger is increasingly heard among Yuanmingyuan residents uncertain of 
their fate. Ironically, perhaps the greatest demonstration of patriotism at 
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Yuanmingyuan today is found in these residents’ willingness to serve the 
common good and to let their present lives be sacrificed at the expense of an 
idealized and fabricated past.51
What some scholars fail to understand is that in contemporary China major 
changes are all occurring simultaneously: industrialisation, urbanisation, nation-
building, globalisation, the dismantling of the welfare state and neo-liberalism. 
Therefore, it is dangerous to draw a profile of the relationship between the state 
and individual person based on the experiences of European and North American 
societies, neglecting the specific dynamics and tensions peculiar to the emergence 
of modern China.
The underlying dynamics of the individual vs the collective, as a psychological 
problem stimulated by reform, need to be further explored. Chinese modernity 
and the individual psyche is a key theme for this study, and to clarify this third 
fallacy is to identify stereotypical thinking on the subject of individualism, which 
has a long and rich history in Western social theory. In this book, I will examine 
the effects of individualism on architects, and indicate that their pursuit of an 
individual identity is both a personal psychological issue and a general social fac-
tor. Clarifying the fallacy in this respect will be the foundation for understanding 
the psychology of individual architects and the role it plays in their architectural 
designs.
• Clearing the path for the architectural research
Eliminating the three crucial fallacies in general assumptions around Chinese 
societal transformation paves the way for a better understanding of contemporary 
Chinese architects and architecture in the transitional era. The fact that Chinese 
contemporary architecture looks disconnected from the past does not mean that 
China’s architecture only reflects capitalist features, or follows the model of the 
West. If outsiders believe “Money is the only language” in China, and the primary 
goal of modern reform is to access the market, then they fail to understand that 
the goal of every reform effort undertaken by the party since 1978 is to achieve a 
balance between the free market and “inside the system”.
It is easy for people to misinterpret the fake Western architectural façades all 
over China without fully understanding which part is the guise and which part is 
significant.
The character of China’s style of capitalism is marked deeply by how the 
political elite has coalesced around certain institutions, corporations and eco-
nomic sectors, how the government and various interest groups have used 
Western financial knowledge, and the crises the state has met along the way.52
For example, the heroic architectural capacity of absorbing the foreign form is 
virtually the only source of jobs, technology and foreign exchanges, and they are 
promoted as long as they are critical architectural components of constructing 
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“ ‘entrepreneurial cities’ that make land available for developmental projects, 
benefiting developer and officials, and enriching city coffers at the same time.”53 
This kind of architecture camouflages the true nature of some of the large-scale 
design institutes: these large-scale design institutes are not autonomous corpora-
tions. One example is China’s Architecture & Design Group located in Beijing, 
which has raised millions of dollars in capital with help from the state, growing to 
an economic scale never seen before in China. I will analyse this in detail in the 
works of one specific Chinese architect in the case studies. In addressing the fal-
lacy, “money is the only language”, it should be noted that the Chinese character-
istics in architecture have assumed the guise of Western appearance and the mode 
of architectural corporations, listed companies on the stock exchange and made 
use of related professions such as architects, civil engineers and cost engineers.
Addressing the fallacy of Mao’s role in contemporary China, we need to be 
aware of the latent role he still plays in the Chinese persona. The manifestation in 
architecture will be illustrated in the case studies. Most contemporary architects 
in China were born in Mao’s era. Because of this influence, memories of socialist 
ideals and rhetoric continue to inform the manner in which people think architec-
ture should be designed and constructed. The height of ambition under Mao is still 
visible in current architectural constructions.
Simultaneously, architects attempt to resolve this influence by expanding its 
conception to include the hidden or inner nature of selfhood in the concept of 
individualisation. The reforms implemented since 1978 have done more than just 
change the Chinese economy; they have also altered the architect’s life and self-
image. Architects want to be recognised as individuals, and they are not collec-
tively disciplined and controlled. But they are still seeking something through their 
architectural designs, which we will discuss in a later chapter. These are the archi-
tectural stories embedded in the new profiles of architects in contemporary China.
Looking at the dramatic economic growth, just how far could the social- 
political system be reformed in China? Looking at capitalism and continuing inno-
vations, how much longer can a socialist version of modernity persist in China? 
Confronting claims about lack of human rights, is it possible for individualism 
to flourish in China? Please keep these three questions in mind while reading the 
case studies, and we will find the answers in the detailed accounts of the architec-
ture and architects. Most significantly: how have the answers to these questions 
shaped contemporary Chinese architecture?
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In the Chinese to English translation, “modern times” (jindai) in Chinese does 
not have an equivalent in the Western context. According to the Chinese aca-
demic convention, “modern times” (jindai) often refers to the period from the 
first Opium War (1839–1842) to 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was 
founded. Subsequently, the period after 1949 until the present is usually regarded 
as the contemporary history of China (dangdai). In architectural discourse, Zhu 
argued that “contemporary China” may be best defined as post-Maoist starting 
from 1976, a turning point in the gradual transformation of China from a Marxist-
Leninist-Stalinist vanguard to a secular market economy.1 In this study, I define 
1839–1949 as modern times, concurrent with the mainstream division; 1949–1976 
is the period defined as pre-reform China or Maoist China; and the post-Mao era is 
from 1976 onwards, defined as the contemporary period for Chinese architecture 
in agreement with Zhu’s definition. This book is focused on architecture from the 
1990s onwards, since most architects active in the contemporary scene began to 
have intensive practices from 1990 in the post-Mao era.
In this chapter, the aim of the historical review is not to present a full and 
detailed picture of modern architecture in China. Nor is it focused on one con-
sistent theme. Although my focus is the new waves of architecture in post-Mao 
China, I wish to clarify the unclear perception of the relationship with the past, by 
which it advances into contemporary forms. The main objective of the historical 
review is to trace forgotten elements in the compiled history. More significantly, 
the following three case studies will open with emphasis on historical events and 
cultural trends in different periods, aiming to elucidate the extent of the influence 
of specific historical factors in the architect’s designs. Through a chronological 
historical analysis of events, it is possible to locate the context of the case stud-
ies and the associated ideology, clarifying the view of the architecture before and 
after the events. I will attempt to take a broader view of each historical period by 
seeking to understand the similarities and differences between Chinese architec-
ture and architectural movements in Europe, Japan and elsewhere.
Based on existing research, the historical review takes a close look at society and 
architecture in three periods (1840–1949, 1949–1976, and 1976 onwards), with a 
different focus, and a special storyteller section of the new waves of architecture 
since the 1990s. This chapter first explores the trajectory of modern architecture 
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in China and the influence of Chinese architects educated overseas from 1840 to 
1949. The relationship between architecture and politics between 1949 and 1978 
is examined in order to discover the effects of Maoism on architects and archi-
tecture. Here, Mao refers to the person who took power at gunpoint in 1949 and 
also extends to the communist or socialist regime and its philosophy. After 1978, 
the emphasis shifts from a unified political influence to the more fluid relationship 
in the post-Mao era, in which the multiple influences of politics, economics and 
cultural aspects of the market have been the driving forces. A number of architects 
positively responded to Chinese contemporary conditions after the 1990s. Since 
2000, Chinese cities have been intensively driven by the market, and therefore, 
the intention here is to test to what extent the market has influenced architec-
ture, and to what extent it could challenge the spiritual independence of emerging 
architects. However, the state still retains its crucial influence, and Zhu has made 
some general observations regarding the architecture of modern China as hav-
ing four aspects: continuity, evolution, foreign influence and the presence of the 
state.2 Although “the presence of the state” has different expressions in different 
historical periods, it always persists. Since the theme of this study revolves around 
the transition from Mao to market, discussion of post-Mao Chinese architecture 
is not limited to the condensed historical narrative in the later part of this chapter.
1840–1949 unforgotten history
The nineteenth century was a period of rapid decline in China. It saw the rul-
ing Manchu Qing dynasty weaken and the bureaucracy grow more corrupt. 
China’s modern times began with the first Opium War (1839–1842). The first of 
the unequal treaties3 was the Treaty of Nanjing, signed on August 29, 1842. The 
Opium War and these treaties were beginning of an era in which Western powers 
attempted to gain unfettered access to Chinese products and markets for European 
and US trade. China’s defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 gave 
further impetus to the need for reform and modernisation. In 1898, Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao instigated the Hundred Days’ Reform. However, after 102 days 
the reform failed. It was a short-lived attempt to propel China into modernity.
In October of 1911, a group of revolutionaries in Southern China led by Sun 
Yat-sen conducted a successful revolt against the Qing Dynasty, establishing in its 
place the Republic of China and ending the imperial system. Sun Yat-sen, often 
called “the father of the nation”, succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy in 
China and developing the ideology of a Nationalist Party.4 But state power soon 
fell into the hands of the counter-revolutionary Yuan Shikai, largely because the 
Nationalist Party failed to effectively mobilise the peasantry, the strongest mass 
force in China, and involve it in the struggle.5 The failure of Sun Yat-sen’s revo-
lution led to a period of intense instability, perhaps the most pronounced feature 
of which was the rise of warlords. Partly as a result of the ideological vacuum 
arising after the collapse of the imperial system, China experienced a new cul-
tural movement. The patriotic May 4 Movement of 1919 marked the outbreak 
of a new revolutionary storm and the advance of the Chinese development to a 
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new stage.6 The trigger for the demonstration was the Paris Peace Conference, 
which was negotiating the terms of a treaty to put a final end to the horrors of the 
First World War. The Conference had decided on 30 April 1919 to accept Japan’s 
demands that all previously held German interests in Shandong Province should 
be handed over to Japan.7 This May 4 Movement is also called the New Culture 
Movement; the leaders of the movement believed that traditional Confucian val-
ues were responsible for the political weakness of the nation. This saw the rise of 
a generation of young people keen to overthrow the old traditions, who were also 
nationalistic and hostile to imperialism.
The beginning of modern Chinese architecture can be traced to developments 
in the late nineteenth century.8 In the early 1900s, the practice of studying archi-
tecture abroad became common. When architects returned from overseas studies, 
they brought back to China progressive architectural ideas.9 Although the study of 
traditional architecture still prevailed, the significance of learning modern archi-
tecture was recognised. Chinese students, after studying architecture in Japan, the 
United States and Europe, returned and established design practice from the early 
1920s.10 Zhang Jun (1888–1970) is a typical architect who graduated overseas in 
1914, and soon after returning, he opened his own firm in China and established 
the Society of Chinese Architects in 1926.11 Liang Sicheng studied architecture 
at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sci-
ences between 1924 and 1927. Most of these architects were the last generation 
following traditional Chinese values, but they were also among the first genera-
tion who embraced Western knowledge in architecture.
The Nanjing decade is the term applied to the period beginning when Nanjing 
became the capital of China and ending with the outbreak of the War of Resistance 
against Japan in 1927. During this time, China was reunified, at least in name: 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party brought in a centralised bureaucratic 
system and functionaries after more than fifteen years of political chaos. At the 
same time, Chiang Kai-shek’s National Government faced stiff opposition from 
several domestic and foreign quarters. According to Lloyd Eastman, “The regime 
that took shape in Chiang Kai-shek’s hands after 1927 was neither totalitarian nor 
democratic, but lay uncertainly between those points on the political spectrum.”12
Born in the shadow of the May 4 Movement, the Chinese Communist Party 
played an important role in the nationalist movement of the 1920s. On July 1, 
1921, with the assistance of the Communist International, the First National Con-
gress of the Communist Party of China was held in Shanghai. It was established 
on the pattern of the Russian Bolshevik Party, a new type of revolutionary party. 
Such a party sees itself at the vanguard of the class-conscious task of liberat-
ing the working class, which it undertakes armed with the science of Marxism- 
Leninism.13 After its suppression in 1927, the Chinese Communist Party went under-
ground, founding its own Chinese Socialist Republic in Jiangxi Province in 1931.
China’s condition in the 1920s was instrumental in forging the nation’s subse-
quent architectural mindset. Young architects’ interests lay in serving the needs 
of their country as it faced rapid development and modernisation, but it was 
increasingly apparent that China’s needs were inextricably linked to resolving the 
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question of foreign interference.14 Zhu Qiqian, as a scholar and collector, passed 
the city of Nanjing and discovered a manuscript of the Yingzao fashi (Treatise on 
Architectural Methods or State Building Standards) at the Jiangnan Library, the 
book of which is written by the Chinese author Li Jie, the directorate of Build-
ings and Construction during the mid-Song Dynasty (1097–1010).15 Almost at the 
same time, Adolf Loos delivered his influential lecture, Ornament and Crime, in 
Vienna in 1910, giving immortality to decorations by advocating clear surfaces in 
architecture. The ornament in the traditional Chinese architecture was regaining 
the morality associated with its reprinting, pushed forwards by Zhu, within “a 
much larger meaning: the development of a sense of the importance of a Chinese 
architecture to a Chinese nation-state.”16 The competition to design Sun Yat-sen’s 
mausoleum in 1925 was a prologue to the upsurge of this kind of Chinese renais-
sance in architecture. The competition document prescribed that traditional Chi-
nese design must be applied, but the conventional timber-brick structure should 
be abandoned.17 Promoted by the Nationalist Government, such Chinese renais-
sance architecture prevailed during the 1920s and 1930s, especially in the national 
capital Nanjing and the most important economic centre, Shanghai.18 In 1928, a 
professional architectural infrastructure began to take shape with the creation of a 
department of architecture at the Northeastern University in Mukden, headed by 
Liang Sicheng. Liang’s investigation into traditional Chinese architecture accom-
panied the rise of nationalism in China during the 1930s, when Japan launched its 
invasion into Manchuria.
By 1931, twenty-eight of the fifty-one architects in the Society of Chinese 
Architects were American-educated; that number rose to thirty-five of fifty-five 
members by 1935, and eight more were trained in foreign countries other than the 
United States.19 From the 1930s, Shanghai witnessed the emergence of modern 
architecture. Associated with the imagination of the Chinese tradition, the influ-
ence of international style was transmitted into China and applied to some projects, 
for example, Picardie Apartments, designed by Minutti & Co. Civil Engineers 
and Architects; and Ecole Remi, I.S.S. Gasgoigne Apartments and Le Dauphiné 
Apartments, by Leonard, Veysseyre and Kruze.20 The circles of Chinese architects 
began to introduce works and theories of modern architecture to China in the 
same decade. In 1933, the international exposition, “a century of progress”, was 
held in Chicago. Several Chinese architectural publications carefully reported the 
exposition.21 The most common characteristics of this international style that was 
gaining acceptance included rectilinear forms and surfaces completely stripped of 
applied ornamentation and decoration.
In addition, in the 1920s, Art Deco was introduced into the United States, and 
shortly emerged in China as well. It soon became one of the most fashionable 
styles, especially in Shanghai.22 It is argued that the golden age of 1930s Shanghai 
was characterised by imagined modernity and its manifestation in architecture, 
like the chaotic present. In 1944, the writer Eileen Chang first used the term, 
“Chuanqi”, which literally means legend, to represent the experience in the leg-
endary urban life of Shanghai. Shanghai, known then as “The Paris of the East”, 
its architectural style a collage of British and American Art Deco, conveyed a new 
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urban vision. “There is no city in the world today with such a variety of archi-
tectural offerings, buildings which stand out in welcome contrast to their modern 
counterparts,” wrote an experienced Shanghai visitor in the golden era.23 In the 
writing of Tess Johnston, “Shanghai has the largest array of Art Deco edifices of 
any city in the world.”24
With regards to modern architecture in this historical period, Ji summarised 
that,
The exploration of modern architecture by Chinese architects was in par-
allel with their pursuit of Chinese renaissance, and their views on modern 
architecture were lopsided. Only a few of them comprehensively recognized 
modern architecture, while most regarded it as a new optional architectural 
style for their design. Most Chinese architects synchronously designed 
international style buildings, western classical style buildings and Chinese 
renaissance style ones, and many of them only cared for the exterior forms 
of modern style.25
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) was the result of a decades-long Jap-
anese imperialist policy aimed at dominating China politically and militarily and 
to secure its vast raw material reserves and other economic resources, particularly 
food and labour. At the end of 1936, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to give top prior-
ity to fighting the Japanese. Lasting until 1945, the war became enmeshed with the 
Second World War. Therefore, due to unstable social condition in China, modern 
architecture in that specific context was more connected to “being modern”, in 
contrast with the overarching modernist movements in architecture at the turn of 
the twentieth century in the West, which were a strong response to rapid techno-
logical advancement and the modernisation of society. The various and entangled 
architectural styles providing different options for modern China were not be able 
to reflect their relations to the social and political revolution. “Being modern” 
revealed their intention to be “something new and different, something exciting 
and unorthodox, something Chinese and something characterised by a sense of 
independence”. As a result, they displayed some peculiar aesthetic exuberance 
that was associated with Chinese modernity at that specific historical moment.
At the end of the war against Japan in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek was greatly 
weakened, while the Chinese Communist Party was much stronger than at the 
beginning of the war. Hardly had victory against Japan restored peace in 1945 
than China faced yet another war, the Civil War between Chiang Kai-shek and 
the Chinese Communist Party. Lasting from 1946 till 1949, this resulted in a vic-
tory for the Chinese Communist Party, which established the People’s Republic 
of China on October 1, 1949. In general, after the fall of the imperial government 
and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, the time from the 1910s 
until the 1940s gradually led to the emergence of new architecture styles associ-
ated with cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Some principles of modern archi-
tecture and modern city planning imported from the Western world, although not 
genuinely digested, were gradually accepted. The main trend still departed from 
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traditional Chinese architecture. By the 1940s, the architectural profession was 
well established by the first generation architects’ efforts. Some of the prominent 
figures, such as Yang Tingbao, Liang Sicheng, Tong Jun and Chen Zhi, were all 
trained at the University of Pennsylvania, and they were deeply influenced by the 
Beaux-Arts traditions prevalent in America in the 1920s. They returned to China 
and brought back this tradition, which had a long-term impact in Chinese archi-
tectural practice and education.
1949–1976: Mao’s influence on architecture
After the Second World War and the Civil War, the People’s Republic of China 
was established in Beijing in 1949 under Mao and the Chinese Communist Party. 
The founding of the People’s Republic of China marked the beginning of its 
socialist stage. The task in this stage was to build a socialist society in China. 
The People’s Republic of China was founded upon the historical condition of a 
very low stage of economic development and an extremely backward economic 
structure. In response to this international economic pattern and its own situation, 
the first priority for the new Chinese Communist government was to bring about a 
quick improvement in the backward economic structure and upgrade the level of 
industrialisation. As Yifu Lin wrote,
The prioritizing of the development of heavy industry was commensu-
rate with the international political and economic environment that China 
was facing at that time, as the Western countries, led by the United States, 
imposed political isolationist measures and an economic embargo on China. 
As a result, China was faced with the denial of sound international economic 
relations and the threat of war at any time.26
This made the Chinese leadership realise that the rapid development of an indus-
trial system, especially a heavy industry system that included defence industries, 
was a matter of life and death for the new state and the new sovereignty. Moreover, 
the Soviet Union’s successful implementation of rapid industrialisation by using 
state plans also exerted considerable influence over the choices of development 
strategy of the Chinese leadership.27 If a market mechanism had been adopted to 
allocate resources, it would have been impossible to channel investment towards 
heavy industries; instead, it would have induced industrialisation dominated by 
light industries. Therefore, the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) directly 
under the administration of the central government increased considerably, from 
over 2,800 in 1953 to over 9,300 in 1957.28
Architecture constructed after the establishment of People’s Republic of China 
until 1978 was responding mainly to changing political agendas. The main objec-
tive of this section is to elucidate how politics governed Chinese architecture over 
this period, assessing the sensitiveness between architecture and Maoism since 
1949 rather than tracing the stylist development in step with the political events. 
Specific architectural characteristics will be further discussed in the case study 
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of Liu Jiakun. It should be noted that the sensitiveness in the initial stage is not 
purely passive. During the early 1950s, the communist victory was widely and 
eagerly welcomed. There was a strong and universal antipathy to the former cor-
rupt nationalist regime. Although Chinese professional practitioners were inactive 
in politics and unfamiliar with the communist or socialist ideology, they wel-
comed the reunification of China and the restored peace and order brought by the 
new rulers.29 Within one year of the founding of the People’s Republic, most for-
eign enterprises were immediately confiscated or nationalised. The party gradu-
ally reduced the opportunity for private architectural practices in the professional 
market.30 Most Chinese architectural practitioners ceased their individual firms 
because they believed that joining a state-initiated design institute would pro-
vide a stable income, secure their careers and offer more chances in architectural 
design. At the same time, they had great expectations of the new social order and 
wished to work under the communist regime, serving the nation and its people.
The first round of political influence in architecture was associated with the 
arrival of the Soviet experts. On February 17, 1950, Mao said in his farewell 
speech at the Moscow railway station, “It will be clear to everybody that the 
solidarity between the Soviet and the Chinese people, consolidated by a treaty, 
will be everlasting, indestructible and inalienable.”31 In Beijing, as early as Sep-
tember 1949, the first team of Russian town planners and construction experts 
were invited to assist in planning the goals of urban development, proposing an 
optimum size and a general layout for the city.32 Social realism, prevalent in the 
art and architecture of the Soviet Union, was seen in China as an appropriate way 
of celebrating the Socialist Revolution and a newfound sense of nationalism. It is 
customarily stated that social realism was adopted as the official style of Soviet 
art and literature at the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. Social realism 
governed the production and criticism of Soviet art and literature until the mid-
1980s.33 It is usually characterised as the aesthetic principle of Stalinism, and its 
specific formulation, like its first works, did indeed emerge as weapons of Soviet 
cultural policy at the height of his rule. Cooke pointed out that the basic conflict 
between social realism and avant-garde modernism lies in the contribution to the 
national culture: the modernists’ work was international, seeking global aesthetic 
principles and languages that made no appeal to the particularities of a given 
national culture.34 This explains why the Soviet architects also emphasised that 
building design plan should include national traditions, integrating them with new 
technologies and standards. This model became a central part of communist city 
construction with an elaborate propaganda apparatus in China. “Socialist Content 
and National Form” was a slogan sponsored by the Soviet experts. Liang Sicheng, 
a Chinese architect, was one of the key figures in this movement. In Liang’s sum-
mary of traditional vocabulary, most of the characteristics related to the tradi-
tional Chinese roof. Therefore, between 1952 and 1954, traditional Chinese roofs 
became the rule in decorating most civil buildings.
The second round of political waves was initiated with the Three-anti- 
Campaign (1951) and Five-anti-Campaign (1952). Though originally not aimed 
at the architecture, they eventually developed into a wider movement embracing 
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architecture. These campaigns aimed to consolidate Mao’s power base by tar-
geting political opponents and capitalists, especially wealthy capitalists. These 
movements were originally instigated by Mao in an effort to rid Chinese cities of 
corruption and enemies of the state. Construction easily became a pivotal target 
for accusations of fraud and theft of state property. During the First Session of 
the First National People’s Congress in September 1954, the Premier Zhou Enlai 
indicated in his Report on the Work of the Government that there was too much 
unnecessary resource waste in the construction industry. He stressed that “this 
waste of resources phenomenon is not in single isolated cases in our construction 
industry; due to the lack of defined building criteria, many cities, schools, institu-
tions, and enterprises have built many unnecessary and overly lavish projects, 
exhausting the limited resources of our country.”35 Facing this problem, from 
December 27, 1954 to January 8, 1955, the Ministry of Construction conducted 
the First National Conference of the Directors of the Provincial Departments of 
Construction.36 In order to address the party leaders’ concern of scarce resources, 
this meeting formulated a new guideline slogan – “function, economy, and aes-
thetic appearance when circumstances allow”.37 Liang’s national expression of 
“big roofs” were targeted as an “unnecessary resource waste in the construction 
industry”, hence they soon ceased to be built.38 The Central Propaganda Depart-
ment of the Chinese Communist Party also organised a group of articles target-
ing Liang in a nationwide criticism; luckily, the deputy director of the Central 
Propaganda Department, Yang Zhou, rejected those articles by claiming a lack of 
evidence.39 From then on, architectural emphasis was placed on a modern con-
struction industry and on the development of new construction types. This led to 
the standardisation of building with a focus on mass production and systematic 
construction.
The next ideological whirlwind to strike architects was the Hundred Flow-
ers Campaign (1956–1957) and the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957–1959), the 
impact of which was mainly in the suppression of their professional thoughts. 
During the Hundred Flowers Campaign, intellectuals and others were encour-
aged to offer diverse views and criticisms on matters of national policy under 
the slogan “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought 
contend.” It did not last long as it was suppressed after critical thought began 
to target Mao and communist rule. The Anti-Rightist Movement emerged in 
response to the Hundred Flowers Campaign; people who had been critical of 
his regime and ideology were labelled “rightists” and persecuted. Architects 
who were educated in the modernist conventions were in fact suspicious of the 
architectural interpretation of Soviet realism. The Hundred Flowers Campaign 
encouraged them to speak out. Therefore, some architects, for example, Zhu 
Yanong and Li Xijun, argued that the Soviet experience was not a good exam-
ple to emulate and began to advocate that Chinese architecture could also 
learn from the capitalist countries.40 Chen Zhanxiang even boldly attacked 
the design of the institute system.41 Unfortunately, the party struck back using 
the Anti-Rightist Movement. For example, Chen Zhanxiang was one of the 
prominent architects who was labelled “rightist” and lost their position. The 
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individual architects’ voices were ruthlessly suppressed and replaced by a 
rigid uniformity that paved the way for the radical social programme of the 
Great Leap Forward.
The Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) pushed architecture’s loyalty to politics 
to the extreme. It was a campaign initiated by Mao Zedong, whose aim was to 
rapidly transform China into a modern communist society through the process of 
agriculturalisation, industrialisation and collectivisation of land. The Great Leap 
Forward commenced in 1958. Mao concluded that the Chinese people were capa-
ble of anything and the two primary tasks that he felt they should target was 
industry and agriculture. In March 1958, at a Working Conference of the Central 
Committee in Chengdu, the principles for the general line of socialist construction 
were first put forward using the formulation, “Go all out, aim high and achieve 
greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism”.42 The 
most important driving force in Mao’s thinking was his ambitious pursuit of a 
unique route to transform Chinese society from an economically backward state to 
a prosperous and ideal communist utopia in a relatively short period so as to equal 
and even outdo the achievements of its Soviet neighbour.43 In February 1958, the 
Journal of Building published an editorial calling for a “great leap forward” in 
architecture. The bold architecture experiment with Chinese characteristics in this 
period was the establishment of a series of Peoples’ Communes. “Concurrent with 
sweeping institutional changes, the state mobilized planners, architects and stu-
dents in spatial disciplines to make planning proposals for the newly established 
communes.”44 The Ministry of Construction’s meeting in April 1958 also created 
a new slogan for architectural and construction practice – “fast design and fast 
construction”. The other manifestation was the Ten Great Buildings in Beijing 
that were part of an architecture and urbanism initiative of the Great Leap For-
ward; most of the buildings were largely completed in a time span of ten months. 
In August 1958, the Chinese Communist Party decided to construct ten large-
scale building projects in Beijing as monuments displaying the first ten years of 
great socialist achievement of the People’s Republic and celebrating the tenth 
anniversary of the People’s Republic. The Ten Great Buildings include the Great 
Hall of People, the National Museum of China, the Beijing Railway Station, the 
Cultural Palace of Nationalities, the Worker’s Stadium, the National Agricultural 
Exhibition Hall, the Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Museum, the Minzu 
Hotel, the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse and the Overseas Chinese Hotel. There 
was no unified style that was officially enforced: large and heavy roofs laden with 
ceramic tiles inspired by traditional Chinese architecture, rational and modernist 
architectural language and eclectic approaches were applied in different projects. 
There were complicated and mixed influences tied closely together, including 
modernism, historicism and social realism. The “socialist style” in China at that 
time was under debate. These monumental new buildings, constructed on a grand 
scale and providing modern facilities and services, helped establish and celebrate 
an image of Mao’s New China.
The final interplay between architecture and ideology sinks into absurd-
ity during the Cultural Revolution. National efforts had achieved a degree 
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of industrialisation and a measure of self-sufficiency. However, the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–1976) ruined everything. China’s Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution shook the politics of China and the world’s perception of 
China between 1966 and 1976. It dominated every aspect of Chinese life: 
families were separated, careers upended, education interrupted and striking 
political initiatives attempted amid a backdrop of chaos, new beginnings and 
the settling of old scores.45 In March 1965, the Ministry of Construction Engi-
neering officially published its “Suggestions on the integration of political 
work into design professional work” as a prelude for the next step in the revo-
lution. In 1966, the Architectural Journal – one of the most important profes-
sional journals – ceased publication. In its stead, Architectural Revolution 
began publication in 1967. During the Cultural Revolution, many architecture 
professionals who worked in public institutes and universities were sent off to 
various rural sites. Bing Wang writes,
The overall architectural profession was paralysed sadly by the endless 
witch-hunt for political dissidents. Toward the end of the Design Revolu-
tion, political purges turned most of the design institutes into little more than 
empty shells, and only a few politically special projects designated by the 
central government managed to stay in operation.46
The “revolutionary soul” was absorbed in the guiding principle of design work, 
mostly led by lay people rather than design professionals, as design professionals 
were not considered revolutionary enough and did not maintain deep solidarity 
with the masses. As a result, anything related to Mao was worshipped and utilised 
as elements in architecture. Zhu summarised that there was a short period when a 
political expressionism emerged in the early 1970s after the Cultural Revolution, 
in which large sculptural forms, such as stars and red flags, were applied to many 
public buildings.47
Therefore, it could be argued that architecture was an integral manifestation of 
Mao’s socialist aspiration between 1949 and 1976. In 1956, Architectural Journal 
declared, “We need modern architecture.” Others immediately objected, arguing 
that modernist architecture was not socialist but functional, a mode of building in 
which technology had supplanted art.48 The continuous and unpredictable politi-
cal campaigns forced architects to abandon their private work and join the “great 
tide of socialist construction”. Generally speaking, the arrival of communism fun-
damentally altered China’s architectural community, and from 1949, a new chap-
ter in China’s architectural history under Maoist ideology began to unfold. It can 
be seen from the unfolding of these historical events, that during each campaign, 
the great tide of socialist construction led architects to share the party’s different 
aspirations and work alongside them, regardless of whether or not their aspira-
tions were realist.
However, socialist construction did not manifest as traditional wooden struc-
tures. Socialist content was primarily focused on steel, concrete and glass and the 
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abstract forms promoted by the modernists during this period. The shortage of 
housing and industrialisation did not even give way to inspiration from the Beaux-
Arts. Instead, it boosted the experiments on minimum space standards and mass 
production techniques in order to be more functional, efficient and inexpensive, 
and then to be more socialist. But what does it mean “to be more socialist”? What 
is the legacy of the post-Mao Chinese architecture and architect? Duanfang Lu’s 
erudite and insightful study Remaking Chinese Urban Form: Modernity, Scarcity 
and Space, 1949–2005 revitalised the role of the work unit in the study of moder-
nity in China. Specifically, it demonstrates that work-unit-based urbanism was 
an alternative both to capitalist and Soviet urbanism. Drawing on Edward Said’s 
travelling theory, Lu explored the modern planning ideas that occurred at inter-
secting regional, national and transnational levels.49 Her work has already proved 
something unique in the realm of the built environment, as Chinese modernity 
unfolded within a specific national and social context, which did not necessarily 
match the creeds of socialism. The idea of socialism originated from the West, 
and it was applied to China so overzealously that Chinese socialism and its archi-
tecture lost its sensitivity and became politically correct. However, there was no 
clear definition or agreement on what constituted a capitalist design ideology and 
a socialist design ideology.
At that time, the release of the modern from the Eurocentric notions of moder-
nity had already extracted its price in the increasing incoherence of what it means 
to be modern. It is imperative to consider Chinese modernity both from an inside 
point of view and an outside point of view. For example, Japan started to reflect the 
project of modernity, identifying something characteristically Japanese that they 
could contribute to a “world” civilisation. In 1960s Japan, there were metabolist 
groups who wanted to address the problem that land was not only too expensive 
but also in critically short supply. Architecturally, they deliberately maintained 
an awareness of “tradition” with a sense of the local culture and history of Japan. 
The determination of the modern in China did not reach the negotiation of values 
in the global marketplace of modernity, but it was more or less like recourse to 
some abstract standard of value for the sake of ideology. In contrast to China’s 
negotiation on modernity before Mao, in which the discussion on the modern 
and the traditional composed a continuum of historical development, there were 
no place to retreat. Architecturally, sometimes it was given a “big roof”, and 
sometimes it was taken off. No doubt there were some important individuals 
who wanted to put Chinese architecture on the map through a re-investigation of 
the inherited ideas, paired with some modernist practices. But these proponents 
were too few in number, and their consideration was overzealously combined 
with ideology. There is no doubt that, although ideology dramatically influenced 
architecture between 1949 and 1976 and architecture mainly manifested as being 
busily sensitive in the flood of perpetual revolution and critique of capitalism, 
and the national form constantly entangled Chinese architecture under the spe-
cific ideology, the trend of modern architecture and modern construction could 
not be turned back.
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After 1976: influences of the market on architecture
All the interplays between Mao and architecture came to an end in the late 1970s. 
Following the death of Mao in 1976, his wife, Jiang Qing, and three of her sup-
porters, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan (“the Gang of Four”) 
were arrested and put on trial, charged with being responsible for the Cultural 
Revolution. In December 1978, at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central 
Committee, Deng outlined a new political programme that was to have far-reaching 
consequences for Chinese society. It was the meeting that consolidated Deng 
Xiaoping’s position as China’s leader and laid the groundwork for a generation of 
economic reform. His primary aim was to initiate a series of economic reforms to 
make China prosperous and to guarantee his reputation on the international stage. 
In 1978, Deng was the great survivor when China’s economy was on the brink of 
collapse.
Modern China, in terms of architecture and urban planning, in 1978 was not 
charming: most of the buildings, towns and cities were desperately ugly and shod-
dily built. Zou used the short heading “Back to Humanism, from the Shortage of 
Residential Architecture” in his book to describe the situation after 1978.50 On 
October 1978, the State Council approved the National Committee’s “Report on 
the acceleration of urban residential buildings’ construction”, requesting quick 
solutions for the severe problems in workers’ housing shortage.51 The tragic vio-
lence at Tiananmen Square in 1989 had a negative effect on the construction 
investment. Soon after this, Deng’s southern tour gave Chinese people a boost 
of motivation again. In the spring of 1992, Deng made a historical tour of south 
China. To Deng, socialism was first and foremost about “liberating and develop-
ing the forces of production”.52 In his political vision, the kind of socialist system 
under the leadership of the Communist Party would be flexible enough to allow 
market forces, private enterprises, foreign capital and almost all kinds of institu-
tions of a modern capitalist market economy.53 Deng foresaw in 1992 that it would 
take another thirty or so years for a comprehensive new system of governance to 
take shape and mature.54
The “great tide of socialist construction” gradually pulled on a capitalist jacket. 
The party gradually increased space for private architectural enterprises’ practices 
in the professional market. In the paper entitled “Development and Evolution of 
Contemporary Chinese Private Architectural Offices”, Huang divided the transi-
tion after 1978 into three periods, “1978–1992 economic enlightenment period; 
1993–1998 development period; 1990–2009 mature and stable period”.55 In the 
initial stage of the reform, the state-owned design institute was still dominant. 
In June 1979, there were eighteen pilot units nationwide, nine of which were 
practicing units: Beijing Institute of Architectural Design, Tianjing Architectural 
Design and Research Institute, Shanghai Civil Construction Design Institute, 
Shanghai Industrial Building Design Institute, Jiangsu Provincial Architectural 
Design Institute, Fujian Provincial Civil Construction Design Institute, Guang-
zhou Design Institute, Guangxi Design Institute and Yunnan Provincial Design 
Institute.56 The charging system reform stopped the allocated funding from the 
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state to some extent, but it allowed the pilot units to take a self-supporting, self-
financing, self-restriction and self-development mode of operation.57
In 1984, the government formulated three specific regulations for opening a 
private architectural design firm: the first regulation required independent produc-
tion and management, thus creating an independent economic entity; the second 
regulation asked for a fixed group of architectural designers, whose qualifica-
tions and number had to comply with the stated requirements, in accordance with 
the design task; and the third regulation required a fixed place of business and 
the necessary conditions for production and operation.58 In November 1984, the 
Ministry of Construction for the first time approved the small-scale private archi-
tectural design firm run by architect Wang Tianci. The real movement of private 
firms into the market began with Yung Ho Chang and his firm, Atelier FCJZ in 
the 1990s. Yung Ho Chang received his master of architecture degree from the 
University of California, Berkeley, and taught in the United States for 15 years 
before returning to Beijing to establish his private architecture firm, Atelier FCJZ. 
His return encouraged a wave of architects to establish private architectural firms 
and subsequently changed the practicing environment of the architectural market. 
At the same time, architectural design was gradually computerised in the 1990s, 
enabling architects to design and change their designs quickly and conveniently. 
In 1994–1995, a registration system was re-established after four decades of 
absence, allowing architects to obtain licences and establish private practice.
Zhu argued that the 1980s witnessed a neo-national style, a new vernacular, a 
formalistic late modernism, and a commercial modernism, similar to the interna-
tional style.59 They were quite unstable expressions that were fashionable for a 
very limited time before the nationwide modernist revival. The reason for these 
unstable expressions partially came from literary, philosophically and politically 
diversity ambiguity and confusion that was so pronounced in the 1980s, which in 
fact damaged the legitimacy of the Communist Party. Except the legal imagina-
tion of the West after opening-up, 1989 was a significant factor for China’s turn 
into the largest building site in the world.
Unable to reconcile its Marxist ideology with the increasingly active role of 
the market and unwilling to whole heartedly embrace institutional and other 
political reforms, the party looked more and more to the economy as a means 
of shoring up its popular appeal.60
Therefore, the party was also keen to accelerate the transformation from a pre-
dominately socialist planned economy to a diverse and largely capitalist market 
economy and consumer society. Therefore, referring to modernism in the context 
of China 1990s onwards, Dubrau summarised that “Western architecture becomes 
Chinese modernism”.61 He further asserts,
They are working less on specific concepts than falling back upon standardized 
patterns from Western countries which are considered modern in China. . . . 
They are decorating themselves with completely oversized high-rises, 
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congress centers, concert halls and exhibition halls, in order to at least be 
able to communicate a touch of grandeur with a newly designed landmark.62
This suggests that specific concepts in “modern” architecture have been endowed 
with the power of cultural supremacy. Chinese architects are using certain mate-
rials in certain ways in combination with some Western forms in some desig-
nated ways. Variety and individuality are not the primary concern for the investor; 
the buildings are often constructed as steel-glass structures possessing an all-
embracing dynamic and a shed-roof. Most often, it has been only when Western 
modernists “validated” Chinese aesthetics by appropriating them that Chinese 
architecture has been seen as having the capacity to be modern.
It is not always necessary to follow the tenets of modernism in architecture; the 
classic Euro-style forms are another important reference for being modern. Xue has 
observed that “the new apartments are constructed according to taste in appropriate 
styles such as Imperial Eclectic Style, European Modern Style, or Beyond Vision 
Style.”63 Bosker looked deeply into these residential settlements that resemble 
theme parks in his book. She argued, “The simulacra movement was also a readily 
visible means by which the Chinese could demonstrate – to themselves and to other 
nations – that they had attained a certain level of sophistication, wealth, and moder-
nity.”64 Consequently, modern Chinese cities look like either modern Western cities 
or historical Western cities, as the party tried to show its prosperity compared to the 
other countries in this global condition, while also forgetting the trauma of 1989.
July 13, 2001, was a significant day for China, when the 112th plenum of the 
International Olympic Committee held in Moscow, voted for Beijing to host the 
2008 Olympic Games. It was the first time China, the world’s most populous 
country, would host the games. The year also held another milestone. Having quit 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) shortly after the Communist Revolution 
of 1949 and reapplying in 1986, China had to wait fifteen long years to gain re-
entry. The doors finally opened for China in December 2001. After that China’s 
economy evolved faster than anyone expected. With the globalisation of the world 
economy and China’s joining the WTO, the industrial structure and economic 
system of China are experiencing significant reforms. China under the WTO must 
continue to open its market to the outside world. The “Regulations on Manage-
ment of Design Enterprises of Foreign-Funded Construction Projects” has also 
been enforced since December 1, 2002. The market economy system requires 
that the design institutes must be turned into enterprises that are market guided, 
service-oriented and knowledge-technique intensive, in order to provide project 
construction with a full range of services.65
However, the collective large-scale design institutes have not stepped down from 
their preeminent positions. By the end of 2001, there were 4,327 architectural design 
institutes in China, including twenty-one large institutes staffed by 300–500 people, 
operating primarily at the provincial level (with eight especially large institutes 
employing more than 600 people). These large institutes are mainly established by 
municipalities under the state council, or by large districts.66 After the reform of the 
property rights system, diversified ownership forms emerged (stock-holding, joint 
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venture, and small partnerships), but state-owned and collective-owned forms pre-
vail. According to the annual report of survey design statistics 2001, state-owned, 
collective, solely state-funded or state-holding design institutes occupied 84.6 per-
cent of the total market, especially large institutes that are entirely state-owned.67
The decades of the 1980s and 1990s saw a dynamic transformation driven by 
market reform and modernisation, resulting in urbanisation on a grand scale and 
intensive building construction throughout the country, turning China into the 
largest building site in the world today.68 Lin summarised the achievements of 
China’s economic reform,
China’s reform took a gradual approach, aptly described by Deng Xiaop-
ing as “Crossing the river by groping the stones.” At the beginning of the 
reform, there was no blueprint or clear orientation. The initial goal was more 
planned-economy-based than market-based. But the gradual reform brought 
China closer and closer to the market economy – in some ways closer even 
than some market economy countries.69
In architecture, Li sums up the collective ambitions, desires and inventions of the 
last two decades as “Five Points for New Chinese Architecture”, and these could 
be the context for all relevant discussions in its urbanisation on a grand scale and 
intensive building construction throughout the country: “Novelty, Monumental-
ity, Bigness, Swiftness and Cheapness”.70 Regardless of the scale, new projects 
can be designed and constructed within a very short span of time in China. As a 
result, the majority of architecture in Chinese cities is losing its Chinese character. 
Many architects in China are increasingly losing their distinctive flavour. In the 
middle of this phenomenon of homogeneity, a rising generation of Chinese archi-
tects has begun to thrive on something different.
The new wave architecture
An important component of the current architectural scene, especially after the 
mid-1990s, is the emergence of a young generation of Chinese architects. They 
are the new wave of architects who resist the simulacra practice. They not only 
aim to sell their works to the public and entertain the public, but their work has an 
ethical and aesthetic value.
Several major events marked the emergence of this group; for example, the 
5/18 “Symposium of Young Architects and Artists” in Guangzhou in 1998, 
and the “Chinese House” exhibition of the work of five experimental archi-
tects in Shanghai in 2001. At the Twentieth UIA Congress in Beijing, art 
critic Wang Mingxian organized an exhibition of experimental architecture 
that provided a platform for a group of ambitious young designers.71
Some of these designers studied architecture in China, for example, Liu Jiakun, 
Cui Kai and Wang Shu; some studied architecture in both China and the West, for 
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example, architects in URBANUS, Qingyun Ma, Zhang Lei and Yung Ho Chang. 
Most of them began their independent architectural activities in China in the late 
1990s: some of them had experience in the large design institutes. An exception 
is Cui Kai, who still holds fast to the state-owned design institute. Whether work-
ing in private architectural firms or in the large-scale design institute, it has been 
legitimate for them to accept commissions from individual people, public enter-
prise and the government.
As discussed in this chapter, the majority of contemporary Chinese architecture 
has been driven by the image of modernity in the massive inconsiderate wave of 
construction. For Yung Ho Chang, Liu Jiakun or Cui Kai, the desire for a new, rec-
ognisable Chinese identity, and an identity for themselves as Chinese architects, 
is growing. Yet there is no denying that the influences of current Western architec-
ture are unmistakable in almost all the projects of the new generation.
Architects in China have always been burdened with cultural mission. This 
sense of mission is driven by a wide range of theoretical discourses and is often 
fueled by single-minded and extremist viewpoints, such as anti-Westernization, 
Westernization, doctrines of “contemporary architecture with Chinese charac-
teristics,” or those that stridently oppose the restoration of ancient form.72
However, Xue also argued that “such rigidly held positions can only lead to a dead 
end, as shown by some of the inferior and awkward buildings that have resulted 
from the adherence to such dogmatic ideologies.” Do the new innovative archi-
tects swamp themselves in these dogmatic ideologies?
Three case studies, to be expanded in the following three chapters, are critical 
analyses of the architects Liu Jiakun, Cui Kai and URBANUS, and their designs. 
There is no intention of citing these three cases to stand for the sum of Chinese 
architects, neither should their works stand for all strands of architectural thought 
in contemporary China. These cases are selected because they are three different 
manifestations of intricate details of the societal transformation from a command 
economy to a market economy, and they offer various practical approaches by 
Chinese architects. The aim of this book is to explore the various interactions 
between architecture and the socio-political situation in contemporary China, 
rather than broad generalisations, as previously stated. In contrast, there are some 
prominent Chinese architects demonstrating their belief in “architecture for archi-
tecture’s sake” no matter what societal transformation is taking place in China. In 
other words, their works show little connection with the socio-political situation, 
and they are not relevant to this study.
Liu Jiakun and Cui Kai were born in the 1950s; the three architects in 
URBANUS were born in the 1960s. The post-1970s architects and subsequent 
cohorts are also excluded from this discussion. First, Chinese architects born in 
the 1950s and 1960s are playing key roles in the profession. The specific reason 
will emerge in Cui Kai’s case. Much was due to the abrupt pause of advanced 
education for ten years during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the post-1950s 
and 1960s architects are the driving force in both architecture and architectural 
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discourse in China. Second, different from the architects born from the 1970s 
onwards, Chinese architects born in the 1950s and 1960s are real witnesses of 
the transition. They experienced all the ups and downs from pre-reform China to 
early market China: they are the last generations that grew up in a system largely 
connected with the ideology of Mao. Yet they became socialised and worked in 
an environment that increasingly signalled that consumerist materialism should 
be seen as the path to national advancement and personal well-being. Therefore, 
I selected them as target cases since the architects do not belong to the Mao-
oriented generation or to the market-oriented generation. They disliked political 
references in their works, and their preferences are not global clothing labels or 
computer brands. Sometimes the way they differentiate themselves from others is, 
surprisingly, on the basis of their lives in Maoist China.
In each case, there will be a part seeing how both architects and the designs 
resonate with the political, social and cultural circumstances of the period from 
pre-Maoist China to the market in germination in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Chronologically, there is another part focusing on the early 1990s market until the 
recent time. Although the historical review will be integrated with the architect’s 
life experiences and thoughts, one part will focus on the individual architect as a 
disintegrated component, re-positioned in the architecture and its history: this will 
be a close look at the subjectivity of Liu Jiakun, Cui Kai and URBANUS and their 
respective architecture. In the other part, I will trace the profiles through the case 
studies by illustrating some main transformations in different levels, including: 
the reforms of state-owned enterprises, something out of Mao’s shadow, some-
thing still in Mao’s shadow, the floating population, new private goals and public 
policies. Infusing the different levels of analysis, this part indicates genuine social 
crisis and the architectural dynamics encountered in the process of marketisation 
and globalisation. In other words, this part will revisit the architects in each case 
whose architectural practice was advanced through their architecture, but whose 
concern in their work was society at large. Each case study concludes with a sum-
mary addressing the research questions previously proposed.
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Liu Jiakun is based in Chengdu, which is located in the Western region of China, 
and as an individual architect, he represents one specific stream in the increas-
ingly diversified architectural discourse in China. An understanding of his archi-
tecture must start with attempting to understand some of key contradictions within 
contemporary China: the confusing relationship of contemporary architectural 
designs with Chinese life lived on a daily basis, and China’s current connection 
with the pre-reform China of Mao’s rule, are in conflict with the contemporary 
market. Liu Jiakun’s architectural features are formulated in terms of the col-
lective sense (in the socialist history of China), a memory that still permeates 
the social fabric in China. Architects like Liu Jiakun decode Maoist or socialist 
architectural-aesthetic programmes in the new social context, and they construct 
new architectural identities on the basis of a subconscious familiarity with archi-
tectural traditions and routines from the China of Mao.
The necessity of being real
In Building a Revolution: Chinese Architecture Since 1980, Charlie Q. L. Xue 
analysed the development record and prospects of Beijing, Shanghai and Guang-
zhou, based on their history, development process and spatial structure in order 
to present an overview of China’s cities after 1980. He summarised the three 
distinctly different and instructive trajectories of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou 
as “from walled kingdom to megacity”, “from foreign concessions to metropo-
lis”, and “always a southern wind”.1 Although Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou 
undoubtedly occupy preeminent positions in any ranking of Chinese cities, it is 
worth examining the general urban morphology, in which most of the second-tier 
cities, third-tier cities or country towns have not been part of the transitions tak-
ing place in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Most of the existing literature is 
inclined to focus on the integration of globalisation and localisation in the major 
cities; however, this view has serious limitations for a broader understanding of 
the socialist contribution in the formation of the localisation of Chinese cities as 
a whole. Liu Jiakun’s works architecturally contribute to the understanding of the 
socialist contribution in the formation of the localisation of Chinese cities.
3  Conceiving the modern past
Liu Jiakun
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• Decoding implicit historical references
Scholars often describe the aesthetic inclination or style in art and architecture in 
the pre-reform period of modern China as social realism.2 However, the style of 
pre-reform architecture did not only originate in Mao’s tastes or social realism. 
Cooke criticises younger academic writers in the Soviet Union who dismiss social 
realism as a phenomenon entirely confined to the Stalinist period and equally 
inaccurately, as a “style” originating in the dictator’s own untutored and meg-
alomaniac tastes.3 Pre-reform architecture in China has rich roots and Chinese 
expressions embedded in different political events, various political propagandas 
and the accompanying aesthetics and ideology. Liu Jiakun does not have a clear 
idea of what specific reference has been used in his work and from exactly where 
the reference is. To him, they are all from his collective memory. I will examine 
how Liu decodes these references in his designs and argue that Liu has made 
the connection in his designs by developing the industrial identity introduced by 
the Soviet Union that further took hold in the Great Leap Forward and critically 
integrating these with the unique aesthetics brought by the Cultural Revolution.
The examination of the reference in Liu Jiakun’s designs to modern Chinese 
history will begin with the architectural aesthetics introduced by the Soviet 
experts and later promoted by the Great Leap Forward. The construction of a 
planned economy in a Soviet model necessitated Soviet forms of architectural and 
construction practice. For the Chinese communists, the Soviet model was the only 
historical example of completing the socialist transformation by industrialising 
an economically backward country into a powerful modern nation within a short 
period. Thus, Chinese communists believed that the Soviet means of development 
were extremely valuable for China and would lead China’s socialist advancement 
to the desired outcomes. One significant contribution of this Soviet influence was 
the establishment of a complete set of industrialised building systems. The mass 
development of industrialisation generated an urgent need for housing. The Soviet 
experience of industrialisation provided relief. During 1954–1956, translations of 
Soviet industrialisation building systems were widely published.4
Except for the industrial architecture that naturally inherited the industrialised 
building systems, in the post-war housing shortage, the core of the industrialised 
in building system in China was mainly manifested in the standard dwelling unit, 
which was first built in 1952, under the guidance of Soviet experts in northeast 
China.5 Two types of residences were developed in the socialist period, with dif-
ferent degrees of access restrictions. In general, these housing units took the form 
of two to six storey apartments constructed in concrete and masonry, with access 
along the length of the block to each group of apartments offered via stairways or 
internal corridors. Dozens of Soviet advisers also worked with Chinese architects 
to compose the standardised design patterns for mass production and systematic 
construction. Based on the Soviet experience, major design institutes in different 
provinces were responsible for providing a few patterns of standardised housing 
units and spatial modules made up of standard building components. These hous-
ing units and building components were manufactured in factories and transported 
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to the construction site to form buildings.6 A pattern of housing units could be used 
on multiple sites and repeatedly constructed as long as the site conditions suited 
the design. The industrialised building system held obvious benefits in fast con-
struction: low costs and labour savings. This was critical for China in the 1950s, 
when construction resources and skilled designers were acutely scarce.7 Until the 
1960s and 1970s, five to six storeys of apartments dominated the residential dis-
tricts. Cities were constructed according to the standardised design, which in turn 
meant a standard dwelling unit or module made up of standard building compo-
nents; various combinations of these units formed buildings, which were then 
placed together to create residential areas. The production of housing influenced 
by the Soviet legacy prevailed in Chinese cities in the Mao era, and the city had 
two main morphologies: industrial architecture and worker villages built for sev-
eral work-units or the whole industrial sector, causally interrupted by monuments. 
The Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1961 was led by Mao and aimed to rap-
idly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a communist society 
through rapid industrialisation and collectivisation, as previously introduced. It 
urgently called for a rapid development in both industry and agriculture. As a 
result, the standardised industrial model was further promoted in this campaign.
In Liu’s designs, the pre-reform industrial identity in the planned economy 
can be detected in the educational building of the Sculpture Department of the 
Sichuan Fine Arts Institute and Sichuan Fine Arts Institute New Campus (Chong-
qing, 2003). It is one of Liu’s operations in the industrial architectural language 
of Mao’s era in post-Mao designs. The educational building of the Sculpture 
Department (Chongqing, 2003) is dignified and strong, and it was designed to 
suit the surrounding industrialised scenery that was left by the great industry era 
in Chongqing (Figure 3.1). The Sichuan Fine Arts Institute New Campus (Chong-
qing, 2003) in a suburb of Chongqing is a more sophisticated project echoing this 
reference (Figure 3.2). The site of the New Campus rests prominently on the top 
a hill. Lying along the slope, the whole complex is broken into parts and divided 
into different volumes. The architectural complex is composed of seven multi-
story buildings. The west, south and northeast ends are respectively topped by 
a vault roof, a pitched roof and a V-roof, which imply a prototype of industrial 
architecture. This is different from the general industrial zones, where buildings 
are arranged in lines, usually with a strong axial arrangement; the whole site was 
featured with a relatively loose and free site plan. In other words, it is consider-
ate of its connection to the site and was designed to settle along the slope effort-
lessly, without boldness and straightness, without promoting the unease between 
the building and the place that can be seen in the old industrial zones. A close 
examination reveals the slab for the air conditioning equipment, usually hung 
outside the window, is reversely inserted into the building. As a result, the out-
side has a certain propensity towards the volumetric, as opposed to the planimet-
ric industrial prototype. But unlike the extreme fluidity and freedom in the plan 
followed by many contemporary architects, following its prototype, a corridor 
with bilateral classrooms appears in each building – a well-disciplined and well-
functional arrangement that gives rise to the volumetric expression in the Maoist 
standardised design.
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Figure 3.1  Liu Jiakun, educational building of the Sculpture Department, Sichuan Fine 
Arts Institute, Chongqing, 2003
Figure 3.2 Liu Jiakun, Sichuan Fine Arts Institute New Campus, Chongqing, 2003
Another interesting reference looks more direct. The 512 Wenchuan Earth-
quake Memorial (Anren, 2011) in the museum cluster located in Anren, in the 
Sichuan province (Figure 3.3), designed by Liu Jiakun, employs the model of the 
Great Hall of the People, in “Ten Great Buildings”.8 The Great Hall of the People, 
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Figure 3.3 Liu Jiakun, 512 Wenchuan Earthquake Memorial, Anren, 2011
designed by Zhang Bo, is located on the Western side of Tiananmen Square. The 
complex is very large, at 336 by 174 metres; the central building component is 
40 metres high.9 The central part of the Earthquake Memorial was composed of 
a portico leading first to a grand entrance hall and then to a large, assembly hall 
with various exhibition space. The tall and exaggerated columns in the memo-
rial achieve a striking effect in replicating the “Ten Great Buildings”. However, 
it goes beyond direct reference; instead, architectural features are allowed to 
be self-reflective. For one, the plaza in front of the Earthquake Memorial is not 
flat. It is slightly wavy, which, although difficult to detect, gives an alternative 
sense of experience to the grand portico. The sense of the ceremony regarding 
the nation-state is subtly reconsidered and transformed through the experience of 
the plaza. It also allows architecture to be an enlightening subject for the public. 
In the museum cluster in Anren, there are several earthquake memorials of dif-
ferent scales and derived from different ideologies. For example, the Hu Huishan 
Memorial, which is discussed in greater depth later, more or less represents Liu’s 
individual’s voice to an ordinary Chinese individual, Hu Huishan, who died in the 
earthquake. There is also an earthquake memorial integrated into an exhibition 
building originally for mirrors in the Cultural Revolution that was reloaded with a 
first-hand collection of relics from the site by the developer after the earthquake. 
Liu Jiakun was commissioned by local government to design the 512 Wenchuan 
Earthquake Memorial (Anren, 2011). It is an attempt to find the abstract stance of 
the nation-state or government among the diverse ideological positions.
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Another reference can be traced to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), yet 
it is a critical reflection as well. The stated goal of the Cultural Revolution was 
to enforce communism in the country by removing capitalist, traditional and cul-
tural elements from Chinese society and to impose Maoist orthodoxy within the 
party. Architecture in the Cultural Revolution stagnated, except in the “Long Live 
Pavilion (wansuiguan)”, where dozens of Mao statues were erected throughout 
the ten years of Cultural Revolution. The building of a Mao monument was con-
sidered a matter of patriotic pride and political necessity. In 1966, Mao possessed 
enormous moral authority with the Chinese public. People believed that his acts in 
the Revolution, and the establishment of socialism, were motivated for the good 
of China. The Mao cult grew from this spontaneous respect, which radicals then 
manipulated for political advantage.10 Mao’s words were quoted in newspaper 
editorials, by the nation’s intellectuals, and they were even used as decoration in 
architecture. Instead of making a sharp contrast between a good China and a bad 
China, as most of the Western media attempted to do, Kraus drew out the con-
nections between the isolated and beleaguered China of the 1960s and the newly 
risen global power of today.11 He argued that these two Chinas are not opposites. 
Rather than fence off the Cultural Revolution as a historical swamp, Liu Jiakun 
architecturally and critically reflects “bad China” in the evolving “good China”.
Liu’s Clock Museum of Culture Revolution (Anren, 2004) in the Jianchuan 
Museum Cluster is probably the sole piece of architecture in contemporary China 
to convey the individual architect’s critical reflection on the Cultural Revolution 
by exhibiting explicit symbols and implicit atmosphere. Mao’s statues and Mao’s 
words are applied in the project, like the title, “Long Live Pavilion”. The museum 
uses bright brick and employs several typical classical geometries such as the 
circle, square and transept to construct a holy space; thus a special atmosphere of 
singleness, extremeness, purity and fanaticism is cultivated (Figure 3.4). In the 
banner section, space itself is a closed square front yard. On the top, under a grid, 
hangs a Red Soldier banner that casts a red shadow into the entire the room. In the 
middle of the floor stands a black granite inscription. Through architecture, Liu 
ushered in the most controversial historical period in modern China.
By analysing these selected works of Liu, it can be revealed how the archi-
tect decodes the architectural-aesthetic programme of socialism in the new social 
context. The fluctuation of architectural aesthetics during the pre-reform period 
was associated with a brand of architectural characteristics introduced by Soviet 
experts in 1949 that subsequently justified the Ten Great Buildings project, begun 
in Beijing in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), among other ideo-
logical slogans and campaigns. Arguably, Liu Jiakun’s designs architecturally for-
mulate a context necessary to reflect socialism under the planned economy, which 
was a significant, though too often unilaterally forgotten, part of Chinese history. 
But China is one of the world’s oldest civilisations. It has a long and complex 
history – with records dating to around 1600 BC at the founding of the Shang 
dynasty. The question that arises is what makes Liu Jiakun have this personal and 
unusual choice, different from his peer architects, in confronting the long and 
complex history of his country.
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Figure 3.4  Liu Jiakun, Clock Museum of Culture Revolution, Anren, 2004. Clock exhibi-
tion space
• The everyday urban landscape of China: Mao remains potent
Chongqing, which houses many designs of Liu Jiakun, has a 3,000 year history. 
The Ba people, ancestors of today’s Chongqingese, established Jiangzhou as the 
capital of the Ba Kingdom in about 1000 BC. The Ba people were traditionally 
good at shipping, textile production and agriculture, and by the time of the Qin 
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Dynasty (221–206 BC), Jiangzhou was becoming a centre of transportation, busi-
ness and agriculture in southwest China.12 As the wartime capital of China during 
the Second World War, Chongqing developed into a modern industrial city in the 
1940s.13 After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the development of 
Chongqing was accelerated in the 1960s when the policy of the “Third Front (San 
Xian)”14 construction was carried out by the central government. Under the policy, 
a number of defence-related enterprises were established in and around Chong-
qing. For instance, from 1964 to 1965, more than sixty state-owned enterprises 
under fifteen sectoral departments of the central government moved their factories 
from more than twelve cities and provinces, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing 
and Liaoning provinces, to Chongqing, with 46,000 workers migrating to the city 
and 200 key projects established.15
The architectural style of the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute New Campus (Chong-
qing, 2003) is closely related to the industrialised city image in the Soviet model 
under the planned economy. Whereas the new buildings being constructed in 
Chongqing are dominated by a novel and modern language that address the era’s 
aspiration, the building in the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute New Campus incorpo-
rated a whole series of elements that clearly had their origin in Maoist Chong-
qing and standardised industrial design. However, contemporary architects often 
refer to ancient China in their designs through either nostalgia or novelty. What 
makes Liu Jiakun choose the pre-reform modern history of China as an element 
in his architecture? What is the contribution of this choice to the identity of his 
architecture?
Liu Jiakun himself does not have an accurate definition of socialist architec-
ture, because he was on the outskirts of architectural design for ten years after he 
graduated, and he did not have an overseas education, as did most of the active 
practicing architects in China. His works are fully integrated in real observations 
of everyday life in China and have a more accurate definition of the real local 
identity of Chinese cities, which governs his choices. Liu has said,
I am not against the preservation of historical districts or historical architec-
ture, but if you take a real look at this city that covers such an extensive area, 
you take a bus from Zhuge Liang Memorial Hall16 to Kuangzhai Alleys,17 but 
ignore the area between two visiting spots.18
This remark suggests the question proposed in the beginning of this chapter: what 
is the role of the socialist period in the formation of localisation of Chinese cities? 
What does the city look like between the Zhuge Liang Memorial Hall and Kuang-
zhai Alleys, both of which are preserved and renovated tourist hotspots?
After 1990, China experienced a major transition as a consequence of the 
adoption of a market-oriented paradigm. It is true that Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou have activated a process of altering their urban images to a new, eco-
nomically refined vision invested primarily in skyscrapers, which particularly 
conjures up Western ideals. However, “all that is solid melts into air”19 should 
be “all that is solid seems melting into air”. But the effect of these images is 
usually limited to the cities’ central business districts and tourist hotspots, while 
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the aesthetic programme of socialist China still holds sway over the other parts 
of modern Chinese cities. If the world sees that Paul Andreu’s National Centre 
for the Performing Arts, Zaha Hadid’s Guangzhou Opera House and Herzog & 
de Meuron’s Bird’s Nest, as well as the myriad gargantuan, newly erected high-
rises, have reformed the skyline of major Chinese cities – and thus their municipal 
images – the distinct architectural characteristics wrought by socialist thinking 
after the Communist Revolution in fact remains potent in the architectures and 
urban landscapes of real Chinese cities where most Chinese people live. Even 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, China’s modern city remained a city with the 
primary features of Chinese design standardisation, mass production and system-
atic construction, which were characterised by grey exterior walls, concrete and 
masonry, red brick, pitched gable roofs and other simple motifs. It is imperative to 
clarify that the majority of the urban population are living in second-tier or third-
tier cities, and until now it is difficult to think about China and its cities without 
a certain residential type in the work unit and industrial sector images immedi-
ately coming to mind. The destruction of many large historic urban districts for 
new urban development is actually erasing the once-elegant urban patterns of the 
imperial era of China.
The reasons why Maoist architecture, urban landscape and construction models 
remain potent even in contemporary China’s urban identity may be summarised 
into these points. First, the belief “fast design and fast construction” was deeply 
entangled with the architect’s attitude and approach. It no longer means: the faster 
the design task is completed, the more loyal to the party the architect is consid-
ered, but it could be argued that the model in the Great Leap Forward and violence 
in the Cultural Revolution have been inevitably inherited in the haste of current 
construction.
Second, the influences of Soviet architectural theory and an advocacy of “social-
ist content and national form” or “cultural form and socialist content” delivered 
by official design institutes in China have been developed into systematic design 
principles. For example, in order to make better use of land and decrease con-
struction costs, the increase of depth and reduction in width are naturally adopted 
as design principles. In addition, a concrete framework with a brick wall struc-
ture that reduces the consumption of steel and cement has been broadly accepted. 
According to the advice from the Soviet advisers, building five stories was the 
most economic strategy. This resulted in many apartment-style housing units with 
five or six stories built in concrete and brick, even in the 1990s. Inside the build-
ing, some architects were advised to abolish the living room and replace it with a 
hallway of smaller area.
Third, in 1979, thirty years after the founding of the People’s Republic, China 
was taking stock of itself. Up until the communist takeover, 100 years of con-
tact with the West, conditioned by the unequal treaties, had brought little in the 
way of modernity to China or economic benefit to the great bulk of its popu-
lation.20 Xiaoping Deng memorably summed up the spirit of the times and the 
urgent demands of the times with his comments that “it does not matter if the cat 
is black or white, as long as it catches mice!”21 supposedly uttered in justification 
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of adopting some of the approaches of capitalism in pursuit of what was still said 
to be the goal of socialism after 1978. Hence the fastest way to “catch mice” in 
accommodating the rising population is to produce a set of standardised designs 
which could be used on different sites with minor adjustment. At the same time, 
standardised design can reduce building costs and the consumption of construc-
tion materials and control spatial efficiency. Therefore, Maoist architecture, urban 
landscape and construction models remain potent even in contemporary China’s 
urban identity. It could be argued that Liu’s choice in this period of history created 
an architectural conjuncture, an architectural integration into the everyday urban 
landscape.
• Confronting the psychological burden of Mao
Yet his designs’ engagement with the everyday urban landscape, and the local 
identity of Chinese cities in China, creates a contested identity with the glorious, 
ancient part of Chinese history that both the government and the people are inter-
ested in. In other words, the real everyday urban landscape is something both the 
government and people feel reluctant to face. As Porter wrote,
Life under the People’s Republic for the first thirty years brought its own hard 
lessons: that personal rivalries and struggles for power are just as likely under 
the Communist Party as among the transitional warlords or in the Imperial 
courts of the dynastic era; that despite offers of aid from apparently friendly 
states, taken up for a while, China ultimately stands alone and must never 
abandon its quest for self-sufficiency in all things essential to its way of life; 
that ideology and political commitment cannot ultimately solve China’s 
problems, and indeed can rapidly become a blight on the discussion of policy 
alternatives, and even worse, an excuse for acts of violence and great inhu-
manity. All Chinese carry this psychological “baggage” with them into the 
latest phase of modernization.22
Facing the materialised and concrete subject existing in most Chinese cities, Chi-
nese people are inclined to ignore it, and no sophisticated words can adequately 
account for the psychological complexity of Chinese citizens. Chinese people, as 
they find it, have little interest in examining the link between Maoist China and the 
country today. They avoid awkward discussions about their own youth, and they 
adhere to an unspoken understanding to discard recriminations from that period.23
In regard to architecture and urban landscape, when standardisation became 
a powerful tool in socialist urban planning and architecture of equality to create 
a classless and moneyless social order structure, in urban planning and architec-
ture, and the result was an undifferentiated urban landscape. The simplified design 
actually ignored the unique feature of architecture by removing the processes of 
the preliminary design and design development, which are the most creative and 
essential components of architecture. People became bored with the standardised 
design, which is fixed in form and sometimes monotonous in content.
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Psychologically, decades of civil unrest, poverty and ideological revolution had 
left China’s cities ill-equipped to serve the needs of their residents. “If there was 
one thing on which almost all of China’s people agreed at the end of the 1970s it 
was the cost in emotional, psychological and even physical distress of the methods 
used during the Cultural Revolution was too great to be sustained or repeated.”24 
Hence the value of the modern metropolis has become especially meaningful for 
Chinese people. Furthermore, in the global political domain, socialism in China 
has been intensely scrutinised by the capitalist world, since the socialist spirit 
in the former Soviet Union, East and Central European countries collapsed. The 
value of socialism is hard to express in a world dominated by capitalism. Chinese 
people are still at a loss in understanding the socialist political system. Last but 
not least, with such a high speed of growth, it is also difficulty to assess and iden-
tify the underlying forces in the political, cultural and economic changes in the 
contemporary context.
Therefore, the psychological reactions of Chinese people to pre-reform China, 
and even to the characteristics of their architectural heritage, is far from straight-
forward; it is erroneous to think that they merely feel urged to have the lifestyle 
with the same logic of individual human rights that infuses some of the critiques of 
Chinese socialism. As summarised in Chapter One, the majority of architectures 
in contemporary China enthusiastically adopt modernisation in novel architectural 
forms and use technology as the language of development, thereby striving to cre-
ate new images for modern Chinese cities in order to satisfy both the government 
and the citizenry’s imagination of entering a new world. In Liu Jiakun’s works, 
it could be further argued that they have a contested identity with psychological 
complexity and imagination. Here, architecture unconsciously becomes a psycho-
logical medium to urge Chinese people to confront themselves. While addressing 
the architecture of Liu Jiakun in detail, it should be noted that the familiar sense 
of architecture created by the architect parallels the perspective of people, rather 
than that of the state, yet it does not evoke the people’s sense of feeling awkward 
about their own youth.
Architecturally, comparing the systematic design principles and outdated 
aesthetics in the architecture that survives from the pre-reform period with the 
novel forms being constructed in today’s China seems to elicit memory loss. Liu 
Jiakun’s awareness of a new way of manipulating the folk language evinced in 
his architecture, as well as his awareness of the dynamic use for sustaining the 
collective memory of contemporary Chinese people, makes these designs sub-
stantially different from their prototypes. For example, in the design of the new 
campus of the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute (Chongqing, 2003), the strong socialist 
and industrial presence in the buildings appears not only in certain architectural 
elements – red brick, sand plaster, a vaulted roof – but also in its systematic lin-
guistic improvement. Both the particularities and the total design language show 
innovations in assemblage by recasting architectural elements from the Maoist 
period to achieve a contemporary presence. The tension between the industrial 
atmosphere and dynamic space, manifested in this exhibition space, finds an echo 
in the wooden case wrapping the obsolete industrial column, in the manner of 
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decoration and a vehicle for exhibits, and allows it to be a visual centre with an 
advanced industrial sense. In addition, the construction is of a deliberately coarse 
quality, with cracks on the walls and staircases, and disorderly cement plaster. 
This is evidence of the architect’s manipulation of the coarseness and ordinariness 
of the construction, and it is even more industrially provocative than the drawings 
and models had expressed.
It is impossible to determine whether Liu had considered the influence of the 
past in his design for the project, but the effect of lapsed time emanating from the 
accumulated drawings by students on the buildings’ surfaces, as well as the easels 
and canvases haphazardly placed on balconies, are naturally synthesised in the 
front to showcase the verisimilitude of such chaos. Instead of being easily punctu-
ated by everyday life as some other architecture, the seven multi-story buildings 
of the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute (Chongqing, 2003) incorporate everyday life 
experience and further demonstrate the special stamp of the architect’s language. 
All the contradictions that the buildings incorporate are finally transferred to the 
sphere of everyday life.
Architect and artist in the market: Liu Jiakun  
and Zhang Xiaogang
Zhang Xiaogang is a contemporary Chinese symbolist and surrealist painter, and 
he is also an intimate friend of Liu Jiakun. In 1993, one of Zhang Xiaogang’s 
works sold for a record high $2.3 million in Hong Kong. However, in the same 
year, Liu was considering abandoning his architectural career.25 Liu came to the 
foreground of public attention after 1999. Zhang’s artistic life runs parallel with 
the development of modern art in China, and he experienced many historical 
turns and transitions including the Cultural Revolution, market socialism, global 
forces, and economic boom with the opening-up of China to the West. In general, 
Zhang has experienced the ups and downs era from the pre-reform China to the 
early market China, which gives the Chinese contemporary art an opportunity to 
break restrictions and push boundaries. Liu also, in the discipline of architecture, 
achieves this same quality, but in different shape of waves from the pre-reform 
China to the early market, which will be explored by comparison with Zhang in 
this part.
The research concerning Chinese contemporary artists in this transition era has 
been explored extensively.26 In discussions about the individual and the state, the 
market and the planned economy, Salmenkari has explored how unofficial art-
ists have worked to create a space for innovative elite culture outside both state- 
promoted official culture and market-driven popular culture.27 The author has argued 
that the non-official artists’ strategies require non-state resources available through 
the market economy. Kraus investigated the artists operating between the state plan 
and global market in the development of modern art and artists in China.28 Andrews 
and Gao traced the way that the avant-garde movement, which seeks to attack and 
destroy the traditional order in China with the ultimate goal of attaining artistic 
freedom, challenges official art.29 Yet the research that crosses various disciplines 
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is still missing, requiring interdisciplinary perspective and comparative study to 
see the trajectory of artists and architects and milestones of the disciplines within 
the tension from Mao to market under a socialist conceptual framework in China. 
A brief look at Liu and Zhang’s life trajectories in the changing society allows a 
comparison that will answer the questions: What were the social and historical fac-
tors constituting the turning point in their careers from Mao to early market? What 
led Liu to a more individual creation? How did their attitudes towards the market 
change in the progression to a society dominated by the market? To what extent 
does the government still control art and architecture in China?
• Life trajectories, 1950s–1990s
Liu Jiakun was born in Chengdu in 1956. His parents were doctors in the local 
hospital. In 1982, he earned his degree in architecture from the Chongqing Insti-
tute of Architecture and Engineering. He was then assigned to the Chengdu 
Architectural Design Academy, while also working as a freelance author. He rep-
resented his work unit, Chengdu Architectural Design Academy, to help and sup-
port architectural design in the provinces of Tibet from 1984–1985 and Xinjiang 
from 1990–1992. While he designed a few art studios for his old artist friends that 
later added to his reputation, he also went through practices in some large-scale 
public architecture, such as Chengdu Sheraton Hotel (1996–1997, 78,000 m2) and 
Chengdu City Art Centre (1996–1998, 29,000 m2). When Liu Jiakun was con-
sidering abandoning his architectural career, he was invited to the Shanghai Art 
Gallery to attend his schoolmate Tang Hua’s architectural exhibition and a 21st 
Century Culture Symposium at the same time. He was impressed by the school-
mate’s achievement in architecture, and this marked Liu Jiakun’s real start in the 
architectural area. In 1997, he resigned from the Chengdu Architectural Design 
Academy and collaborated with the Beijing Sanlei Architectural Design Ltd. The 
year 1999 marked a significant change in his life, when he earned the Registered 
Architect Certificate and established Jiakun Architects.
Zhang Xiaogang was born in Kunming in 1958, the third of four boys. His 
mother Qiu Ailan and father Zhang Jing were employed as government offi-
cials. In 1963, his family moved to Chengdu in China’s Sichuan Province. Lin 
Ling, a Chinese watercolour painter, trained Zhang in 1975, teaching him formal 
watercolour and sketching techniques. In 1976, Mao’s death and the imminent 
arrest of the infamous Gang of Four heralded the end of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Entrance exams were reinstated for the newly opened colleges and, in 1977, 
Zhang gained admission to the prestigious Sichuan Fine Arts Institute in Chong-
qing.30 After a ten-year hiatus from education, he entered the college as one of a 
group of extremely talented young artists. In 1978, he began his studies in the oil 
painting department.31 In 1982, Zhang graduated with a bachelor’s degree from 
the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute. Although his work had received support from 
the independent art critic Li Xianting, Zhang was not offered a teaching post at the 
university, as he hoped. The next three years (1982–1985) – which he later 
referred to as the dark era in his life – represented a period of great uncertainty 
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for Zhang in which he struggled with depression, although he continued to grow 
and develop as an artist.32 In 1992, Zhang travelled to Germany for three months, 
where he encountered firsthand many of the Western art works he had admired 
through art books and journals. Although when he returned filled with enthusiasm 
for the paintings of German artist Gerhard Richter, Zhang was disappointed with 
what he thought was the stale air of wealth and opportunity of the West’s avant-
garde. The art show hosted by the Hanart Gallery in 1993 declared that the new art 
from China was not just going to remain underground – it was also going to break 
new ground.33 In 1994, Zhang Xiaogang showed his “Bloodline: The Big Family” 
series in the 22nd International Sao Paulo Biennial and in the 1995 Venice Bien-
nale. Zhang as an individual artist became a best-selling contemporary Chinese 
artist and a favourite of foreign collectors from the early 1990s.
• Establishing themselves in the new commercialised power
In these two stories, the emerging market was the new site for the latent commer-
cialisation that gradually provided alternative resources for the unofficial archi-
tect and artist. A Chinese art market based on the Western and Japanese models 
was created in the early twentieth century, but it was abolished in 1949 when the 
People’s Republic of China.34 In the People’s Republic, since the end of the Cul-
tural Revolution and the death of Chairman Mao in 1978, the art world has been 
embroiled in a mesh of alternating political relaxations and tensions in the name 
of modernisation and party control.35 The architecture market followed a similar 
path as the art market. In the 1990s, in respect of the private sphere, there were 
no restrictions on private artistic creation or the launch of the private architectural 
firm. The authorities had little interest in paintings kept privately in homes or stu-
dios run by the private architect. Therefore, markets have been useful to unofficial 
architects working in the private architectural firm and artists, by providing a new 
medium for obtaining contracts or auctions, and new aesthetics associated with 
positive acceptance in the domestic market have been gradually established which 
show a departure from the official aesthetic standards of the past.
Exhibitions are still the most important platform for both artist and architect 
to let the market see them and make connections, transforming the artist and 
architect into celebrity status. In the early 1990s the series “Big Family” was 
shown in a range of international exhibitions including Chinese New Art from 
post-1989 in the Hong Kong Art Centre (1993), the 22nd International Biennial 
of Sao Paulo (1994), the 46th Venice Biennial in Venice (1995), China New Arts 
in Vancouver (1995), Chinese Contemporary Art in Hamburg (1995) and Des del 
Pais del Centre: avantguardes artistiques xineses in Barcelona (1995), and these 
facilitated Zhang Xiaogang’s striking mark on the international scene. Around the 
late 1990s, Liu Jiakun began to make an impact through exhibitions inside and 
outside, including Chinese Architects Experimental works exhibition in Beijing 
initiated by Wang Mingxian (1999), Construction Document Exhibition of Five 
Persons in Shanghai’s Dingceng Gallery (2000) and Chinese Young Architects’ 
Work Exhibition in Berlin (2001).
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From the early 1990s, it could be argued that Chinese contemporary art was at 
least five years ahead of Chinese contemporary architecture in the creation and dis-
semination of the new reputation and values in both the internal and external mar-
ket. Zhang Xiaogang’s transition occurred quickly from hostility towards regional 
politics and cultural institutions to a self-reflective and more individual condition; 
from an instructor in the Education Department of the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute 
to an independent figure in many international exhibitions in the 1990s, until he 
gave up teaching and left the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute in 1997. In the architec-
tural scene, Liu Jiakun received attention in the late 1990s through exhibitions as it 
became clearer to detect the market-oriented direction of economic privatisation in 
the field of architecture. He submitted his resignation to the Chengdu Architectural 
Design Academy and then established his own architectural firm in 1999. Unlike 
Zhang, his participation in the exhibitions was probably not driven by the desire 
and possibility to garner instant celebrity status overseas, because China was not 
a politicalised icon on the international scene in the late 1990s, but the West was 
still far from a two way communication with China. Liu Jiakun quoted a sentence 
from the movie Isabella in describing this situation, “It is not that I look down 
upon you, it is that I cannot see you.”36 Hence it could be argued that the abrupt 
changes of artists were partially due to the country’s political history and outside 
world’s curiosity for this “other”; however, the mild changes in attitudes towards 
architects were more related to the localised development of the discipline within 
China, which finally flourished in the global geography in the 2000s.
Zhang Xiaogang is included in most of the selections featuring contemporary 
Chinese artists’ works in colour photographs. China! New Art & Artists by Dian 
Tong and The Revolution Continues: New Art From China documented a collec-
tion of new Chinese art which was presented on the eve of the opening of the new 
Saatchi Gallery in London’s Chelsea; both used Zhang’s paintings in his “Big 
Family” series as their covers. It indicates that he is an international celebrity in 
the contemporary art scene. In the early 1990s, when exhibition venues and art 
collectors were located almost exclusively abroad, the contents of the artworks 
were often planned for Western audiences. At that time, the Chineseness in the art-
works was usually shallow. Installations with Chinese calligraphy or silkworms, 
or pop paintings of Mao, used symbols of Chineseness obvious to even those 
who knew little about China, and combined them with Western art forms.37 In 
the 1990s, much of Zhang’s recognition came from abroad. Generally speaking, 
Zhang Xiaogang’s works were displayed in various Western countries at a time 
when China was partially concealed.
As demonstrated by Salmenkari, unofficial artists have worked to create a 
space for an innovative elite culture, and sometimes a counterculture, outside both 
state-promoted official culture and market-driven popular culture.38 Although 
both Zhang and Liu have experienced problems in mapping themselves into the 
context of new commercialised power, Liu did not consciously align himself with 
elite culture or counterculture in operating within the commercialisation during 
the early 2000s, partly due to the limitations of the discipline of architecture. In 
the twenty-first century, their works have moved away from appropriation of and 
deviation from Maoist ideology and entered a new stage of self-discovery, rather 
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than reacting to the country’s political history. In spite of the immature domestic 
market and long-time political upheavals in the past that made them occasionally 
uncertain about their individual existence in the long-term collective umbrella, 
neither Zhang nor Liu are conscious of aligning themselves with or against the 
large-scale political, ideological campaigns from this period. However, even 
some politically sensitive projects, for example, the Hu Huishan Memorial, Liu 
Jiakun’s connection with international peers – the influential architects participat-
ing in the international exhibitions held in China – give him greater opportunities 
to be invited to deliver lectures overseas, gain more online support, and thus miti-
gate the risk of being attacked by the Chinese government.
• Similarities in their works
As an intimate friend of Zhang Xiaogang, Liu Jiakun was regarded as capable 
of materialising the distinctive spirit of stupor, nervousness and surrealism in 
Zhang’s paintings in the design of the Art Gallery of Zhang Xiaogang (Chengdu, 
2008). The whole art gallery is the result of gathering several geometric spaces 
that gravitate towards a dynamic shape. Each volume intrudes into other spaces 
and concedes some of its lively spirit to the shadows cast by the shape outline. 
Inside, as the dimensions of the space voids are extended into a number of angles, 
accompanied by multi-angle light, space itself has an unsettling effect on visitors 
to the gallery (Figure 3.5). This art gallery can be considered to be a collabora-
tion between Zhang and Liu from the perspective of both art and architecture – in 
Figure 3.5 Liu Jiakun, Zhang Xiaogang Art Gallery, Chengdu, 2008
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achieving a surrealist space, and in achieving dream-like distortions architectur-
ally that reflects a complex psychological dimension of Zhang’s work.
Zhang Xiaogang’s paintings themselves were embedded in the thinking about 
the anxiety between public veneer and private vulnerability, official doctrine and 
personal conscience. His trademark paintings, the “Big Family” series, make 
viewers sense the strong uniformity of the figures depicted, but at the same time, 
they also have some unique characteristics that challenge the utopian idea of an 
organic collective. Paintings in this series are often monochromatic, stylised por-
traits of Chinese people, usually with large, dark eyes, posed in a stiff manner 
deliberately reminiscent of family portraits in the Maoist period. Zhang’s paint-
ings were inspired by family photos from the Cultural Revolution, as well as the 
European tradition of surrealism. Zhang said,
For me, the Cultural Revolution is a psychological state, not a historical fact. 
It has a very strict connection with my childhood, and I think there are many 
things linking the psychology of the Chinese people today with the psychol-
ogy of the Chinese people back then.39
His paintings convey a standard Chinese family, but actually question the 
notion of identity within the collectivism attached to the “Big Family”, especially 
in the Maoist period. Each individual was destined to live in Chairman Mao’s 
great revolutionary family in that period, where all individuals were brothers and 
sisters, irrespective of traditional family ties. Similarly, as I have discussed previ-
ously, Liu Jiakun’s architecture legitimises a new dynamic based on the archi-
tect’s reinterpretation of the collective memory in the Mao era, even if that means 
recalling a collectively traumatic past. Are there any similarities in their work, 
even if one is an artist and the other an architect?
The popular strategies of developing the collective theme in China are often 
very close to those traditional and federal styles, for example, the red lantern 
and Chinese traditional furniture. Meanwhile, the influence of surrealism, expres-
sionism, minimalism and phenomenology imported from the West in Chinese 
architecture are especially noticeable. Zhang Xiaogang was not using obvious 
symbols of Chineseness, but his ambiguity in the object of resistance seems even 
more attractive to the West than the straight narrative of the communist past, pop 
Mao or the excesses of unregulated capitalism. Zhang Xiaogang’s main reputa-
tion comes from the “Big Family” series, in which he superimposes the concept 
of family over the ideology of collectivism in China. In this series, one can easily 
sense the strong uniformity, yet it is also challenged by some subtle differences 
between these figures in the paintings (Figure 3.6). The expressionless eyes of 
the figures in Zhang’s paintings can be seen as a motif that mocks the exagger-
ated tendency that Chinese culture attaches to the importance of the collective; 
however, the otherness of political collectivism and individualism emphasised by 
the West were somehow translated as an expression of political opposition, which 
all attracted the Western buyers of Chinese contemporary art who have been 
consistently fascinated by work that expresses political opposition. The motif 
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Figure 3.6 Zhang Xiaogang, Bloodline-Big Family No.3, 1996
representing Chineseness, chosen by Liu Jiakun, mocks the exaggerated tendency 
that the everyday urban landscape of China is attached to Mao, which neither the 
state centre nor the Chinese citizens are willing to face in the twenty-first century.
Chang tried to explain the concept of family in the context of communist China 
in tune with Zhang Xiaogang’s paintings:
We all live “in a big family”. The first lesson we have to learn is how to pro-
tect ourselves and keep our experiences locked up in an inner chamber away 
from the prying eyes of others, while at the same time living in harmony 
as a member of this big family. In this sense, the “family” is a unit for the 
continuity of life and an idealised mechanism for procreation. It embodies 
power, hope, life, envy, lies, duty and love. The “family” becomes the stand-
ard model and the focus for the contradictions of life experiences. We interact 
and depend on each other for support and assurance.40
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Therefore, the memories of collectivism encapsulate many youthful memories, 
although many of them were traumatic memories, central to their practice, and 
continue to inform their careers. In their work, there are symbolic aspects not 
perceived by the senses, which distinguish the works from superficial aspects of 
painting or buildings such as novel colour, form and texture. Liu Jiakun and Zhang 
Xiaogang’s works produce a different discourse and visual effect, partly because 
of a more precise awareness of Chinese modern history when collectivism was 
central to everyday life. In their works, one can see a willingness to explore the 
socialist cultural realm. In the era of collectivism, individual architects and artists 
adapted to and interpreted this mysterious code set by the party.
Furthermore, Zhang Xiaogang and Liu Jiakun’s works show their capacity in 
polishing and consolidating the collective memory in architectural or painting 
details. For example, in the Zhang Xiaogang Art Gallery (Chengdu, 2008), in 
the treatment of the landscape, environmental elements constituting the everyday 
landscape from pre-reform China until the 1990s, such as, telegraph poles, round 
pools, fragments of brick wall and lines of cypresses, blend with typical signs of 
the era; roof yards as the relic of grim days, and gazeboes with trees are re-used. 
In this way, a contemporary sense and a historical depth of collective memory 
to get a surrealistic environment loom upon a rough and determined sensational 
environment. In Zhang Xiaogang’s paintings, the comrades hide their individual 
personalities and histories behind the façade of a standardised portrait. Lacking 
a specific gender, they appear so similar that we are forced to search for subtle 
characteristics. Zhang’s extended family conveys individual identity through their 
unalterable physical features: too big heads, tiny hands, long noses and subtle 
alterations in hairstyle give clues to intimate characteristics and stifled emotions. 
Incorporating the collective memory of their youth, their art styles finally waver 
between the exaggeration of animation and stoic flatness, neither provocative nor 
feeble.
Untamed architecture
Liu Jiakun is one of many influential contemporary architects in China. His 
schoolmate, Tang Hua, recalled that “Even though many years have passed; they 
still remember when Liu Jiakun recited the poems in the dark dormitory at night. 
The most memorable one is A Psalm of Life written by the American writer Henry 
Wadsworth Longfellow.”41
The Department of Architecture in Chongqing Institute of Architecture and 
Engineering where Liu studied is located in Chongqing, an inland city of China, 
and it is one of the most prestigious architectural schools in modern China. It dif-
fers from the schools of architecture in Tongji University, Tsinghua University 
and Dongnan University, in that there is no dominating tradition or agenda in the 
architectural discourse. Liu’s seemingly indifferent and casual attitude towards 
architecture was partially due to the fact that he was educated in a less strict tra-
dition with a less systematic architectural curriculum. Liu Jiakun describes his 
own undergraduate period in these terms: “Everything could be tried from the 
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very beginning, but everybody felt at a loss with what they tried in the end.”42 
Therefore, to him, architecture was not limited to any one school. Such an attitude 
led him to think that learning architecture could lead to its own epiphany in self- 
exploration in the new cultural, political and ideological context of China.
When Liu Jiakun was an undergraduate student in the university, young stu-
dents’ long-suppressed desire for a new life was a reaction to ten years of Cultural 
Revolution. In 1979 and 1980, a total of sixteen exhibitions of work in the avant-
garde styles were held in Beijing, Shanghai and Xi’an.43 During the mid-1980s, as 
government attitudes encouraged intellectuals to contribute to society, the social 
and cultural influence of Chinese intellectuals increased. This was reflected in an 
increase in activity in all cultural areas, ranging from university to newspapers to 
television networks. Moreover, at this time, many intellectuals felt a particularly 
strong responsibility to the public and believed that official and popular culture 
could be enlightened through their efforts.
The expression of the humanistic feeling by depicting ordinary individuals 
came to the foreground in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Liu was part of 
that trend. In 1982, Liu entered Chengdu Architectural Academy. Yet he was not 
so much interested in the architectural design; in contrast, his career as a writer 
of fiction reached its first peak. In an analysis of Liu Jiakun’s novel Hero (1983), 
Peng argued that the novel is a reflection of his long-term speculation on the 
relationship between hero and anti-hero. Furthermore, his novel Highland (1984) 
excited heated discussion in the literary journal Young Writer, in its reflection 
upon the value of the individual and the individual’s relationship to nature, the 
era, society and the rest of the world.44 He was able to memorise A Psalm of Life, 
but in my interview when asked whether he clearly realised that life belongs to the 
individual in his university time, he said,
I did not have much theoretical fundamentals. I was just a young rebel. The 
period of my rebellion was prolonged by literature and writing. I did not have 
a clear consciousness at that time. . . . I just felt moved by that poem, at that 
time.45
Parallel to the Scar literature in the same period, Liu Jiakun’s expression of 
humanism was more or less following the feeling produced by mental or physical 
scars. In literature, a specific type of socially critical work that used realist tech-
nique appeared: Scar literature, which describes ordinary people’s calamities and 
spiritual wounds caused by the Cultural Revolution. Most of the representative 
authors of Scar literature were in their thirties and forties at the time; they worked 
as salaried writers and editors and published their works in state-sponsored liter-
ary journals.46 They aimed to turn the social realist style back onto itself, high-
lighting the detrimental effects left behind by the previous decades. But most 
of them just took over the writing technical legacy of realism and introduced 
other themes: self-reflection and humanism. From 1975–1978, Liu was sent to the 
countryside and forced to be re-educated by the uneducated poor peasants in the 
“Down to the Countryside Movement”. During the creation of Hero (1983) and 
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Highland (1984), Liu had been restricted by the doctrines of social realism and 
isolated from world literature for years; hence, his works were filled with enthusi-
asm and emotions but weak in profundity at that time.
After thirty years of contemplation and practice, Liu Jiakun’s reflection was 
finally translated into the Hu Huishan Memorial (Anren, 2009) in mature pro-
fundity and artistry in 2009 (Figures 3.7 and 3.8). However, in the Hu Huishan 
Figure 3.7 Liu Jiakun, Hu Huishan Memorial, Anren, 2009. Sketch
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Figure 3.8 Liu Jiakun, Hu Huishan Memorial, Anren, 2009
Memorial (Anren, 2009), Liu takes advantage of the abstract architectural lan-
guage, in less detailed decoration, and devoid of a direct inscription of the emo-
tion to awaken Chinese people to the relationship between the individual and the 
nation by memorialising the collective traumatic earthquake of May 12, 2008, 
Wenchuan. This was one of the most destructive earthquakes in recent decades 
and occurred in the northern Sichuan province of China. It registered 8.0 on the 
Richter scale with an eleven-degree quake intensity. Based on the official govern-
ment announcement of August 7, 2008, the earthquake killed 69,222 people and 
injured 37,4638, and 18,196 people were missing. In addition, it also destroyed a 
large number of buildings, house, bridges, and 43,125 km of roadways.47
After the earthquake, some memorials, memorial parks and a memorial museum 
were unveiled under national support to commemorate the lives lost and damage 
wrought by the Wenchuan earthquake. Cultural centres were also included in the 
later reconstruction of the cities. The first memorial park that opened in May 2008 
included the entire destroyed city of Beichuan, its crumbled and crumbling remains 
propped up and preserved to serve as a reminder of the tragedy. Bechuan Culture 
Centre (Beichuan, 2009), which is adjacent to the Earthquake Memorial Park, 
originated from the Qiang minority nationality’s settlement around Beichuan. It 
could be argued that the shared features of these memorials are their large scale 
and the same supporters: different levels of government. Hu Huishan Memorial 
(Anren, 2009) is perhaps the smallest memorial hall among them, which was not 
only designed but also financially supported by Liu Jiakun. Hu Huishan is neither a 
hero nor a great figure; she was a 15-year-old girl who was buried in the Wenchuan 
earthquake on May 12, 2008. The erection of the simple memorial for this third 
64 Conceiving the modern past
year student at Juyuan Middle School touches on ordinary people’s values and an 
ordinary person’s dignity. Liu Jiakun wrote for the Hu Huishan Memorial: “This 
memorial is built for a normal girl, and is also built for all the ordinary lives – and 
treasuring ordinary lives is a foundation for reviving the nation.” This building 
instantly stirs distinct feelings when contrasted with the other buildings in the 
metropolis of China: it carries an independent person’s spirit and an individual 
human being’s concern about other ordinary people. The natural energy of this 
building links his thinking on the position of the individual. It is self-expression 
about the humanist position. It looks untamed.
• The concept of tamed
Yet most architecture in contemporary China looks tamed. It is imperative to iden-
tify the term “tamed” in the contemporary Chinese context. The nation’s bur-
geoning real estate market, which serves up almost every conceivable fantasy and 
competes relentlessly for new consumers, has thrown into relief the altered rela-
tionship between the government and the individual.48 Apart from self-expression 
and a humanistic revival, there is another side in the societal transformation: it 
also includes private accumulation, self-promotion and self-interest in profit-
making. Especially after the 1990s, some fundamental changes began, as eco-
nomic reforms in areas such as the privatisation of economic ventures, real estate 
development and foreign investments led to the transformation of architecture, 
architectural design and architectural function at every level.
Architecture has become a channel for investment. Building construction 
has become such a profit-making tool that a building’s primary function is 
no longer to serve human needs. The traditional concepts associated with 
architecture such as aesthetics, comfortable environment, advanced building 
technology, and human occupancy have been suppressed to emphasize quan-
titative measures like construction volume, capital investment, construction 
time, cost and profit return.49
Consequently, the majority of the new architecture looks were somewhat tamed 
by the modernist authority in architecture, which is the fastest way to enjoy the 
economic relief offered by the market and accept the new cultures that the market 
exposes to the architecture. “In general, the average time to construct a fifteen-
story and thirty-story concrete building was ten months and eighteen months 
respectively. The fastest high-rise project has been done in just seven days.”50 
Hence, what an architect can do in seven days is usually to mimic any shape or 
façade of the architecture of Chicago. In other words, they look tamed by the 
international stylised style which has been promoted by globalisation. They look 
tamed by the immense amount of investment in the real estate. They look tamed 
by the excessive demands of the bureaucrats as well, in which many bureaucrats 
have assumed ambiguous roles as “entrepreneurial” officials-cum-businessmen51 
in these construction projects, making the architect more lost than ever. They 
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looked tamed by reaching their maturity in architecture by introducing a coarse-
ness of architecture into high-speed urbanisation.
To characterise Liu Jiakun’s Hu Huishan Memorial (Anren, 2009) as any “-ism” 
as modernism, brutalism, postmodernism, futurism, is to ignore this conjunction, 
since the architecture is untamed by any of the “-isms”. When architecture has 
become the most overwhelming activity in contemporary Chinese cities, “to be 
tamed or not to be tamed” actually provokes continual dialogue in architecture itself 
between promoting self-expression in architecture and promoting self-interest 
by exploiting architectural design in contemporary China, especially when most 
clients are indicating their willingness to pay more money for faster service. In 
Great Leap Forward, Lin observed that,
Every architecture should have a recipe. Architectural recipes have become 
indispensable references to every professional architect and student. Existing 
project or previous designs are recycled with minimum alterations. Designs 
are processed simply by replacing new labels and “hats,” a method that has 
become the most common for architectural design. “We collect a lot of bro-
chures, pattern books, and projects from Taiwan and Hong Kong, so it is very 
easy to find a project where I have an entire set of construction drawings,” 
says architect Sun Yimin.52
In contrast, Liu Jiakun walked away from the pattern books from which cus-
tomers are constantly ordering their building designs. Rejecting the architectural 
elements, languages, styles, forms and standard details in this transitional era to 
convey an architect’s own philosophy, his architecture is trapped between the 
relaxed self-expression and its unattainable and immature aspects; however, it is 
also an opportunity offered to architecture itself. Liu never expressly talks about 
these, but the nature of “untamed” has been reflected in the elements he utilises in 
his designs, for example, water and light, the materials he chooses purposely for 
different buildings, the wall as a special architectural component and the experi-
ence of space in his design.
• The untamed thread in Liu Jiakun’s works
The untamed thread can be discerned in various elements in his built work, in 
which water is one of the best examples. The importance of water is well recog-
nised by contemporary landscape planners and designers, but the water features 
have been further elevated to the human perceptual evaluation of the designed 
landscapes scenic quality, and the nature of the water has been diminished. In 
some of the architecture, water has been overexposed and over-intervened. For 
example, in the Gallery of Horyuji Treasures (Tokyo, 1999) designed by archi-
tect Yoshio Taniguchi, the building is poised beside a pond, tucked along a path 
on the water for visitors. The elegant shape of the water surface and water body 
gives the pond a monumental sculptured feature, making visitors feel the detailed 
texture of the water surface, when they walk alongside it. Endowed with social 
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attributes as well, water is not deliberately tamed by Liu Jiakun in the Luyeyuan 
Museum (Chengdu, 2001), which is located on a plain site between a riverbed and 
a bamboo grove (Figure 3.9). The solution is quite different from the minimalism 
of allowing water no form of its own, but occasionally polishing the shape of its 
container. Yet overall, the reliance and independence between the architecture of 
Luyeyuan Museum (Chengdu, 2001) and water are a manifestation of the tender 
and vigorous design intervention of Liu. That is to say, the elegant play between 
water and architecture in the Gallery of Horyuji Treasures (Tokyo, 1999) makes 
the water odourless, colourless and tasteless. However, in the Luyeyuan Museum 
(Chengdu, 2001), water is not perfectly noticeable for the visitors but has been 
naturally embedded in the landscape and added into a three-dimensional architec-
tural experience. Therefore, water here presents itself as a meditation of nature, 
events, sculptures and happenings. Water is not odourless, colourless and tasteless 
in Liu Jiakun’s intervention anymore, but water still seems quiet.
The attitude in the element of light is similar and of particular importance for 
measuring the “untamed” essence of Liu Jiakun’s architecture. Liu considered 
that “Light always does not send the surface a clear shadow in Sichuan province. 
If the light is searching the corner of one building, it does not mean it will deter-
mine the visual boundary of the building’s corner on the land”.53 The climate in 
Sichuan is vastly different between its eastern and eastern parts. The eastern part 
of Sichuan Basin has a humid sub-tropical monsoonal climate with China’s lowest 
sunshine totals. Chongqing is one of the cities with the shortest sunshine time in 
China, and is called the “foggy city”. Hence, in Liu Jiakun’s works, it is difficult 
Figure 3.9  Liu Jiakun, Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum, Chengdu, 2001. Presence of 
water in architecture
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to find highlights existing in the space. There is an awareness of a new way of 
manipulating light, of it being fogged. In Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum 
(Chengdu, 2001), the sculpture of Buddha is exhibited in the natural light, which 
comes from the gap in-between the building blocks from three directions, creat-
ing an atmosphere of serenity among the silent statues (Figure 3.10). The sun, 
moon, fire and electricity all light our world, but Liu is inclined to choose fuzzy 
in-between light among the sources. In Zhang Xiaogang’s Art Gallery (Chengdu, 
2008), light is a very significant factor in the space arrangements. In order to 
maximise the effect of light in different functional areas, Liu employs light from 
the south in the rest area such as bedrooms, reading rooms and entrance hall in 
the affiliated building, and light from the north in the atelier. In order to achieve 
a mysterious atmosphere and a better environment for appreciating works, the 
exhibition space sets the windows on the sidewalls and roofs to import various 
light qualities through diffusion and reflected and controllable light. There can be 
no visual form without light, but Liu does not care about the visual form when he 
deliberately uses the in-between light. In his architecture, light is not necessarily 
integral to architecture, its mission is not to reveal beauty, function or form; its 
mission is to maintain innocence in the secular world. It is untamed. Here, it is 
strangely rationally controlled yet irrationally emotionalised.
With regard to the materials Liu Jiakun used, the exaggerated presence of indus-
trial material in itself has a striking effect. These materials strike a contest with 
the glass, steel and other popularly used materials. The new campus design of 
Sichuan Fine Arts Institute (Chongqing, 2003) is an example of this effect. In this 
Figure 3.10  Liu Jiakun, Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum, Chengdu, 2001. Presence of 
light in architecture
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project, he tackled the materials freely, unburdened by assumptions. The result is a 
complex combination of unselfconscious materials, including as-cast-finish shale 
brick, as-cast-finish concrete, perforated cellular brick, galvanised iron sheet, cor-
rugated concrete slab, clay-pottery brick and concrete sun-shading board. A large 
part of its façade is made of bared shale bricks, which may create an illusion of 
piled-up red glaze tiles or surface painting for a visitor taking a glimpse from a dis-
tance. In China, bared shale brick is often used to build the façade of the shanties 
at construction sites or low-quality housing in rural areas. At the brick surface we 
can see black stains with white spots surrounding occasionally due to incomplete 
firing. Shale is a common building material; however, through the specific design, 
this façade creates a specific feeling: the red shale brick stands there, but it is not 
tamed into the surrounding, the fake Westernised buildings. In the building of the 
Sculpture Department of the Sichuan Fine Arts Institute (Chongqing, 2003), the 
surface has also adopted red shale bricks to blend with the environmental tone. 
And the special usage of the caesious cement is to resume the sand plaster tradi-
tion in the Chongqing zone. The rusty aluminium board partly used is made by 
the students of the Print Department. Besides the red brick, the black, white and 
grey concrete blocks are used as the main materials for the Lodging Centre of 
“China International Practice Exhibition of Architecture” (Nanjing, 2004). The 
design reflects local rural context by borrowing elements such as common cement 
products, which are often used in rural areas. Liu does not depend excessively on 
these low-quality materials but deploys their independent spirit (Figure 3.11).
Figure 3.11  Liu Jiakun, Lodging Centre of China International Practice Exhibition of 
Architecture, Nanjing, 2004
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Yet untamed material is not the same as crude treatment. The material in the 
design of Shanghai Qingpu District Exhibition Centre (Shanghai, 2006) of New 
Town Construction by Liu Jiakun is one such case. Shanghai Qingpu district is 
dotted with group designs by star architects and popular in the architectural scene. 
The attempt of Qingpu district council to create a contemporary water city envi-
ronment is a combination of architectural aesthetics and political and cultural 
intention. In the selection and treatment of material by Liu, stone window shading 
is a special design consideration, piling up black stone pieces (450-mm width and 
35-mm thickness) at intervals of 600 mm. These pieces are ordered, according 
to their heights, as 1,350, 1,200 and 850.54 In order to prevent tumbling, there is 
a 15-mm-thick steel plate extending from the inner window frame, which has an 
engraved slot to fasten the stone pieces. The stone pieces are well processed, with 
deliberately chopped coarse and protruding short edges. The surface of the long 
side edge is especially polished, and some slots (5 mm x 5 mm) are engraved at 
every 20-mm spacing. This is an example of the delicate treatments of one mate-
rial in the whole design (Figure 3.12). Being untamed is not the same as being 
disrespectful, although the building may be described as minimalistic.
The experience of space in this design is also good illustration of “untamed”. 
Before visitors arrive at the Luyeyuan Museum (Chengdu, 2001), they need to 
walk up a slope in a bamboo grove and pass a pond decorated with lotus flowers. 
Liu explains it was intended to create an everyday life experience and let visitors 
walk downward from the gate of the museum. Visitors spiral down, generating 
a sense of coming into an underground palace. Like an archaeological dig, the 
Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum (Chengdu, 2001) reveals itself from the top 
down, offering a sense of discovery as visitors move through it.55 From riverside 
open platform at the second floor, the stairs lead visitors to the roof space. The 
view from the roof is a pastoral scene of West Sichuan Plain and a river with 
cobblestones flows nearby. These experiences that the architect has deliberately 
created are fundamentally anti-everyday life experiences.
In the brick and reinforced concrete mixed structure Liu Jiakun initiated, the 
wall becomes a central element. What this wall carries is not only the untamed 
architectural element itself, but it shows the untamed attitude towards architec-
tural theory. Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum (Chengdu, 2001) is a collec-
tion of stone sculptures; thus, the architecture wants to tell people a story of an 
artificial stone. Owing to the limitations of the local building trades in this part of 
Sichuan, the architect used the inner brick wall as a template, ensuring a vertical 
pour for the wall. Shale bricks also provide a formwork to create a grid pattern on 
the concrete, which gives the walls texture and hides imperfections in the exposed 
material. As local construction technique is primitive and flexible modification 
afterwards is always possible, a combined technique of frame structure with fair-
faced concrete and shale bricks is created. Indention templates with stripes are 
used to pour the fair-faced concrete walls of the main building in order that a clear 
pattern is formed, a strong impression of walls is made and the fault caused by 
lack of experience in the pouring technique is camouflaged behind the dense and 
wild lattice that covers it.
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Figure 3.12  Liu Jiakun, Shanghai Qingpu District Exhibition Centre, Shanghai, 2006. 
Stone window shading
However, this wall caused many debates. The content of the debates are not 
my focus in this study, but I will list them out and then discuss Liu Jiakun’s 
response to questions, which reflect his personal quality and its connection with 
the untamed architecture. In Tao Zhu’s article published in 2002, Promises and 
Assumptions of Tectonics,56 he used the Luyeyuan Museum (Chengdu, 2007) as 
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an example to illustrate the inclination of reduction in regards to tectonics. He 
argued that the expressiveness of the concrete tectonics was the priority for Liu 
Jiakun in Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum (Chengdu, 2000), in order to repre-
sent a “monolithic structure”: “if Liu Jiakun had at his disposal the same recourses 
as Tadao Ando, in terms of economic and technological conditions, he would not 
have had any hesitation in using a cast-in-place concrete wall to achieve a mono-
lithic structure.”57 In the same year, along with the book Here and Now by Liu, 
he subtly answered Tao Zhu’s doubt. He rationally rectified the unusual combina-
tion of poured concrete and shale brick’s structural concerns first; furthermore he 
peacefully made a stand regarding the notion of the tectonic: “Writing an archi-
tecture has writing’s own aim, and it does not necessarily leave a space for the 
narration”,58 which seemingly replied the doubts around tectonics in an indirect 
way. Peng Nu further discusses the essential difference between tectonic expres-
sion of material, when facing the question of the validity of tectonics.59 Therefore, 
that the combined technique of frame structure with fair-faced concrete and shale 
brick is inauthentic from the perspective of tectonics, has already been discussed 
abundantly, and it is not my focus in this study.
My focus here is the ways Liu Jiakun confronts doubts and the attitude he 
holds, showing his nimble mind, which is an important personal resource for 
the untamed attribute of architecture. When the visitor arrives at the site of Luy-
eyuan Stone Sculpture Museum (Chengdu, 2001), the real local condition is dis-
covered, which helps people to understand that when Liu was requested to use 
the local farmers, unskilled, as the construction team in building the Luyeyuan 
Stone Sculpture Museum (Chengdu, 2001), it is hard to imagine that the perpen-
dicularity of the walls could stir so much debate regarding tectonics. The fact 
is that due to the limited time and budget, the architect promptly dealt with the 
reality he faced, but with a long-term plan. For example, the interior face of the 
composite wall, which adopts brick-laying and plastering techniques, leaves a 
space for coping with different kinds of change afterwards, when the exhibits on 
display gradually moved in. Talking of architectural theories, like tectonics, Liu 
shows his respect in a few interviews, and he said he is not particularly familiar 
with architectural history or theory. However, he does not show the slightest fear 
when being involved in vague and theoretical discussions. He did not dispel the 
doubts directly but logically let them unfold in the article. Nu Peng later intel-
lectually summarised what he replied into three points. But for Liu Jiakun, he 
responds to outside discussions that are full of jargon in simple words, analogous 
to his designs.
All these elements give his architecture a special stamp of being untamed. They 
do not look tamed by the authority of modernism; they do not look tamed by the 
international stylised stroke; and they do not look tamed by the immense amount 
of investment in the real estate. They do not look tamed by the excessive demand 
by the bureaucrats; they do not look tamed by quickly reaching their maturity 
in architecture by introducing a mature-coarseness of architecture into the high-
speed urbanisation. They do not look tamed, but this adjective only refers to his 
designs, not to the person.
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A tamed architect
Apart from Liu Jiakun’s consciousness of individualism and humanism that has 
been discussed above, what else makes his architecture look and feel untamed? 
Media and commentators have summarised Liu’s design philosophy as,
Set foot on China’s status quo, positively deal with all the social conflicts 
coming up in the process of development, make the best use of all the advan-
tages and change the unfavourable factors into consignments and resources 
for the design. A good design equals the limited resources in a creative way.60
But nobody has pointed out what the main social conflicts are or why he is willing 
to deal with these social conflicts.
For Liu Jiakun, there were obscure years of dedication to self-reflection in 
Tibet, which all came to the fore between 1994 and 1997 with the artists’ private 
studio projects, commissioned by Luo Zhongli,61 He Duoling62 and other intimate 
friends of his youth. By the mid-1990s, China’s once centrally planned arts world 
gave way to a partial disengagement of art from politics.63 With the post-socialist 
relaxation of control over personal pursuit, and the orientation towards the market 
since 1990, Luo Zhongli artists’ studio (Chengdu, 1996) was the first batch of 
individual artist studios in China being legitimised. With the freedom outside the 
public cultural organisations, it allowed artists to have greater independence in 
art, but greater dependence on money as well. However, with the distance of time, 
we can say that this action itself was operating with massive uncertainties in the 
new wave of uncertain reform and an uncertain cultural sphere. Cultural markets 
operated with uncertainties and speculation, which introduced new jealousies and 
insecurities in commerce, alongside the more obvious problems of political pres-
sure.64 Facing inflation and declining public subsidies, the huge uncertainty of 
self-investment possibly made the artists Luo Zhongli and He Duoling themselves 
insecure.
The He Duoling studio (Chengdu, 1997) was the first time Liu Jiakun experi-
mented with the aesthetics and spatial possibilities of brick and a reinforced con-
crete mixed structure, which saves costs when compared to only a reinforced 
concrete structure (Figure 3.13). Meanwhile, the brick and reinforced concrete 
mixed structure is widely utilised in the local rural area. Moreover, the exterior 
and interior walls are both treated by local methods, adopting plaster and paint. 
In China, the brick and reinforced concrete mixed structure is always assumed to 
be backwards, with less potentiality in windowing, and less freedom in design. 
But it is still widely applied in the rural areas of China with a long-term history, 
and the local people have also accumulated a wealth of experience. However, the 
latent capacity of it has been explored and magnified by Liu’s design: a rising 
path surrounds the podium of the patio, and makes a sharp turn when the perspec-
tive is about to close, the blind façade and the protective thick wall in contrast 
with the slight crevices, and the four blind walls formulating the inner patio are 
raised up deliberately, reinforcing the empty inward space. Even the poor quality 
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Figure 3.13 Liu Jiakun, Duoling He studio, Chengdu, 1997
of the locally produced bricks does not obstruct the expressive spatial ability of 
brick and reinforced concrete mixed structure. It is an experiment, but it is not an 
experiment ignoring the signs of the time and the place.
Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum (Chengdu, 2001), which confirms Liu 
Jiakun as a leading figure in the China’s architectural scene was also initiated 
by an individual artist, Zhong Ming, the curator of this small museum. As China 
moved boldly into a market economy in the 1980s and 1990s, Denton argues that 
museums of modern history edged slowly away from standard narratives of class 
oppression and revolutionary struggle towards representations of the past that 
legitimise the contemporary ideology of commerce, entrepreneurship and market 
reform.65 In the early 1990s, despite a lot of rhetoric about globalisation and plu-
ralism from museum curators and musicologists, museums in China continued to 
be used by the state for legitimising purposes or are at least closely aligned with 
state interests.66 In June 1994, a new set of “Guidelines for Patriotic Education”: 
was adopted at a National Conference on Education. This document gave the 
official stamp to the displacement of Marxist ideology by “pragmatic national-
ism”.67 The different types of patrons of museums were also encouraged as the 
new ideology was legitimised. A private museum like Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture 
Museum (Chengdu, 2001) was erected along with the rising self-fulfilment and 
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self-expression of the successful individual entrepreneurs, artists who grasped the 
opportunities and made a lot of money in that period. Although the official propa-
ganda was still in the transient period from socialism to patriotism, the content 
of Luyeyuan was not aligned with this. Although confronted by uncertainty, Liu 
Jiakun was commissioned and finally let the design have its own characteristics.
When considering how Liu Jiakun smoothly held the attitude to be naturally 
tamed in the social conflicts, we notice that the projects mentioned above are all 
built between the old-line and new-line: the rapidly rising personal income has 
meant that individuals can enjoy more choices with individual economic power, 
while it also pushed them to maintain their investments carefully. Unlike the archi-
tects who work in the National and Municipal Architectural Institutes who are usu-
ally commissioned by some national or municipal projects, Liu was commissioned 
by personal friends, and he gave importance to that reality: aware that the extremely 
limited funds of the artists themselves could only be solved by saving more money 
in the construction budget, and at the same time, the artists were extremely careful 
of their individual identities associated with the architecture. Different from most 
intellectuals at that time who considered private patronage to be the carrier of crude-
ness into intellectual life, Liu Jiakun embraced this embarrassment. Considering 
the studios of Luo Zhongli (Chengdu, 1996) and He Duoling (Chengdu, 1997) and 
Luyeyuan Stone Sculpture Museum (Chengdu, 2001), on one hand, the architecture 
had to be transgressive, while on the other hand, it was controlled by the investors’ 
anxiety about the instability of the market, inflation of incomes and political unrest.
Liu’s architecture embodies his own psychological acceptance of the declin-
ing sponsorship from the government, and his understanding of artists’ anxiety 
regarding money and their will for “art for art’s sake”. According to Adorno’s 
theory of aesthetic autonomy, cultural products embody social values and have 
the potential to push the limit of existing forms only when they can be protected 
against the effects of schematisation that result from the system of commodity 
exchange.68 Adorno’s belief fails to find resonance in Liu’s world. Liu salvages 
the limited resources provided by the artists who worked under personal pressures 
of living and working for material benefits and creates interesting designs that not 
merely aligned with state interests. Liu’s psychological change occurred earlier 
than most of the architects who worked in the collective National and Munici-
pal Architectural Institutes. That is to say, in opposition to most intellectuals at 
that time who considered private patronage to be the transmitter of crudeness 
into intellectual life, Liu Jiakun embraced this embarrassment. His psychological 
adjustment gave him new impetus in design and pushed the limit of existing forms 
in architecture in embracing this embarrassment.
“To make the best use of all the advantages and change the unfavourable fac-
tors into consignments and resources for the design”, which has been repeated by 
many commentators, is his creative contribution to the new forms of architecture 
of contemporary China in the tension between centrally planning to the market 
economy. Therefore, we could say that Liu’s own experiences have given him a 
better understanding of the relationship between design and market expectations. 
What makes his architecture unique is the elegant architectural play between the 
design and market expectations.
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Jianchuan Museum Cluster is a more recent case representing this interplay, as 
China’s economy has continued to deliver double-digit growth, underpinned by 
a rapid expansion of individualism, which legitimised the launch of the museum 
cluster. Jianchuan Museum Cluster is located in Anren, a national-class historical 
and cultural town in Chengdu, Sichuan, planned together by Liu Jiakun and Yong 
Ho Chang. The groundbreaking fact of this cluster is that it is owned and very 
much directed by an individual person, the entrepreneur Fan Jianchuan. These 
museums have a rich repository of over eight million artefacts, with 121 of them 
classified as Class-One National Treasures, mainly collected by Fan Jianchuan. 
Liu Jiakun proposed that here a museum does not necessarily serve as political 
propaganda. With a total area of 500 acres (2.0 km2), the museum cluster is made 
up of fifteen museums, but Anren is still a rural and undeveloped town, one hour’s 
drive from Chengdu. Liu summarised his vision before: “The core problem is to 
learn how to control the utilitarian; it drives the construction, and it is also the 
driver of destructive power.”69 But how to make the utilitarian drive a building 
dedicated to sacred space in this project was the core problem for Liu. At that 
point, Liu was an architect aligned with the entrepreneur Fan Jianchuan. There-
fore, how to sustain the largest private museum cluster in Anren was taken into 
serious consideration in Liu’s designs.
In the design of the Clock Museum of Culture Revolution, Liu Jiakun regards 
the success of commercial business as a surviving foundation for the museum. 
The logic of realising the importance of money serves to promote achieving the 
satisfaction of the commercial facilities. Liu implements a museum inside the 
core of an abandoned commercial site, bisecting two different conditions into two 
extreme sectors by superimposing the cacophony of the surrounding commercial 
zone with the quietness of museum core space, and making an apparent contrast 
between “secular space” and “sacred space”. By doing these things from above, 
Liu further strengthens and deepens the power of influence coming from commer-
cial reality and historical heritage and eventually creates a unique sense of place.
Therefore, when the architect is tamed by the social conflicts in the transi-
tion era, it does not mean the architecture has to be tamed as well. Being tamed 
alternatively gives the architect a new understanding of architecture and evokes 
the new way of manipulation in design. In The Little Prince, there are some other 
words concerning “tame”: “But if you tame me, then we shall need each other. To 
me, you will be unique in all the world. To you, I shall be unique in all the world.” 
To Liu Jiakun, the market does not imply to meticulously reconstruct versions 
of the most iconic cities of the West. But as an architect, if the market and social 
transformation tame him, then they shall need each other. It could be argued that 
one of the main reasons for his good design with limited resources in a creative 
way is, to some extent, because he is psychologically tamed in the social conflicts.
The individual architect and the emerging market
Clearly the emerging market provided a new opportunity for latent commerciali-
sation, gradually providing alternative resources for an individual architect like 
Liu Jiakun. In addition, exhibitions flourishing along with the development of 
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the market helped unofficial and individual architects transform themselves into 
architect celebrities. Although contemporary architecture is lagging five years 
behind art in the dissemination of new reputation and values in both the internal 
and external markets, the personal changes in architects are more related to the 
development of the discipline itself, rather than purely serving foreign collectors, 
or aligning themselves for or against large-scale political/ideological campaigns 
during this massive transition.
Through the comparison between Liu Jiakun and Zhang Xiaogang, we can see 
a personal reaction to this huge social transformation becoming a significant fac-
tor in determining his career choice and designs. Even though Zhang and Liu 
practice in different disciplines, they consciously or unconsciously convey the 
same “collective memory”, albeit through different techniques of expression. 
Liu’s architecture legitimises a new dynamic based on the architect’s own reinter-
pretation of the collective memory embedded in his life experiences, even if that 
means recalling a collectively traumatic past, for his designs confirm that social-
ism under the planned economy was a significant part of Chinese history, and the 
memory of the collective is an intrinsic part of the psyche of people born in the 
1950s and 1960s. Incorporating the memory of the collective in architecture dem-
onstrates Liu Jiakun’s humanistic understandings of memory. His life experiences 
as a writer before embarking on a career in architecture gave him a heightened 
sensitivity to humanism, withstanding even the recent chaos of massive construc-
tion in China. Even with the immense amount of investment in real estate, Liu’s 
subjectivity does not lead him to promote self-interest by exploiting architectural 
design. This is the reason that his works look untamed.
Liu Jiakun in his architectural practice significantly exceeds the limits of Chi-
nese people’s contemporary anxiety when confronting the era of Mao, because 
his designs parallel the perspective of the people, rather than the state, yet they do 
not evoke people’s sense of feeling awkward about their own youth. Although the 
assertion of socialist aesthetics in the Chinese context, no matter how contrived, 
might be assumed at face value to be a kind of politically correct manoeuvre, the 
analysis reveals that the architecture designed by Liu has overcome ideological 
deviation and retains its integrity, instead of serving the purposes of the gov-
ernment, simulating a sense of involvement in the socialist regime, or serving 
the imagination of the West. It also demonstrates how such works have further 
enriched the architectural language in contemporary China. The result is the 
expression of genuine folk language linking new identities emerging from the 
everyday urban landscape and general anxieties in China.
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Cui Kai is the deputy president and chief architect of China Architecture 
Design & Research Group (CAG). He has been honoured with the highest recog-
nition of achievement in China’s building industry. His designs have been widely 
published in journals, magazines and books. His work has its roots in modernism 
and postmodernism from Mao to early post-Mao. I have devised two terms in my 
analysis of Cui Kai’s architecture – “delayed modernism” and “hazy postmod-
ernism”. Chinese architecture was destined to continue its way in the interna-
tional modernist trend in 1950s, but this move was cut short by the Communist 
Revolution in 1949. With the launch of the open policies in mainland China 
after 1978, Chinese architecture finally re-embraced modernism, after a delay 
of almost thirty years. The term “delayed” is utilised to describe the modernist 
condition for Cui Kai and his generation of architects. While Chinese architec-
ture was absorbing modernism in the late 1970s, this movement was interrupted 
by the intrusion of post modernist theories into Chinese discourse. However, for 
many reasons, when post modernist theories travelled to China, they took a differ-
ent form from the postmodernist theories originating in the West. In other words, 
Chinese postmodernist theories were ambiguous, originating from a different 
family tree; that is why they can be described as hazy postmodernism. All these 
factors manifested in Cui Kai’s architecture in a subtle way. In comparing the tra-
jectory of modernism and postmodernism in Mainland China and Taiwan, I will 
address two issues: first, why it is impossible to detect the Bauhaus-influenced 
clean lines of modernism in Cui Kai’s early designs, a trend which was given full 
expression in early Taiwanese modern architecture; second, why postmodernist 
characteristics emerged so abruptly in his designs.
Cui Kai joined CAG in 1984, and his works have been consistent with CAG’s 
step-by-step reform from the early 1980s until the present. In the second part, the 
analysis of powerful sources that sparked his aspirations in architecture will be 
located within the trajectory of CAG. The critical review of Cui Kai’s work asso-
ciated with CAG was initiated by Feng Li’s master’s thesis (2010)1 which gave 
a general overview of the history of the CAG, CAG’s reform, CAG’S works and 
Cui Kai’s works separately, following a critical analysis and explanation of the 
causes and effects of reform on its working mechanism. Yet Li does not directly 
associate Cui Kai’s designs with the exploration of CAG; he lists a separate 
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chronologic stylistic analysis of Cui Kai’s work. In other words, Feng Li’s analy-
sis of Cui Kai’s designs was limited to the domain of stylistic studies and set apart 
from CAG’s reform amid the broad societal transformation.
Delayed modernism and hazy postmodernism
In Feng Li’s analysis, the first pattern emerging in Cui Kai’s earlier works in the 
1990s reflected influences from both eclectic historicism and postmodernism. The 
style might be traced back to Hyatt Hotel E’fang Palace (Xi’an, 1991), Shenzhen 
Minghua Centre (Shenzhen,1992) and the office building for Foreign Language 
Teaching & Research Press completed in 1998.2 The office building for Foreign 
Language Teaching & Research Press (Beijing, 1997) is a milestone design in 
Cui Kai’s career, which later became an icon for Foreign Language Teaching & 
Research Press. Li described this building as “suspended bridges, stacking and 
falling balconies, non-orthogonal axis, complex mass cut”,3 which are recognisa-
ble postmodernist characteristics. However, what is the origin of Cui Kai’s vision 
of postmodernism? Does it really arise from postmodern theory?
Like the majority of architects in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Cui 
Kai’s response to modernism and postmodernism and his own interpretations 
of the two trends are principal factors shaping his view on architecture and his 
designs. It is also useful to make a comparison between the social and political 
conditions that allowed modernism and postmodernism to influence architecture 
in mainland China and Taiwan. This comparison between mainland China and 
Taiwan elucidates the trajectory of modernism and postmodernism in China’s 
architecture, giving a context to Cui Kai’s early works from Maoist China to the 
early market transition, and revealing the underlying social conditions and edu-
cational conditions that determined the characteristics in Cui Kai’s works. We are 
then in a position to understand the accidental combination of modernism and 
postmodernism in Cui Kai’s works.
• Delayed modernism for Cui Kai
Prior to 1949, thirteen Christian universities in mainland China made great con-
tributions to the nation’s higher education. From the “Archives of the United 
Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia”, documented by Yale University, 
at a meeting of representatives of the China Christian Educational Association, it 
was proposed to establish a “Board of Co-operation of the Union Institutions of 
Higher Education in China”, which would serve to facilitate coordination in the 
areas of educational programme, faculty recruitment and financial promotion in 
May 1920.4 St. John’s College (later St. John’s University) was one of the first 
institutions to be founded as a college.5 In September 1937, following the start of 
the Sino-Japanese war, it was decided to move St. John’s University to the Inter-
national Settlement in Shanghai.6
In 1942, Huang Zuoshen set up the Department of Architecture in St. John’s 
University in Shanghai and, in this way, formally introduced the Bauhaus 
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approach to China. Huang Zuoshen had first trained at the AA School of Architec-
ture, and he later became committed to modern architecture under the influence of 
Walter Gropius at Harvard University.7 The Bauhaus approach was introduced by 
Huang to St. John’s University in the 1940s. Yet social realism imported from the 
Soviet Union in the early 1950s was imposed as an official style in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Therefore, abstract art and modern architecture were 
not promoted. Artists were required to produce realistic works that any proletarian 
could understand, and the architecture’s mission was also to celebrate the triumph 
of socialism and serve the proletariat.
Since the Bauhaus approach had totally disappeared in mainland China by the 
early 1950s, understanding architecture in Taiwan helps us to realise the limita-
tions of a linear investigation of mainland China. The defeat in the Civil War 
(1927–1950) led the Chinese Nationalist Party – also known as Kuomingtang – to 
retreat to the island of Taiwan, colonised by Japan fifty-one years previously. Tai-
wan, an offshore Chinese island, was thus raised to independent status overnight. 
When the political leadership in China split in 1949, it also brought cultural and 
architectural isolation. Furthermore, since the geographical split, the two Chinese 
higher education systems developed separately, led by two Chinese ruling par-
ties.8 In mainland China, after 1949, all rival forces which the Communist Party 
perceived to be associated with capitalism – such as the free market and religious 
observances – were eliminated. Like other private institutions, all pre-1949 pri-
vate colleges and universities, particularly those run by foreign associations, were 
nationalised in the early 1950s; their ownership and administrative powers were 
transferred to the state.9 After 1949, the Christian universities, including St. John’s 
University, were forced to close, and their campuses were gradually taken over 
by the People’s government. The era of Christian Higher Education in mainland 
China was terminated at that time.
However, in Taiwan, in 1950, a group of enthusiastic Chinese educators pro-
posed to the United Board for Christian Colleges in China to foster the spirit of 
Chinese youth by establishing an ideal university in Taiwan that would both con-
tinue the work of Christian education in China and inherit the grand tradition of 
the thirteen mainland universities.10 In this way the establishment of Tunghai Uni-
versity in Taiwan would continue the legacy of Christian universities in mainland 
China. In 1952, the board’s secretary, Dr. William P. Fenn, made a trip to Taiwan 
to investigate the possibility and decided to establish a university. In June of 1953, 
the board sent Dr. Thomas W. Graham of Oberlin College, Ohio representing the 
organisation, together with Dr. Fenn, to set up a preparatory office and board to 
oversee the establishment of the school.11 In 1955, Tunghai University was estab-
lished. At this point we must examine the question of whether this continuing 
enthusiasm of Christian Colleges in Taiwan assisted an architectural continuance 
of modernism or caused a serious deviation.
Zhang Zhaokang is the key figure in the modernist shift of the Bauhaus archi-
tectural spirit by way of St. John’s University in mainland China to the United 
States and then to Taiwan. Zhang was born in Guangzhou and graduated from the 
Department of Architecture in the St. John’s University in 1946, the first university 
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to adopt the Bauhaus architectural education in China. However, the founder of 
the Department of Architecture in the St. John’s University, Huang Zuoshen, 
chose to stay in mainland China after the Communist Revolution, and he was later 
persecuted in the Cultural Revolution. There was thus no chance for him to spread 
a Bauhaus approach either in education or in practice in that period. However, 
Zhang Zhaokang, as the first graduate from the Department of Architecture in 
St. John’s University, moved from mainland China to the United States. In 1949, 
Zhang enrolled in the Harvard Graduate School of Design (GSD) and became 
a disciple of Bauhaus architect Walter Gropius. The approach he absorbed was 
brought back to Taiwan by Zhang, who received an invitation from the founder of 
the Department of Architecture of Tunghai University, Chen Qikuan. With help 
from the United Board for Christian Colleges, Chen was the architect who estab-
lished the Department of Architecture of Tunghai University in 1960, which has 
been a leader in defining and piloting the discipline of architecture in Taiwan. 
I. M. Pei and Zhang Zhaokang were invited to cooperate in the planning of Tung-
hai University. Concerning Chen Qikuan, I. M. Pei and Zhang Zhaokang’s educa-
tion backgrounds, it is not hard to trace their convergence in Harvard and their 
connections with Gropius, the founder of the Bauhaus School and one of the pio-
neering proponents of modern architecture. In 1935, although Pei had enrolled 
in the University of Pennsylvania’s architecture school and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology successively, he later transferred to and finally graduated 
from the Harvard GSD. In 1951, Chen enrolled in Gropius’s architectural research 
group and subsequently joined his design firm. His teaching at MIT was soon 
terminated by his new role at Tunghai University.
According to Ming-Song Shyu and Chun-Hsiung Wang’s book, Rustic & Poetic – 
An Emerging Generation of Architecture in Postwar Taiwan, as the economy grad-
ually revived in the mid-1950s, three trends in architecture dominated Taiwan: one 
was Chinese nationalist architecture; the second trend was modernist architecture – 
supported and promoted by the architectural academy, some intellectual archi-
tects and the economic construction department in the national government. 
The third trend was the so-called “Chinese modern architecture”.12 Looking at 
Wang Dahong’s Architect’s Own House on Jien-Guo S. Road (Taipei, 1953), St. 
Christopher’s Church (Taipei, 1957), Kung-Tung Technical Senior High School 
(Taitung, 1960) and Tsz Hechen’s Third Refectory in National Cheng Kung Uni-
versity (Tainan, 1962), it is possible to detect in these buildings the characteristics 
of buildings constructed in the heyday of modernism in Europe. Some of them 
are unembellished white boxes featuring flat roofs and open plans that offer light, 
air, space, transparency and dynamism. Yet these pure modernist characteristics, 
reflected in the buildings mentioned above, did not emerge in Cui Kai’s early 
works or the early works of his generation of architects in mainland China.
In other words, the Bauhaus-based modernism, which did not have enough time 
to rise to prominence and stabilise in mainland China, was forced from main-
land China after 1949. However the opportunity offered by the United Board 
shifted the site of its continuance to Taiwan. Thus in post-war Taiwan, we can 
see a generation of architects’ designs displaying rational, practical and simple 
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characteristics. On the mainland, there was an absence of Bauhaus-based modern-
ist theory in architectural education during the founding period of the PRC, and 
this gap delayed the absorption of Bauhaus-inspired modernism for a generation 
of Chinese architects.
Cui Kai, as the representative of this generation, was consigned to the coun-
tryside in the “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement”.13 
He seized the first chance to pursue his ambitions. In 1977, due to hepatitis, he 
was assigned to pasture cattle in the countryside, and at the same time, he started 
to prepare for examinations. The university examinations, which had been sus-
pended in 1966, were held again from 1977 onwards. In acknowledgement of 
more than a decade of missed opportunity, candidates ranging in age from 13 to 
37 were allowed to take the exam. “A pent-up reservoir of talent and ambition was 
released as 5.7 million people took the two-day exam in November and Decem-
ber 1977, in what may have been the most competitive scholastic test in modern 
Chinese history.”14 Cui was successful and received an offer to study architecture 
at Tianjing University at 1977. He continued to pursue his master’s degree in the 
Department of Architecture, graduating in 1984.
In respect of modernism in Chinese architecture in his undergraduate study, 
Cui Kai wrote,
At that time, teachers basically taught modernist architecture. Due to the 
extreme lack of relevant reference material about modernist theory or mas-
terpieces of modern architecture, teachers always drew modern architecture 
from foreign magazines by pen and converted them into printing. In that era, 
we felt exhilarated confronting the modern architecture that was extremely 
novel for us. I always drew the modern architecture by pen after class. The 
understanding of architecture at that time was more close to the monument, 
focusing on the architectural form, composition of a picture, proportion, style 
and so on. . . . The relevant material was very limited. Therefore, it was good 
enough for us to find some site plans in the usual information, regardless of 
the understanding and personal interpretation of the historical significance 
and humanistic significance.15
After the death of Mao in 1976 and the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 
1978, the Chinese architecture curriculum began to reflect modernist theory. The 
resumption of uniform entrance examinations for universities across the coun-
try was prompted by the need to promote “four modernisations” under chairman 
Hua’s policy.16 The Chinese leadership thought it to be the only way to achieve 
the objective of the “four modernisations”, raise the standard of education and 
thereby the standard of living of Chinese people.17 Hence the four modernisa-
tions were first outlined in February 1978, by Chinese premier and party chairman 
Hua Guofeng. Hua identified the success of the campaign with the completion of 
120 key industrial projects, including mines, steel mills, power plants and har-
bours.18 Modernist architecture was categorised into the disciplines of applied sci-
ences and technology – including mechanical, electrical and civil engineering and 
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water conservancy. Parallel with the process of reforming Institutions of Higher 
Learning, the restoration of scholastic examinations and the need for talented 
young people was the importance given to science and technology.
Therefore, modernist architecture was an integral part of the ideology of mod-
ernisation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A dialogue between Cui Kai and the 
Taiwanese Wang Weijen19 titled “Cross-Strait Questioning and Retrospecting – 
A Dialogue between Cui Kai and Wang Weijen”20 was recorded by Time + Archi-
tecture in 2012. It suggests that Cui Kai and Wang Weijun, who took their under-
graduate studies and postgraduate studies in the similar period, but studied in 
mainland China and Taiwan, respectively, held different ideas about modernism. 
Wang was taught to be critical of modernism while learning it. Therefore, in 
Wang’s early designs, the architectural language is always far from the “puritani-
cally moral language of orthodox modern architecture”.21 In the Fumin Primary 
School (Taichung, 2002), which won the 2003 award for Far East Architecture 
Award, it is apparent that the regional motive, which serves as an inspiration, 
counters the influence of modernism. In the planning of Fumin Primary School 
(Taichung, 2002), Wang said,
As it develops from the dance with the trees, we do not employ a geometric 
idea that follows the sense of view and touch: thus, our design becomes vivid 
so even the windows seem to be dancing with the trees.22
The concept that Wang promotes could be defined simply as a local sense of 
space, aware of itself. The overall planning does not fall into a geometrical strict-
ness. The façade windows and the roof shapes reject the highly-industrialised 
prototype.
In contrast, the Bauhaus-based modernism was inspirational for Cui Kai when 
he first began to study architecture. On the one hand, the dominant ideology was 
strongly leaning to modernism in that period. On the other hand, the modernist 
exile enhanced the eagerness for modernism in architecture. If his designs had 
continued in this way, a committed modernism would have been reflected in Cui 
Kai’s architecture. However, after he graduated, his early projects – the Hyatt 
Hotel E’fang Palace (Xi’an,1991) and the Shenzhen Minghua Centre (Shenz-
hen,1992) (Figure 4.1), Beijing Feng Ze Yuan Hotel (Beijing, 1994) (Figure 4.2) 
and the office building for Foreign Language Teaching & Research Press (Beijing, 
1997) do not reflect the characteristics of high modernism in the European tradi-
tion, with its practicality and emphasis on integrity of expression.
• Hazy postmodernism for Cui Kai
In the dialogue between Cui Kai and Wang Weijen,23 “Cross-Strait Questioning 
and Retrospecting – A Dialogue between Cui Kai and Wang Weijen”, Wang states 
that he directly adopted postmodernist theories when he was an undergraduate 
student. Wang graduated from the Department of Geography at National Taiwan 
University in 1981. It is evident that Wang’s view on the subject of architecture in 
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Figure 4.1 Cui Kai, Shenzhen Minghua Centre, Shenzhen, 1992
Taiwan has the limitation of his own personal experience, especially as it is pos-
sible that he did not have the opportunity to learn the entire architectural curricu-
lum as a geography student. But it does reflect the general historical moment that 
postmodernism came to Taiwan. Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, 
written by Robert Venturi, was published in 1966. It evolved from the emerging 
historicist architectural movement in the United States and travelled to Taiwan in 
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Figure 4.2 Cui Kai, Beijing Feng Ze Yuan Hotel, Beijing, 1994
1980, translated by Tingfang Ye.24 For Taiwan, after the emphasis on modernism, 
but before the development boom of the 1970s, there was a lull that gave a genera-
tion of Taiwanese architects an opportunity to lay a modernist foundation between 
the 1950s and 1970s, allowing more than twenty years of autonomous develop-
ment. In the 1970s, a major turning point in Taiwan’s economy and its real estate 
seduced Taiwan’s architecture away from the seriousness of modernist ideals. In 
contrast, when modernism arrived in mainland China in the late 1970s, it accompa-
nied the influx of new information, ideologies, theories and cultures which flooded 
into China at the beginning of the 1980s, including postmodern theory.
In the early 1980s, there were some signals reflecting the trend of anti- 
authoritarianism and personal liberation in China. Cui Kai was a young architect in 
the 1980s, when the importation of postmodernist theories took place, and loyalty 
to modernism was shaken. It is also clear that the decorativeness, pastiche, col-
lage, parody and playfulness in postmodern architecture, which was easily associ-
ated with consumer culture, confused the first generation of young architects in 
that era. They were trained in higher education in mainland China, which was 
marked by “overspecialisation, the separation of the natural sciences from tech-
nology”25 and incapable of the deep digestion of the postmodern cultural trend and 
its real context. Xu said, “It is true that Western writers and theorist now known as 
‘postmodernists’ were introduced in the 1980s, but they were part of the upsurge 
of Western names and -isms of that decade and enjoyed no special status.”26 Fur-
thermore, Chinese architects and Chinese culture were simultaneously introduced 
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to several generations of schools of thought, making them almost too overwhelm-
ing to digest. Therefore, “suspended bridges, stacking and falling balconies, non-
orthogonal axis, complex mass cut” (Figure 4.3), Li Feng’s description for the 
office building for Foreign Language Teaching & Research Press (Beijing, 1997), 
are indications that the major sources for Chinese postmodernism in architecture 
are simultaneously “deconstruction, post-colonialism, and third-world theory”.27 
Figure 4.3  Cui Kai, office building for Foreign Language Teaching & Research Press, 
Beijing, 1997
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It should be noted that although postmodernism in China emerged under the influ-
ence of Western postmodernism, in particular from the United States, Chinese 
postmodernism’s theoretical intentions and historical contents are very different 
from the West’s. Similarly, postmodern architecture did not evolve from the same 
historical trends.
Regarding Cui Kai’s designs, I first argue that the postmodernism conveyed 
in his early works betrayed the modernist language yet still to emerge within a 
borrowed frame of modernity. The new episode of Chinese architectural history 
associated with postmodernism in the 1980s was guided and influenced by the 
Chinese American architect I. M. Pei, in the late 1970s. Pei’s achievements in the 
United States and his Chinese cultural inheritance added an authoritative weight 
to the new fashion. Pei’s ambition was to forge a new architectural language for a 
new China. It was to be a hybrid of old and new – a third way – for young Chinese 
designers to follow.28 When he was asked to design the Fragrant Hill Hotel (a 
low-rise hotel of 325 rooms that was a modest venture by his standards) in Beijing 
in 1977, Pei’s search for a new style began with his own past – the gardens and 
courtyards in Suzhou. The eaves, moon gates, accented windows and trickling 
waters are the elements which he identifies with his past memory of China. He 
was convinced that, despite political upheaval, this vocabulary still had meaning 
to most Chinese. He wanted to revive those stylistic traits that still spoke to the 
average person – not the red pillars and golden roofs of obsolete palaces and tem-
ples but the white walls and the grey tiles of ordinary residences.29
Influenced by I. M. Pei in the projects of Hyatt Hotel E’fang Palace (Xi’an, 
1991) and Beijing Feng Ze Yuan Hotel (Beijing, 1994), historical elements are 
evident in Cui Kai’s design for their environment. Xu argued that there were a 
good number of Chinese scholars who wrote about postmodern writers, theorists 
and theories in the 1980s but no self-conscious Chinese postmodernists, for it 
was not the purpose of these scholars to construct Chinese postmodernism.30 It 
could be argued that the postmodernist language in Cui’s early design was not part 
of self-conscious postmodernism as well. “In the post-Mao years prior to 1989, 
modernization was the predominant discourse that was used by both the govern-
ment and intellectuals to envision progress and development and to prevent the 
Cultural Revolution from happening again.”31 To some extent, Cui Kai’s designs 
emerged within a borrowed frame of modernity in architecture that was partially 
triggered by I. M. Pei’s achievements and spiritually exhibited distinctive modern 
attributes. The postmodernism in his architecture was more of a mindset architec-
turally influenced by Pei than of any theory; it was also “more a cluster of shared 
preconceptions than a closely argued system of thought”32 in this period.
Second, by incorporating elements from the classical, the vernacular and popu-
lar culture, US postmodernism appears to be more egalitarian in spirit – a distinct 
contrast from the imposition of the modernist designs on the masses by architec-
tural elites. However, China’s new nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
rationalised the traditional architectural forms to be easily co-opted into post-
modernist designs. These different political conditions led to distinct differences 
between China’s postmodernism and Western postmodernism in architecture. 
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Under the motto of the revival of nationalism, postmodernism did not allow more 
playful light-hearted designs. In architecture, Western postmodernist architecture 
embraced both high and popular culture, but in China, architecture was restricted 
to high culture in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
Cui Kai’s early designs, Hyatt Hotel E’fang Palace (Xi’an, 1991) and Beijing 
Feng Ze Yuan Hotel (Beijing, 1994), do not deliberately co-opt the forms typical 
of their locations: Xi’an and Beijing. These designs reflect his rediscovery of the 
historical reference and its transformation into a new Chineseness, combined with 
an ancient national identity through architecture. The increasingly relaxed appli-
cation of vernacular and traditional architectural elements does not show “the 
impacts from historicism and symbolic post-modernism, which were developed 
in the Maoist era and the 1980s,”33 as Li argued, but elucidate the ambiguity in 
Cui’s avoidance of a discourse on nationalism, informing his postmodern designs. 
Dirlik and Zhang argued the uniqueness of Chinese postmodernity as a reaction 
to modernity in general and to Chinese “socialist and revolutionary modernity” 
in particular.34 The deliberately relaxed application of vernacular and traditional 
architectural elements demonstrates that though Cui Kai considered the national-
ist revival, he did not want to connect this remote Western discourse – postmod-
ernism – to any sense of “socialist and revolutionary modernity” triggered by the 
nationalism.
By investigating the historical ups and downs from the pre-Maoist, Maoist and 
early market eras, as well as by identifying the trajectories of modernism and 
postmodernism and how they determined the characteristics of Cui Kai’s early 
works, this section has identified a number of contentions: Cui Kai cherished 
delayed modernism in his school days; postmodernist architecture in mainland 
China did not experience modernism (as understood in the West and in Taiwan) 
and, as such, coincidently overrode the modernism in Cui’s designs that was ready 
to bloom in the 1980s. Also, although modernist language was not evident in Cui 
Kai’s early works, his prime concern was still in the realm of modernity, espe-
cially the Western affiliation of those architectural principles, since his practical 
interests were still motivated by a desire to move into modernity, not out of it; the 
abrupt emergence of the postmodernist language in Cui’s design and the demand 
for nationalist expression in architecture that occurred simultaneously was not 
a coincidence, but Cui intentionally weakened its socialist and revolutionary 
character. From his early works, the combination of modernism and postmodern-
ism has been achieved in distinct ways. How modernism and postmodernism’s 
became entangled in the later stage of Cui Kai’s designs will be clarified in the 
following sections.
A mission, not a commission
Cui Kai has worked consistently for the CAG after his graduation from Tianjin 
University in 1984. He experienced every change within CAG, which reflected 
a society-wide transformation involving interdependent changes in state policy 
and regulation and the informal norms and organisational culture embedded in it. 
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This interdependence of politics, economics and cultural aspects suggests that the 
study of Cui Kai’s designs associated with CAG’S transition is better pursued as 
an interdisciplinary question. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the connec-
tion between Cui Kai and the development of CAG in order to determine where 
his characteristics originate.
• The state-owned CAG, Cui Kai and their mission
The state-owned CAG may be traced back to the Central Design Company, estab-
lished in 1952. During this time, the Institute has endured many name changes: 
“Design Institute of Ministry of Works” in 1953, “Beijing Industrial Building 
Design Institute of Ministry of Works” in 1955, “Academy of Building Research 
of the Construction Commission” in 1971, “The Architectural Design & Research 
Institute” in 1973, the “Building Design Institute Ministry of Construction” in 1988 
and, finally, the “China Architecture Design & Research Group” (CAG), which was 
established in 2000 with the final merger of Architecture Design Institute Ministry 
of Construction, the China Building Technology Development Centre, the North 
China Municipal Engineering Design & Research Institute and the China Urban 
Construction & Research Institute. CAG is authorised by the State Council and 
under the guidance and supervision of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) that supervises 
and manages state-owned assets of enterprises under higher supervision of the 
Central Government and enhances the management of state-owned assets. Xue and 
Ding reviewed the history of design institutes over the past six decades and how 
they have served the state’s strategic need for socialist construction and urbanisa-
tion. They clearly pointed out two instrumental missions the design institutes have 
fulfilled, one tangible and the other intangible: the construction of a socialist-built 
environment and the legitimation of socialist aesthetics and ideologies.35
The corporate governance system in pre-reform CAG was marked by the depri-
vation of enterprise autonomy in the absence of market competition and sufficient 
information on enterprise performance in Maoist China. CAG had a far more 
complex structure and far more staff than the private sector.
The Group has over 4,000 staff and boasts of 2 academicians of Chinese Acad-
emy of Engineering, 8 national design masters, 90 plus experts who enjoy the 
government subsidy that were approved by the State Council, 240 plus class 
A registered architects, over 210 class A registered structure engineers, over 
40 class A registered urban planners, 30 plus class A registered quantity sur-
veyors, over 50 class A registered consulting engineers, 50 class A registered 
supervision engineers, 180 class A registered mechanical engineers, 80 class 
A registered electrical engineers, 10 other registered engineers, around 1100 
senior designers and researchers, 900 plus medium titled technical staff.36
The large-scale state-owned CAG also works differently from either small-scale 
private architectural firms or large-scale architectural companies. In addition, in 
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state-owned or derived institutes like CAG, people have more enduring relation-
ships, similar to the relationships between comrades in pre-reform China.
Rather than piecemeal incremental reform, the grand theories37 proposed by 
Buchanan and Galbraith advised post-communist China to follow guidelines 
derived from textbook economics: to rapidly dismantle the economic institutions 
of state socialism and replace them with a full set of market initiatives. Although 
in theory this approach was persuasive, in practice the “big bang approach” failed 
to realise its objectives, at least in the short term.38 Chinese reformers emphasised 
piecemeal incremental change, not by design, but by trial and error, resulting in an 
open-ended evolutionary process of institutional change.39 CAG also underwent 
piecemeal incremental change, without conforming to textbook economics, and 
the timing and sequence of reform measures were still shaped by the politics of a 
political elite.
For example, in June 2012, CAG finalised the takeover of a major Singaporean 
design firm – Singaporean CPG, a leading infrastructure and building develop-
ment company in the Asia Pacific region. It was the first overseas acquisition of 
its kind for China’s survey and design service industry. CAG bought the CPG 
Corporation for AUD$147 million from the Australian heavy engineering com-
pany Downer Group in a deal brokered by the investment bank UBS.40 CPG Cor-
poration contributed largely to the development and management of distinguished 
landmarks in Singapore, including the Singapore Changi Airport, the Singapore 
Racecourse, the National Art Gallery and the National University of Singapore.41 
China’s “going out” policy has led to a number of overseas acquisitions in the past 
decade, primarily in the natural resources and equipment sectors, as the nation 
draws on its stockpile of foreign reserves to obtain much-needed raw materials.42 
Regarding the acquisition of the CPG corporation, the head of CAG stated, “This 
is not an opportunistic purchase but part of the national policy to encourage going 
out and improving international competitiveness.”43 As the only engineering 
design corporation in the 115 corporations under the guidance of the State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, CAG 
had been listed as a selected enterprise to go public. The acquisition is also a sig-
nal of accelerating the process of going public. However, the underlying driving 
force for this acquisition is national need; it is a relatively passive choice for CAG 
itself. CAG takes on the mission of upgrading the nation’s design status. In other 
word, the changes of CAG are still shaped by the politics of a political elite in the 
process of marketisation.
Cui Kai joined CAG in 1984. He was quickly promoted to an important position 
in CAG. There is no doubt that the promotion was accelerated by his own hard 
work. But the specific era of societal transformation also provided this opportu-
nity. The suspension of operations in architectural departments and schools in 
China during the Cultural Revolution and the political slant given to architecture 
during that thirty-year period led to a generation gap in the architectural pro-
fession. The resulting scarcity of professionals to meet the increasing demand 
for building, and the advanced age of many professionals, became increasingly 
apparent in the 1980s.44 By 1984, the average age of high-level design technicians 
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was 58.9, and the average age of mid-level design technicians was 48.3.45 In the 
architectural practice, Cui Kai described,
Advanced education was abruptly paused for ten years during the Cultural 
Revolution, and architecture courses cancelled for a time. That led to a miss-
ing generation of architects. Look at the age composition of the technicians 
in design institutes. Senior colleagues from the Cultural Revolution have 
already retired, with only a few reemployed after retirement. Those who 
graduated right after the Revolution and who are in their forties and fifties are 
now playing the leading role. But, as some went abroad and others turned to 
business in the last few years, the remaining number is limited. Young people 
in their twenties and thirties, and sometimes student trainees are the ones who 
really do the job, and that is the present situation.46
The support and help from CAG brought him credit in a short time and gave 
him a chance to mature quickly in the profession. Until the new generation of 
architects from the 1980s matured, Cui Kai was offered the leading role in the 
state-owned design institute in his thirties, which increased his loyalty to the mis-
sion associated with the CAG. Some of the practicing architects in contemporary 
China gradually left the large-scale design institutes, especially those who had 
the opportunity to be educated overseas. It is possible that their sense of mission 
gradually faded and became a pure expression of their Chineseness, rather than 
an expression of the nation-state. But it was difficult for Cui Kai to dispense with 
this sense of mission.
• The culture of nationalism
CAG espoused a specific national purpose from the beginning. Although it was 
reforming for the market, the state was still a decisive force in determining the 
timing and scope of CAG’s reforms, because it represents a national presence in 
architecture. Since neither CAG – a state-owned design institute – nor Cui Kai – a 
nationalist architect in the CAG – could dispense with the sense of mission, the 
direct way to uphold the mission came through incorporating nationalist forms in 
their architecture.
In the university years of Cui Kai, national forms were still crucial to education, 
“In my university years, the most popular topic in school transactions was mainly 
on how to inherit national tradition, combining together the national forms and 
modern construction.”47 Yet in the late 1980s, there was a signal indicating the 
architectural intention to escape the grip of the state, which is usually associated 
with the use of the strict axis in design. The 1986 awards for excellent architec-
tural works are very revealing. The works taking first and second prize have an 
axial distribution similar to the previous single-axis preoccupation. But one can 
easily observe that the distribution of all the illustrations of the designs some-
how departs from the axis; Li concluded that the 1986 award for architecture in 
China still revealed a single-axis structure, an axis of familiarity.48 But the slight 
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deviation from the single-axis reflected architectural relaxation regarding political 
correctness. The other characteristic of Chinese national form is the “Big Roof”49 
due to Liang Sicheng’s interest in China’s heritage: between 1952 and 1954, Chi-
nese roofs were designed for most civil building projects.50
The emphasis on a national form such as the “Big Roof” was significantly 
eased in the 1990s, but it was still occasionally adopted in some types of build-
ing, such as university campus buildings, museums, hotels and office buildings. 
The utilisation of traditional vocabulary in reform-era architectural practice was 
reflected in Cui Kai’s Er Pang Gong Hyatt Hotel (Xi’an, 1991) and the Feng Ze 
Yuan Hotel (Beijing, 1994); yet neither building adopted the “Big Roof” in any 
way. Authorities perceived the traditional form as a way of warding off foreign 
influence in Chinese cultural affairs in that period. Of this design, Cui Kai wrote,
In 1986, not long after the Reform and Open Policy took effect, internally 
people craved for a reconnaissance of the national economy, while externally 
people were curious about the outside world. Emerging at the time, the Er 
Pang Gong Hyatt Hotel (Xi’an, 1991) was required to meet both the eco-
nomical demands from Hong Kong investors, as well as the image demands 
from the city to embody the modernization progress of the historical Xi’an.51
With regard to traditional architecture in China, some advocates of historical dis-
tricts or buildings focused on the preservation of traditional buildings and struc-
tures. Cui Kai’s idea concerning tradition more or less followed the outstanding 
Chinese scholar Liang Sicheng.
In his presentation to the Architectural Society of China in 2007 titled Follow-
ing Liang Sicheng’s Footprints and Toddle on the Road of Native Architecture, 
Cui Kai said,
Our strategy was, while pursuing contemporary geometrical appearance, we 
also tried to express traditions embedded in nationality and locality. . . . Later 
I took the Feng Ze Yuan Hotel project at Zhushikou outside Qianmen in Beijing. 
The location was within the historical district, and at that time the city govern-
ment vowed to “Recapture the style of old Beijing”, so, the design for its appear-
ance and interior space utilized symbols from traditional Chinese housing.52
Liang himself dedicated his entire life to preserving Beijing’s old site and docu-
menting and establishing the discipline of traditional Chinese architecture. Liang’s 
belief in adopting the traditional architectural vocabulary was an attempt to create 
a new socialist style of Chinese architecture, and he succeeded in meeting the 
Chinese Communist Party leaders’ cultural demands as well.
Cui Kai, born in Beijing and educated in the Beaux-Arts design principles in 
Tianjing University, is technically capable of presenting historical values in the 
execution of elaborate new designs and possibly adheres to the old Beijing and its 
architecture as well. Does the nationalist form in Cui’s designs differ from Liang’s 
discourse? If so, how do we distinguish Cui from Liang?
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Dai and Zhi quoted Xu’s argument in describing China’s architectural develop-
ment from the year 2000 onwards: there are three trends of thought that decon-
struct the enlightenment from different directions – nationalism, classicism and 
multiple modernities, but they all have positive values in the theory.53 My con-
cern here is that nationalism is a consistent thread running through the 1980s, 
the 1990s and the 2000s in China, but there were marked changes in terms of 
motive, meaning and manifestation in different periods. In general, nationalism 
has always formed a part of the official discourse of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Nationalist sentiment may be expressed as a feeling of anger aroused by 
the violation of the perceived nationalist aspiration or the feeling of satisfaction 
aroused by its fulfilment.54 After 2000, education, technological development and 
the bureaucratic structure involved in becoming a modern state were increasingly 
driven by rationalist, administrative imperatives in China rather than by a sover-
eign manipulation. However, the modernising imperatives in contemporary China 
occurred simultaneously with the dissemination of national ideology, especially 
within CAG, a fundamental state-owned design enterprise.
With regard to nationalism in the modern context, Geller conceived of modernity 
as a distinctive form of social organisation and culture, and he considered nationalism 
to be a function of modernity.55 That is to say, CAG’s underlying mission is to dissem-
inate the satisfaction aroused by the fulfilment of nationalist principles through mod-
ernisation: nationalism is seen to be a function of modernity in China’s new era. In 
the new era, therefore, distinct from the nationalism in Liang’s discourse and designs, 
I propose that the culture of nationalism in Cui’s designs has since the 1990s dem-
onstrated a new relationship between modernity and nationalism. Unlike Liang, Cui 
Kai does not have to reflect on the new socialist style, which permitted him to think 
about national culture and form beyond ideological and political needs. He states that
the progress of modern technology has also played a part. New structures, 
new materials, and new techniques have provided enormous creative oppor-
tunities and broad possibilities. This is factually the primary foundation of 
modern architecture, and the primary cause for architectural forms to go 
global. The tidal wave of globalization is irrevocable, and any suggestion of 
“Recapturing the style of old Beijing” will eventually get nowhere.56
His suspicion of “recapturing the style of old Beijing” allowed him to look at 
the ways in which new national identities and new architectural vocabularies are 
enacted and produced in the new context. Geller argued that cultures, like plants, 
can be divided into savage and cultivated varieties. The savage kinds are produced 
and reproduce themselves spontaneously, as parts of the life of men, yet cultivated 
or garden cultures are different, though they have developed from the wild varie-
ties.57 Cui Kai’s designs that conflated the imperatives of nationalism and mod-
ernism in the new era are not the savage kinds that are produced and reproduce 
themselves spontaneously. Irrigated, cultivated and promoted by CAG, Cui Kai’s 
designs become a repository of a broad aesthetic knowledge in the high cultural 
domain, transcending the class system.
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• Organisational culture
Although CAG has been gradually opened to the market for twenty years, the 
bureaucratic environment still plays a significant role in the structuring and man-
agement of the CAG in the transitional economy. In order to maintain social sta-
bility and the political influence of large state-owned enterprises within China, 
some government authorities still intervene in employment policy, the appoint-
ment of board directors and chief executive officers, the political careers of senior 
managers and reward policies.58 Many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain 
encumbered by legacy assets, such as broad social obligations like health care and 
worker pensions, and the Communist Party continues to exert some control over 
both labour and management in SOEs.59 Although CAG has adopted restructur-
ing, the influence from “inside the system”, as explicitly introduced in Chapter 
One, remained unchallenged. In order to maintain social stability, a large state-
owned enterprise, for example CAG, continues to employ a substantial portion 
of the population in China. The traditional CAG system is composed of a set of 
interlinked institutional arrangements. Reform began by increasing autonomy and 
improving incentives in micro-management mechanisms that, in turn, prompted 
a reform of the resource allocation system. But CAG has been still plagued by a 
series of policy burdens left over from the previous development strategy, and the 
state still has to provide CAG with various kinds of open and hidden subsidies, as 
well as other types of policy protection.
Since early 1992, the drive to abolish the cadre system in the SOEs has gathered 
momentum, thanks to the party’s new consensus on the market.60 However, the Per-
sonnel Ministry clearly stipulated that the contract cadres in SOEs must be incorpo-
rated into the management of cadres by the state.61 The command economy in the 
pre-reform era is, by nature, an administrative economy requiring an all-powerful 
bureaucracy to execute central planning.62 Built upon this state ownership structure 
is a vast economic bureaucracy. All state factories are embraced in this system and 
are ranked hierarchically according to criteria such as the amount of state invest-
ment they receive, the importance of their products and the number of workers they 
employ.63 Cui Kai, depending on his ranking, is granted an official status at the 
levels of a governmental support enterprise. In this hierarchy, Cui Kai is inevitably 
accorded a certain administrative rank, and more significantly, gains an administra-
tive superiority. From an organisational point of view, these twenty-plus years of 
reforms have involved considerable effort to change the state firms’ internal culture, 
and its relationship with the external environment, but only to a limited extent.
The National People’s Congress legislated the Enterprise Law in 1993, which 
covered clear property rights and clarified rights and responsibilities and sepa-
ration between government, enterprise and scientific management. Furthermore, 
the SOEs were encouraged to enhance their presences in the international mar-
kets. CAG is now following the Western or fashionable styles in architecture. 
Yet emphasis on the Western quality of design and open-mindedness to the glo-
balising world trend does not rest on pure Western style management degrees or 
the executive business model. Research on organisational cultures in reform-era 
Chinese firms has found that there remains a stronger emphasis on the cultural 
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values of hierarchy in SOEs than in joint ventures, wholly owned subsidiaries and 
private firms in China.64
Within CAG, a further project-oriented managing system has been established. 
It has a Design Business Managing Centre and has appointed a group of design 
project directors; a number of celebrities’ studios and discipline research studios 
have been set up. Cui Kai’s studio was set up in 2004. However, the hierarchi-
cal cultural component is still a desired SOE culture within CAG. O’Connor has 
argued that larger SOEs with greater social responsibility (e.g., managing the bur-
den of retirement pensions, social-welfare costs and redundant workers) towards 
maintaining employment will have a reduced capacity to achieve profit maximi-
sation objectives.65 Although Cui Kai appears to avoid politics and bureaucratic 
culture and the state control over contract managers is much weaker than state 
cadres, he and his studio are still within this cadre system.
• Shared values of CAG and their impacts on Cui Kai
In respect to the relationship between Cui Kai’s designs and the development of 
CAG, Cui Kai’s works possess a complexity and richness rooted in the distinctive 
nourishment of national institution where he has continued to work as one of the 
dedicated personnel. Based on the discussion of the impact of nationalism and 
organisational culture, it is possible to speculate that nationalism and the culture of 
hierarchy have significantly impacted long-term shared values and beliefs in CAG, 
which also imparts a certain tone in Cui Kai’s designs. Furthermore, the person-
alised national culture in Cui Kai’s designs, for example, the International Con-
ference Centre of Foreign Language Teaching & Research Press (Beijing, 2004) 
and the office building of Foreign Language Teaching & Research Press (Beijing, 
1997), reveal the development of a sophisticated array of architectural codes in new 
China from the 1990s onwards, which illustrate the relationship between national-
ism and modernity in modern China. Hence, his designed buildings are cultivated 
as an elaborate code, of explicit, grammatical and regularised architectural forms, 
dispensing high culture and harmonising with the organisational culture in CAG.
As discussed above, the high culture carried through Cui Kai’s designs became 
far more authoritative and normative than the old doctrines in modern society. 
Similar to architectural communication, verbal text comes to be more pervasive 
and universal in urban-based societies. The high organisational culture is reflected 
not only in Cui Kai’s designs but also in his articles.
First, his articles always have a professional and contextual interest, and his 
critical analyses of the international context have persuasive power. He disputes 
the negative attitude regarding the entry of foreign architectural design in China, 
and advises his readers to take “the opportunity to learn and assimilate their expe-
rience more quickly and more systematically through cooperation.”66 He wrote of 
this perceived invasion:
Many colleagues criticize that some projects are flashy yet without concrete 
substance, wasting a lot of money merely for the sake of show or novelty. 
But, in my opinion, what is done cannot be undone. Why not take the chance 
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to learn a lesson or two from these irrational designs with a rational atti-
tude. . . . If our architectural technology can march forward in large strides 
through these projects, the expenses are not paid to little avail. If our archi-
tectural creative environment can link up with the international standard with 
these years of opening-up, the expenses will be worthy indeed.67
He further elaborated on the specific aspects of how China should quicken its pace 
and catch up.
By comparison, the advantages of the foreign agencies are very obvious in 
age composition and team structure, in profession and accumulation of expe-
rience, let alone that they possess a huge international network of technique 
consultancy, enabling them to make prompt contact with top-flight experts 
for cooperation in case of any problems. It is perceptible that the difference in 
team composition has an immediate effect on the quality of design.68
Second, Cui Kai’s comments on the national building code applied to all provinces.
Now buildings are no longer functioning as the street wall of the city, the 
structure of historical city spaces breaks down bit by bit. There are other 
planning requirements which must also adhere to city regulations – like fire 
prevention distance, fire loop road, set back, building density, green ratio 
etc. Even in this way, a city constructed under strict planning control is still 
viewed as lacking due order and the city status is losing its due character and 
looks helpless.69
Rather than commenting on any specific design, a reflection on the building code 
is filled with quotidian assumptions of a role that may rarely be challenged. There-
fore, his occasional tangents on the building codes do reveal aspects of his privi-
leged position.
Third, Cui Kai is capable of reading and criticising architecture from the per-
spective of a People’s expert, who shoulders social responsibility and offers social 
services.
When buildings are assessed in line with this cultural concept, the American 
Congress Hall will not be copied in China however beautiful it is; the selec-
tion of architectural designs will not slip into a contest of beautiful render-
ings, and the assessment based on undue emphasis on formal beauty must be 
checked. It is the duty of experts to guide the management and the public to 
comprehend and evaluate constructions in terms of environment, culture and 
technique innovation.70
With regard to the word “public”, Cui authentically refers to “people” or 
“the mass”. In contrast, Liu Jiakun always refers to “we”, and Liu Xiaodu of 
URBANUS always refers to the civic society and related concepts.
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Fourth, he can easily relate the abstract concept in the architectural discourse to 
designs in China or culture in China.
It can be seen that “beauty” is a disputed part of the guideline of present 
architectural design. Then what can take beauty’s place? In my opinion, in the 
present wave of globalisation, people have come to pay increased attention 
to the sense of belonging, and localization. In the architectural community, 
especially in developing countries, regional culture has been more frequently 
mentioned. Therefore, I think it possible to substitute “beauty” with “cul-
ture”, that function and form should be balanced, and that the congruence 
should be further balanced with culture, and this is a positive and meaningful 
solution for the display of Chinese architectural culture and tradition.71
Cui Kai rejects the fashionable concept as the only course for contemporary archi-
tecture in China. His model presumes that the present focus on beauty would, at 
some point in the future, have to be adjusted in favour of Chinese culture. The 
efficacy of his argument may depend on the level of people’s cognition of CAG 
and the position of Cui Kai, not only in the architectural industry, but also regard-
ing his role in the architectural discourse.
Fifth, confronting the history of China, that is, the political revolution of mod-
ern China, he has written extensively, but not critically. On the one hand, he is not 
like any angry young man in criticising socialist China; on the other hand, he is 
confident in commenting on it.
The victory of the Chinese revolution made the people dominant in the coun-
try. The socialist system which takes fair and average wealth as its character 
has made sunlight in every apartment the critical condition in city housing 
projects as a citizen’s right of health, and the non-obstacle sunlight distance 
is one of the most important elements for planning approval. The most sensi-
tive focus of the neighbouring construction activities for normal people is 
sunlight obstruction. Therefore, from north to south, almost all residential 
buildings are facing south and north in their tower and slab buildings. And 
the most important relationship between all buildings is the problem of non-
obstruction of sunlight.72
His argument, informed by a macro-perspective, entrenches the socialist rituals 
and criticises the socialist routines at the same time. In general terms, his tone in 
the articles emanate from a nationalist ambition, social arrangement and hierarchy 
in the organisation.
Cui Kai’s dual role
The marketisation of CAG, which has been evolving over the past twenty years, 
has had an influential impact on Cui Kai’s designs. The state-centred analysis 
assumes that both society and the economy are subordinated to the political order, 
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as largely passive entities to political power.73 Analysts referring to SEOs as symp-
tomatic of the communist political order overwhelmingly emphasise the dominant 
role of the party; my research on the evolving designs of Cui Kai has sought 
to move beyond this approach by looking at the relationships between market 
and institute, market and people, society and reform and market and architecture. 
These appear to be direct causal links shaping his designs within the forces of a 
planned economy and a market economy.
• CAG’s market transition
As an architect working in an institute, Cui Kai is always classified in China as a 
mainstream architect. Cui Kai spoke about the difference between the large-scale 
institute and privately operated firms:
I joined the CAG in 1984, and if we take 60 years old as the retirement time, 
two thirds of my professional working life has passed, and I have more or less 
arrived at the middle of my career. I have been working in the state-owned 
large-scale institute, close to the Ministry of Construction and Architectural 
Association, which accustomed me to the environment, and the sense and 
pace of “inside the system” working. In recent years, reform in the design 
industry has been opened up; many of my friends switched to business from 
the large-scale institute, or opened their own firms in China after overseas 
experiences. Some people have asked me, “which is more competitive, the 
state-owned large-scale institute or small private firms?” I find it difficult to 
answer this question; it should be rated according to the choice of the market 
and the contribution to the profession as well. Actually I am keen to find a 
system featuring smallness embodied in largeness and vice versa.74
Pilot reforms in CAG had been carried out as early as 1979, since CAG and other 
design institutes began to charge fees from the client, based on a contract. The 
main objective of this reform was to separate the design institutes from the gov-
ernmental sectors and let the institutes assume sole responsibility for their profits 
or losses.75 The internal change in CAG occurred in 1992, when the chief man-
ager, Liu Xunfan, pushed an important reform through CAG. In order to solve 
the problem of financial shortfalls and to increase the efficiency of production, 
Liu asked each studio to run design assistants on a contractual basis and linked 
the income of each architect to his productivity.76 He also propelled macro- 
policy environment reform, especially the financial system and interest rate 
policy reforms: the top bracket enterprise income tax rate was reduced from 55 
percent in the older system, to 33 percent, and a variety of surtaxes were elimi-
nated, making the tax structure leaner and more transparent.77 In the early 1990s, 
the central government decided to list some large state firms as a portion of 
China’s state-owned enterprises and sell off small state enterprises.78 The com-
petitive market dynamics generated by market growth and the entry of foreign 
competition, for example, the international architectural bid for China’s National 
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Centre for the Performing Arts, which was won by Paul Andreu, created pressure 
for CAG, which had grown accustomed to occupying a dominant position in the 
Chinese market.
Although some scholars initially held negative ideas on the partial reform of 
China, and argued that it was not likely to result in improved economic perfor-
mance,79 in a recent analysis, Ralston argued that the SOEs have substantially 
transformed to approximate a configuration desired by the Chinese government 
when it began the SOE transformation two decades ago to make them globally 
competitive.80 With regard to CAG,
CAG’s business scope includes project consultation, planning, design . . . 
etc. covering the whole process of fixed assets investment. Its main business 
scope covers: architecture design and consultation; urban and town planning; 
municipal engineering comprehensive design; urban gas and industrial gas 
design; sewage and garbage disposal; road and bridge design; building intel-
ligence and systems design . . . and other above mentioned items. The Group 
has now set up its business structure to integrate building design, urban plan-
ning, municipal engineering, building standardization, construction informa-
tion, project consultation, interior decoration, landscape and gardening and 
housing research/development as its chained businesses.81
This strongly suggests that CAG has been re-engineered into a viable and com-
petitive economic entity.
The role of private clients, including developers, businessmen and any people 
from the private sector with money and ambition has gradually changed in the 
1990s. These private clients have been relatively free from government influence 
with a more market-oriented attitude towards architectural projects. With national 
economic growth, Cui’s working environment in the market has been improved. 
However, market reform in a nation-based design institute is far from accom-
plished, and the reform process is still troubled by a series of contradictions, in 
which Cui’s architectural designs attract undeniable tensions.
• Cui Kai’s dual role in the market transition
The evident tensions between the state and the private market endow Cui Kai with 
a dual role, and he has his own reflections about the nation-state and the market,
I think the localization of Chinese architecture satisfied both the need for pro-
tecting and for proliferating our own culture, and the roots of us, the Chinese 
architects. The concept of localization is different from the style theory of 
“national formats with socialistic contents”, and it also rejects the commer-
cialistic stance that caters to market fashions by copycatting.82
The design of SOHO New Town (Phase I) (Beijing, 1998) (Figure 4.4) is Cui Kai’s 
first attempt to collaborate with a real estate developer. SOHO China Limited 
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was founded in 1995. It is the largest prime office real estate developer in China. 
It focuses on developing properties in the central business districts of Beijing 
and Shanghai. SOHO New Town is the first project of SOHO China. These New 
Towns are professionally designed and built to a high standard, which makes them 
easier to rent and allows investors to achieve rental yields earlier.
SOHO New Town (Beijing, 1998) is a mixed-use development of 471,000 
square metres in gross floor area, including forty-eight shops, 283 offices, and 
1,897 apartments. Designed by Cui Kai and Zhu Xiaodi, and initiated and operated 
by SOHO China, it was recognised as the best-selling development in Beijing in 
1999 and 2000. In an article written by Cui Kai’s collaborative designer Wu Xiao-
hong, in the Architectural Journal, he states:
The collaboration between the architect and the developer in the SOHO New 
Town (Beijing, 1998) should be noted. In the first phase of design, based on 
the developer’s rich market experiences, they offered us good suggestions 
and requirements; for example, no large apartment types facing the north, 
protecting the view of the landscape even sacrificing the orientation, duplex 
apartments required to meet the housing standard, and so on. They constantly 
provide updated information from the market, which made us understand the 
dynamics in the market of the psychological requirement of the clients. . . . 
Generally speaking, in the marketization of the residential buildings, what an 
architect should face is not only the developer, but all the residents and the 
Figure 4.4 Cui Kai, SOHO New Town (Phase I), Beijing, 1998
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whole market. How to maximize the requirements from the buyers and how 
to produce selling points is a brand new task for every architect.83
In this process, the pursuit of profit, the participation of eventual residents and the 
interactive influence of fashion cultures expanded Cui Kai’s vision and further 
pushed his designs to run in tandem with the maturity of the market.
Furthermore, in the market transition, Cui Kai’s architectural styles reflect 
increasing diversity, which results from his dual roles in at once finding his indi-
vidual style and representing a collective identity. Cui Kai’s studio was set up in 
the CAG in 2004. Cui Kai gradually realised that the work would reflect his own 
identity, rather than reflect the collective unit. He began to understand that his 
individual world view, experiences and values created a framework informing 
his design decisions. With the emergence of prominent architects, most of whom 
are independently practicing, it is natural for Cui Kai to expect that his personal 
expression will allow other people to define his unique place in the discourse of 
architecture. Therefore, he has aimed for a more personal expression, striving for a 
personal identity in his architectural designs, a move which has resulted in various 
experiments. However, when questioned in regard to his personal achievement, 
he insists on the collective effort, “The accomplishment of so many works obvi-
ously is not an achievement of my own, but the fruition of the collective work of 
the whole China Architecture Design and Research Group, a collaborative effort 
by numerous participants from all fields.”84 This comment indicates that Cui Kai 
is still very conscious about his responsibility within the collective work unit.
Moreover, Cui Kai’s idiosyncratic position in a national design institute, but 
also within a relatively free market, gives him easy access to both national pro-
jects and private projects of various scales. His dual role has also resulted in a 
variety of designs. Some examples are: the Lhasa Railway Station (Lhasa, 2006) 
(Figure 4.5), the Liangshan Nationality Culture Art Centre and Torch Square 
(Liangshan, 2007) and the Beichuan Cultural Centre (Beichuan, 2011). The 
1956-kilometre-long Qinghai–Tibet railway starts in Xining, Qinghai Province, 
and ends at Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region. This is the highest 
and longest plateau railroad in the world. The Lhasa Railway Station is the termi-
nal of the Qinghai–Tibet railway. The Liangshan Nationality Culture Art Centre 
and Torch Square, designed by Cui Kai, is also a crucial project for the Liang-
shang Yi Autonomous Prefecture fostering local culture.
Simultaneously, the significant technical support from CAG gives him more 
opportunities for architectural experimentation. In addition to the architectural 
institute, CAG is composed of many distinct departments, each with its own 
agenda. The Functional Department, the Structure Institute, the Design Business 
Managing Centre, the MEP Institute, the Town Planning Institute, the Environ-
mental Art Institute, the Human Settlement Engineering Centre, the Building 
Energy Engineering Centre, the Assistant Department and the Research Depart-
ment are all represented. The rich sources of expertise and solid collective support 
in the large-scale design institute in China provides an integrated platform as a 
basis. Therefore, Cui Kai is also able to work on experiments with new materials 
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Figure 4.5 Cui Kai, Lhasa Railway Station, Lhasa, 2006
and new structure. For example, In the Multi-Function Broadcasting Tower in 
Olympic Green discussed above, the Exquisite Tower (Beijing, 2008) assumes 
a triangular shape, in which the three angles contain respectively the stairs and 
elevator shafts, which are also support points for the steel frames (Figure 4.6). 
Oblique beams are crossed, joined and connected with each other among the 
frame shafts, naturally forming rhombic spaces as TV broadcasting studios.
• Resolving the challenge of “inside the system”
In Cui Kai’s designs and his relationship with CAG related in the previous sec-
tion, Westernised architecture clearly camouflages the true nature of some state-
owned design institutes; in this sense, CAG is not an autonomous corporation. 
The goal of every reform effort undertaken by the party regarding the CAG has 
been to achieve a balance between the free market and elements “inside the sys-
tem”, as laid out in Chapter One. However, there have been increasing public 
concerns about the one-party authoritarian regime and complex organisations. 
Similarly, the shared architectural norms influenced by one-party nationalism 
and the organisational culture in Cui Kai’s designs could easily considered to be 
bureaucratic and stereotypical.
The party’s strategy in the post-Mao era was proven successful for economic 
growth. The shift from class struggle to economic modernisation as the key task 
of the party, however, made the party dependent on technocrats and entrepreneurs. 
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Figure 4.6 Cui Kai, Exquisite Tower, Beijing, 2008
In the contemporary context, Chinese people are not committed to party traditions 
but economic growth. Dickson has argued,
The party retains its monopoly over political participation and takes credit 
for the economic growth created by the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may be 
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unwilling to risk the certain benefits of the existing system, despite its many 
irrationalities, for the uncertainties of an alternative arrangement.
Allied with entrepreneurs, Cui Kai, as a technocrat, functioned within a non-
critical realm; he was primarily concerned with promoting architecture in China 
and, to that end, limiting the influence of ideology in architecture. Moreover, he 
lacked exposure to alternative political values and institutional arrangements, 
since he did not receive college degrees from Western countries. Although com-
mitted to current political values and institutional arrangements, he did not want 
to be considered to be a bureaucratic technocrat.
Though people have increasingly challenged the one-party authoritarian regime 
and complex organisations of China, Cui Kai’s design approach, influenced by 
organisational culture, has upgraded stereotypical imagery of bureaucratic, state-
owned institutions. As such, it does not result in an imbalance between the quality 
of design and the political demands imposed on those designs. What has limited 
the negative effect of the authoritarian and institutional culture’s impact on the 
designs has been the emergence of the market. For Cui Kai, his dual role of medi-
ating the state and market finally guaranteed his design as accessible and accept-
able to the Chinese people.
Negotiating the contradictions between challenges of elements “inside the sys-
tem” and the requirements from “outside the system,” his designs appear evolu-
tionary, not revolutionary. An open-ended evolutionary process of institutional 
change has characterised China’s reforms. Though CAG has already formed an 
entrepreneurial or competitive culture, due the burden of the hierarchy of cul-
tural constraints, the designs are usually not provocative, but they aim to meet 
the aesthetic requirements of the public. Though newness and originality are key 
ingredients for breaking into the market, innovation is of secondary importance in 
Cui Kai’s works, compared to other private design firms, as a result of long-term 
hierarchical control in the culture of CAG. Therefore, Cui Kai’s designs are more 
stable and less innovative than those of his counterparts. Yet they have evolved 
along with the market’s evolution and have thus been recognised and accepted by 
the market.
Moreover, Cui Kai’s standpoint and his reflections on architecture have the tone 
of high culture as previously discussed, but this opinion is not restricted to state 
agendas. Cui Kai’s designs do not focus on high culture as pure adornment, con-
firmation and legitimation of state government. He also gives importance to popu-
lar cultures. Achieving the balance between his sense of mission for the nation, 
and the demand from the market, his designs have become a shared medium or 
shared atmosphere that tie the diversified locality-tied popular cultures and inte-
grate them into high culture. Consequently, what Cui Kai seeks is a mediated style 
reflecting modernism and nationalism, an architectural language supervised by 
the academy, codified for bureaucratic communication with the state, but avail-
able to Chinese residents who are eager for a new world and the growing market. 
In the context of globalisation, this high culture is also striving for communication 
with the rest of the world.
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The operation of rationalism in architecture
Cui Kai’s first booklet, Projects Report, was published in 2002. The title of 
this design collection did not even use the term architecture or design, which 
reflects his modest attitude towards his achievements, although by 2002 he had 
already been awarded National Best Science and Technology Engineer in 1997, 
Expert Who Enjoys Special Subsidy from the State Council in 1998, Excellent 
Mid–Young Aged Expert of the Ministry of Personnel in 1999, and Candidate 
of “National Hundred, Thousand & Ten Thousand Reserves Project” in 1999. 
Cui Kai wrote, “It was named so for fear that I should not have attained enough 
aptitude to brag of anything that can be termed a design concept.”85 Native Design 
is his second design collection book published in 2008. It was the first time Cui 
Kai tried to adopt a conceptual term, native, in the retrospective appraisal of his 
own designs. It could be ascribed to his increased overseas experience and the 
increased popularity of a celebrity architects’ cluster across China. From 2003, 
Cui Kai was continuously invited to international exhibitions, including La Bien-
nale di Venezia (2003), the 8th International Architectural Exhibition in Italy 
(2003), Urban Rumor-Chinese Architecture Exhibition in Taipei (2004), the first 
Shenzhen Architectural Biennale (2005) and the Creative China Exhibition in 
London (2008). Meanwhile the celebrity architects’ cluster, assembling pioneer 
architects in China and outside China, flourished within China. Cui Kai, as the 
representative architect in a large-scale design institute, was always invited. For 
example, he participated in the “Commune by the Great Wall” in 2002, a col-
lection of contemporary architecture designed by twelve Asian architects, where 
he worked with Kengo Kuma, Yo Hong Chang and other architects in the group 
design. It was possible for him to see that most of his peers inside or outside 
China had already located themselves and their designs into some conceptual 
framework, regardless of motivations, for business promotion or for a theoretical 
rationale for their designs.
Furthermore, Native Design contains detailed reflections on the term native,
As far as I understand, this concept of native contains several meanings. The 
first is about environment, that is, the land on which we live. . . . Native 
designs should stand out and shoulder this responsibility. The second is 
about culture, the culture growing and thriving on this fertile land. . . . Local 
designs should take root in it, and continue to produce new cultural leaves. 
The third is about space, the regionalism and localization of buildings. . . . 
Native designs should be the creation with such localization, helping the city 
to retrieve its features, and the citizens to recognize themselves.86
However, due to the word-to-word direct translation from Chinese to English and 
absence of an equivalent word in English, problems arose for foreigners in under-
standing this concept. When Cui Kai gave books with the translated expression 
to peers and friends from other countries, they always associated him with nativ-
ism, or something done or designed exclusively by local people.87 Therefore, he 
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started to use the Chinese pronunciation of the Chinese word or the Chinese word 
juxtaposed with native. He made this more explicit statement, “I am a ‘Ben Tu /
native’ architect. I said so not only because of the absence of overseas educational 
experience, but also because of my proposition for design in land-based terms.”88 
The expression native or “BenTu design” is more likely to deliver his sense of 
values towards society, rather than a theoretical framework for his design. In 
other words, native is geared towards his world view, but the approaches could 
be multi-faceted.
Cui Kai expanded his idea to “Land-based Rationalism” in his third design col-
lection book titled Cui Kai, which is less poetic and less equivocal. In regard to 
the “Land-based Rationalism”, he wrote,
In summary, Land-based Rationalism is a rational design principle, taking the 
natural and human environment resources as its base, and emphasizing the 
importance of its supporting land and surrounding backgrounds. It indicates 
both a stance to unremittingly explore the possibilities of new socialist build-
ings with Chinese characteristics, and a policy for land-based constructions 
with distinguished features to gain the rightful place in international architec-
ture. Moreover, it reflects a cultural value, serving as the architectural embod-
iment of “harmony”, which is the core cultural idea of Chinese society.89
It could be summarised that the underlying explanation of this concept is that the 
project might occur next to a historical site, or there is strong local culture and 
tradition or the existing urban environment is daunting, and what he insists on 
is to take root in the soil of natural and human environmental resources through 
rationalist design. The term rationalism has been used to refer to several different 
outlooks and movements of ideas. “The earliest organized form of rationalism 
in philosophy is stoicism, that is, the Hellenistic philosophy that sought to make 
the personal and political views of people as orderly as the cosmos.”90 Cui Kai’s 
education was in the Beaux-Arts tradition, in which he was taught the art of com-
position and aesthetics. His own architecture, although not strictly cubical, sym-
metrical or composed, shows his preference in adapting the art of composition and 
aesthetics to the requirements of new times, new technology and a new economic 
reality. But Cui Kai does not use the term composition often in describing his 
own designs. The term composition that traditionally stands for timeless values 
that corresponds to static phenomena was over-emphasised in his architectural 
education. However, the choice of native reflects a more dynamic quality Cui Kai 
wants to achieve.
As previously discussed, the culture of nationalism and internal and external 
surveillance of the institute, shape the rationalism in his design and underscore 
the conventions about appropriate ways of thinking and designing. The market 
also prevents his designs from irrational nationalism and limits the negative effect 
of the institutional culture’s impact on his designs. Some standards and criteria 
imposed by the outside forces and the architect himself make his individual iden-
tity visible, and this identity embodies a strong sense of rationalism. It is possible 
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to detect two sides within the rationalism practices: on one hand, it leans towards 
a higher degree of complexity in composition, but still under the guidance of 
rational principles, evident in the Inside-Out, Artist Colony (Beijing, 2009), the 
Office Building of Beijing Foreign Studies University (Beijing, 2009), the Library 
of Nanjing Arts Institute (Nanjing, 2010) and the Agriculture & Ecology Group 
of Zijingang Campus, Zhejiang University (Hangzhou, 2010). On the other hand, 
he aims for a higher degree of rational simplicity in another series of designs, for 
example, the Legation Quarter (Beijing, 2008) and the Reconstruction of CSEC 
Office Building (Beijing, 2011).
• The rationalism of complexity
The International Conference Centre of Foreign Language Teaching & Research 
Press (Beijing, 2004) is a good example illustrating complexity within rationalism. 
The design of the office building of the Foreign Language Teaching & Research 
Press (FLTRP) (Beijing, 1997) in 1996 was a milestone in Cui Kai’s career. The 
office building is a single project, featuring high-standard spatial quality and 
innovative geometrical properties. As the FLTRP developed rapidly in the early 
2000s, there was an urgent demand for a large-scale book circulation centre to 
distribute and transport a substantial volume of books. Concurrently a new place 
for publishing was also needed. It is located in the southern suburb of Beijing, 
30-km away from the inner city. This was the first chance for Cui to practice and 
explore the systematic meaning of architectural language in a group of buildings. 
The Book Circulation Centre of Phase I is designed as parallel linked units, with 
four stack rooms and one large paper storage room connected by the discharging 
platform. The architecture here firmly responds to the functional demand.
In the design of Phases II and III, the communications between buildings, and 
forms connecting different volumes, have also evolved into an informal system. 
The Educational Building Phase II in the east faces the main street of the indus-
trial park, and the Western part of the building organically fuses with Phase III. It 
should be noted that there is an echo between a series of refectory, multi-function 
and reception rooms that are scattered in the long and narrow central courtyard 
in Phase II. It is possible that Cui Kai realised that the static and fully enclosed 
traditional courtyard space is an obstacle to modern ideas of movement in archi-
tecture. The long wing of the L shaped main building in the Conference Centre of 
Phase III is connected to the Swimming Pool, Entrance Lobby and Auditorium, 
while facing the training section. In mediating the styles, volumes and façades 
of a group of buildings, he enriched his own architectural language and further 
circulated them in a rational well-orderly system.
Compared to the International Conference Centre of FLTRP (Beijing, 2004), 
Cui found a further territory to work in and developed a rational, organic and 
organisational principle in the planning of a group of buildings in the design 
of the Business Office Area of Songshan Lake New Town (Dongguan, 2005). 
Confronting the project, Cui described it as a “beautiful environment, abundant 
funding, enlightened client and an attractive development.”91 His designed group 
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of buildings are located on a hilly site to the north of the Songshan lakeshore, 
stretching from the Administration Office Building that extends to the lake, and 
ending at the library in the south. The buildings are connected to one another in a 
symmetric layout. They together constitute the central area of the Songshan Lake 
High-tech Industrial Park.
The Software Engineer Apartment in the Dalian software area (Dalian, 2006) 
shows that Cui positively responds to the local condition and aims for a sustain-
able habitation condition. At the same time, he achieves elegance of detail with 
maximum functional demand and correctness of proportions (Figure 4.7) in one 
building. The site for the building of this engineer’s apartment building is  limited – 
a piece of long and narrow land fronting a road street: 160 m from the north to the 
south, and 48-m wide from east to west. Cui Kai designed the two bottom floors as 
shops to fuse into the nearby pedestrian areas. A small five-storey apartment build-
ing sits in the middle, with east–west orientation and with an upper middle-sized 
apartment section facing northward and southward in a grouped form, give the 
building a sense of stretched volume. It is important for living quality in Dalian, 
which has a continental climate with dry winters and hot summers, to achieve a 
north-south orientation, and so the crucial point of this 90 degree rotation is not 
purely about formal composition. It is also the best approach in order to realise the 
highest number of apartments. In the detailed design, the bay windows increase 
the surface of day lighting, and the opening leaf and positioning of air condition-
ers are also carefully considered. Cui Kai adopted grey and white as the main 
Figure 4.7  Cui Kai, Software Engineer Apartment in the Dalian software area, Dalian, 
2006
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hues, and small schists and paint as supplements, which have also been applied in 
other projects. It seems that on occasion his designs adopt a Beaux-Arts style, and 
in contrast, his designs sometimes utilise a Miesian approach.
Cui Kai continued evolving and updating the complexity of the composition 
in the Inside-Out, Artist Colony (Beijing, 2009), but this time using a skeleton 
grid. In this design, Cui Kai started to throws off the constraints of an old, static 
order, to free up a new starting point (Figure 4.8). The block is arranged accord-
ing to the relationship between working and living. The whole project consists of 
seventy-five suites of artist studios on a 108 m X 108 m site, with a height limit 
of 18 m. The concept – “floating container” – is employed by Cui Kai to represent 
the interaction of working and living in the same studio unit: for an artist, working 
appears like diving beneath the water surface, holding his breath to do his best, 
while breathing freely depicts his life in rest time.92 A cramped, material, stable 
equilibrium gives way to a new bolder equilibrium: the boxes are raised up or 
sunken down.
The Beijing Foreign Studies University Complex Gymnasium (Beijing, 2008), 
and the Office Building of Beijing Foreign Studies University (Beijing, 2009) also 
demonstrate his capacity in more complex geometrical systems, which attempt to 
achieve more intricate, dynamic formal expressions and relationships. Both these 
buildings are located on the campus of the Beijing Foreign Studies University. 
Figure 4.8 Cui Kai, Inside-Out, Artist Colony, Beijing, 2009. Model
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These two projects aim to restore a sense of wholeness to the campus’s original 
master plan, designed in the 1950s by Zhang Bo.93 The original forms, vocabulary 
and colours are maintained in the new buildings. Since the existing architectural 
themes are strictly cubical, the Complex Gymnasium (Beijing, 2008) shows Cui 
Kai’s attempts to exploit the possibility of blurring the cube’s boundaries without 
destroying the sense of whole. It has two grand arcades with a four-story height 
and 2.7-m width on either side, which obscure the straight edge of the huge mass. 
The large balcony on the east façade extends the interaction between the gym and 
its surroundings.
The projects discussed above have one shared feature: the cube-based strat-
egy. Yet Cui Kai occasionally searched for rational ways of achieving irregularity 
and spontaneous contrasts as well, extending the limitations of the cube shape. In 
projects like the Beijing Digital Publication Information Centre (Beijing, 2007) 
(Figure 4.9) and Chengde City Planning Exhibition Hall (Chengde, 2009), Cui 
Kai attempted to free the organisational order from the characteristic rigidity of 
rationalism. This direction has been pioneered by many renowned architects, like 
Ma Yansong. However, it should be noted that Cui Kai did not impose the undu-
lating surfaces on the Beijing Digital Publication Information Centre (Beijing, 
2007). The site of this building is on the border of old Beijing city that results 
in a sharp difference of height limitations on one site. The challenge was how 
to harmonise the distinct sizes of a traditional inner city with the rapidly grow-
ing modern city. The client requested the building to be divided into two parts. 
Combined with the different height limitation given by the site, the architect – as 
Figure 4.9 Cui Kai, Beijing Digital Publication Information Centre, Beijing, 2007
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interpreter – chose the undulating surfaces as a device to connect all the height 
limitation points, and simultaneously satisfy the daylight codes and maximise use-
ful space, a rational solution portrayed as a formal invention. Cui Kai avoids being 
identified as a pure follower of fashion: “Telling a story behind design is not to 
deny the influence of current fashionable trends, but to present a reasonable design 
process.”94 For many contemporary architects, fashion trends and consumer cul-
ture are part of practice. But Cui Kai is constantly alert to the corrupting nature of 
fashion. In these projects, Cui Kai was striving to find a rational way of working 
with the free forms and loose structure current in contemporary architecture.
• Rationalism of simplicity
The buildings discussed above represent Cui Kai’s path to maturity in a complex 
architectural vocabulary based on rationalism. In his mature work, Cui Kai’s ini-
tiatives are increasingly reflected in a series of designs, for example, the No.9 
Building of Dalian Software Park (Dalian, 2004), the No.10 Building of Dalian 
Software Park (Dalian, 2006), the Legation Quarter (Beijing, 2008) and the Yin 
Ruins Museum (Anyang, 2006), all of which show order and discipline tending 
towards simplicity, in an attempt to combine his worldviews, goals, strategies and 
cultures into a single theme. Yet the simplicity in Cui Kai’s works does not neces-
sarily rest on a singular geometry. For instance, the fusion between formal dignity, 
functionality and modern technology is revealed in the No.9 and No.10 build-
ings (Dalian, 2006) (Figure 4.10, 4.11) of Dalian Software Park. Composition-
ally, No.9 building is an advance for him in the easy combination of volume and 
ornament. He emphasises horizontal lines in the tension between the five upper 
floors and the five floors below. Cui Kai suggested prefabricated reinforced con-
crete panel to the client: “compared to stone, it has a larger size; compared to alu-
minium sheet, it does not look as light; compared to other composite materials, it 
is durable, solid and has a high working precision.”95 The prefabricated reinforced 
concrete panel has great mass compared to other materials and plays an important 
role in demonstrating the sophistication in the rationalist approach. It achieves the 
aesthetic composition of boxes from the basic elements of accelerated horizontal 
movement. The choice of small slate wall tiles in the lower floors makes the build-
ings look as though they are a component of the street, since this material was 
used to clad as the adjacent school building of the Information College.
The design of the Legation Quarter (Beijing, 2008) is a more extreme case. 
Initially built as the American Legation in the beginning of twentieth century, 
No.23 Qianmen East Street housed many institutions before the renovation, while 
its original layout, five independent buildings and a quadrangle, was corrupted 
after several additions. The renovation focused on restoring the quadrangle and 
making it a centre for high culture in the centre of Beijing city, providing res-
taurants, galleries, theatres and entertainment services. The enclosing and non-
structural volumes achieved a high degree of integration of the modern and the 
traditional in strict orderliness, but with lyrical qualities. By using a series of steel 
and glass structural elements, the Legation Quarter (Beijing, 2008) achieves a 
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Figure 4.10 Cui Kai, No.9 Building of Dalian Software Park, Dalian, 2004
simple, unobstructed connection to the surrounding environment and the history 
of the buildings themselves.
In Yin Ruins Museum (Anyang, 2006), on the basis of achieving a balanced 
combination of structural and material soundness and functional comfort, Cui 
employs the ideals of simplicity and regularity. The history of Yin Ruins is rich and 
provided the architect with numerous ideas. The main part of the building lies fully 
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Figure 4.11 Cui Kai, No.10 Building of Dalian Software Park, Dalian, 2006
underground, covered with green vegetation. Only the bronze walls around the yard 
are slightly above the ground, indicating the presence of a mysterious concealed 
space. Thus the building integrates into the surrounding environment, preserving 
the natural original form of Yin Ruins to the utmost. Cui mainly used one material:
There is only one basic material in the appearance of the museum-pisolite 
plaster. It is the same as that used for the few outer walls and side walls of 
the downward ramp. This round local-produced pisolite, being quite cheap 
and simple in construction, is also the main material for the paving in the 
museum park; even the workers were wondering why the museum was being 
built again in such an old fashion that had been given up for twenty years.96
When walking along the narrow lane, the simple wall on both sides is calming; 
with the gently moving treetop in the sky above, it conveys to the visitors that they 
are comprehensively removed from the uproar of urbanity. Therefore, simplicity 
and serenity here is a matter of functional logic, site logic and locally produced 
materials, to achieve the aesthetics of simplicity.
•   The fluctuation between modernism and postmodernism  
within rationalism
In Cui Kai’s design, simplicity does not display a wholly simple, or unaccep-
table and sterile scientific rigour, but an acceptable and humanistic rigour. The 
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simplicity manifest in his designs does not narrowly focus on one element at the 
expense of others. He suppresses the picturesque and stresses constructional and 
compositional elements. Ideas of simplicity are also given a complex twist, with 
the introduction of a syntax that explicitly describes many elements. In contrast, 
the complexity he employs does not incorporate too many traditional or popu-
lar elements. That is to say, the rationalism of simplicity and the rationalism of 
complexity are that far from each other in their selection and rationalisation of 
devices. It could be argued that Cui Kai’s designs are contained within a specific 
area which has been marked out by his belief in, and tactics of, rationalism.
In this specified area of possibilities described by rationalism, the trajectory of 
his designs can be traced back to how his design evolved in the broader histori-
cal context, including pre-reform China and pre-PRC China and their relation to 
the dominant styles of modernism and postmodernism, two movements exerting 
influence over his designs. However, in addressing the role of modernism and 
postmodernism in his early works, there has remained one question unanswered 
from section one: how did modernism and postmodernism engage with each other 
in his design from the early 1990s onwards?
Cui Kai experienced a delayed exposure to modernism via the architectural 
curriculum in mainland China, in which the new and modernisation are roughly 
synonymous in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Cui Kai was initially educated 
as a modernist disciple, but he soon experienced a significant societal change: 
the “delayed modernism” bloods strongly dominant after the termination of the 
Mao era was then caught up in the theories of “hazy postmodernism” in the post-
Mao era. Chronologically analysing his works from the angles of complexity and 
simplicity, it seems evident that modernist architectural language is never absent 
in Cui Kai’s designs, and his designs that can be categorised as postmodern have 
never incorporated popular elements. In other words, the two characteristics of 
complexity in composition, and a high degree of rational simplicity, have been the 
manifestation of the conflict between the modernism and postmodernism.
The consciousness of serving private clients contrasted with the consciousness 
of serving the nation in a state-owned design institute provided Cui Kai with a 
norm in architecture and a rational mindset. The role of rationalism is to delimit 
the potential and define the boundaries for his designs. Yet the fluctuation between 
modernism and postmodernism determines the trajectory of his designs, which 
are insulated from kitsch culture and overt political practice by rationalism as a 
practice. In the different stages of China’s transition, there have been different 
factors that maintain this unique fluctuation in his designs.
It is also important to define kitsch culture in the context of contemporary 
China. In his essay “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” Jameson lays out the 
differences in culture between the modern and postmodern periods. The author 
argued that postmodernism is not a style, but it is a dominant cultural form indica-
tive of late capitalism.
What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become inte-
grated into commodity production generally; the frantic economic urgency 
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of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing 
to air-planes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly 
essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experi-
mentation. . . . Of all the arts, architecture is the closest consecutively to the 
economic, with which, in the form of commissions and land values, it has a 
virtually unmediated relationship. It will therefore not be surprising to find 
the extraordinary flowering of the new postmodern architecture grounded in 
the patronage of multinational business, whose expansion and development 
is strictly contemporaneous with it.97
The later stages of market transition are different from the combination of the 
frantic economic urgency producing fresh waves of postmodern architecture in 
the West or in 1970s Taiwan, and the maturing market in the late 1990s has been 
quickly combined with glass-concrete-steel modernism or international style in 
China. Modern architecture combined with a capital boom does not display a 
wholly naïve idealism, but rather a belief in money. Therefore, modernism to 
some extent becomes kitsch in the speedy development of real estate in China. In 
China’s social transitioning, modernism – here possibly defined as “low modern-
ism” or “popular modernism” – as a kitsch culture has been a negative aesthetic 
phenomenon in the lost cultural realm. When neither traditional Chinese architec-
ture nor Maoist style can meet the aesthetic challenges of the contemporary land-
scape in massive urban construction, China-in-transition only seeks temporary 
relief from the glass boxes with colourful curtain wall panels or white boxes in a 
speedy design and construction. Cui Kai is an architect determined not to bow to 
kitsch culture. At the same time, he does not want his architecture to become the 
source of illusions, like the thoughtless glass boxes or white boxes in a speedy 
design and construction.
By contrast to low modernist kitsch, Cui Kai still holds onto naïve idealism in 
modernism as he was taught in his early years. After the early designs featuring 
postmodern surfaces, postmodernism gradually weakens in his designs but never 
disappears. In his later designs – for example, the design for the Legation Quar-
ter (Beijing, 2008) and the Yin Ruins Museum (Anyang, 2006) – achieved after 
several years of practice, the unembellished boxes feature a flat roof and open 
plan that offer light, air, space, and manifest themselves in a high-modernist way. 
The hazy postmodernism, with its uncertain nature from the very beginning in the 
Chinese context, has come to rival the low modernist kitsch in the later stage of 
his designs. Cui Kai does not see architecture as decoration, but he views post-
modernism as a way to resist the over-commercialised and to claim the values of 
complexity and diversity of styles confronting kitsch culture. It is also a way to 
express his lasting interest in the recovery of historical reference. However, this 
kind of interest remains recessive in his design, partially because of his avoidance 
of being directly connected to unsuspecting nationalist advocacy or bureaucrat 
technocrat. Therefore, it could be argued that the grand narrative in modernist and 
postmodernist expression has been combined in his design principles in his own 
way, yet within the area fenced off by rationalism.
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Modernism and postmodernism as historical developments
The characteristics of Cui Kai’s designs begin to make sense if we understand 
what modernism and postmodernism mean to him as historical developments. The 
historical process in China cannot be defined as postmodernism challenging the 
basic assumptions of modernism, but rather, that the specific ideologies in the Mao 
era and post-Mao era are challenging the tenets of modernism and postmodern-
ism. This special circumstance manifests as unique fluctuations between modern-
ism and postmodernism in Cui Kai’s designs. This fluctuation does not achieve 
extreme innovation but continues to vacillate in a circular orbit around rationalism.
While the rationalism running through the fluctuation between modernism 
and postmodernism has been influenced by Cui Kai’s personal preferences, it 
still maintains a solid connection to his life experiences from pre-reform China 
through to the most recent decades of Chinese modern history. His role and career 
has fluctuated with CAG and the associated tension between state and market. 
Therefore, his designs vacillate between being representative of nationalism and 
being an expression of his individuality. From the planned economy to the market 
economy, the changes in Cui Kai’s works are primarily focused on developing a 
more acceptable lever mediating between social responsibilities and the private 
sector, which finally manifests as the rational. Furthermore, from the late 1990s, 
the unravelling of the traditional planned system and reforms of CAG gave the 
opportunity of diversified client sources for Cui Kai.
As a rising power, China is still searching for a balance between its market 
power and governmental power. Political power and the governmental mode are 
still being questioned and tested in the market transition. It should be noted that 
the full range of expression, including negative and positive comments about the 
state and its policies, has not been allowed in China. Under these circumstances, 
Cui Kai’s aesthetic contains a sense of the state-owned enterprise’s mission inher-
ited from the collectivist-transmitted culture, yet it is neither transmitted by poli-
tics nor folk. The contested high culture in his design is not only acceptable to the 
state but also acceptable to the majority of Chinese people, the market and the rest 
of the world. The increasing importance of the market mechanism does not allow 
his designs to be emblematic of stoic rationalism. For Cui Kai, his individual 
design is still subordinate to the masses, to the collective good of the Chinese peo-
ple. Fundamentally, his designs are the manifestations of his individual excellence 
raised to a high state of social responsibility and rationalism. The architectural 
rationalism promoted by Cui Kai strengthens affective and cognitive links that 
consolidate a sense of shared aesthetics in the new China.
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This chapter analyses three architects in the firm URBANUS, the architectural 
designs of URBANUS and the social, economic, cultural transformation in the 
Pearl River Delta. These three architects shared a common background from the 
Maoist era to the 1990s: their education in China and in the United States until late 
1980s gave them an unusual individual nature in the 1990s, and the urbanisation 
in the Pearl River Delta during the 1990s gave them opportunities for experimen-
tation in architectural design. The three architects and their firm URBANUS in the 
Pearl River Delta region were then able to make a smooth transition to the peak 
of the market.
Generally, studies regarding the construction boom in the Pearl River Delta are 
inclined to ascribe it simply to the sober pursuit of money in the region. The urban 
strategies initiated by URBANUS are not an isolated professional experiment but 
an attempt to reconcile the ideological anxiety between private and public sec-
tors. This conflict is an inevitable effect of the social transition in China, and it is 
particularly well illustrated in the Pearl River Delta.
The “Haigui” Chinese architects
In an ad hoc expression in newspapers, TV and other Chinese media, three archi-
tects in the firm URBANUS were titled “Haigui”1 architects. Since the mid-
1990s, large numbers of Chinese overseas residents have returned to mainland 
China. These three architects, Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan and Wang Hui, returned in 
1999 and established URBANUS in Shenzhen. At present this architectural firm 
is recognised as one of the leading forces among China’s design firms. It was 
featured as one of the ten global “Design Vanguards” by Architectural Record 
in December, 2005, and has been awarded many prestigious architecture prizes.2 
The partners Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan and Wang Hui all graduated from Tsinghua 
University in China in the 1980s and received their master of architecture degrees 
from Miami University in the United States in the 1990s. Prior to establishing 
URBANUS, they had worked in different US design firms as project architects. 
Liu Xiaodu worked in Design Group Inc. and Stang and Newdow Architects from 
1993 to 1998. Meng Yan worked in the New York office of KPF and MELTZER/
MANDL from 1996 to 2000. Wang Hui worked in Gensler New York and Gary 
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Edward Handel from 1997 to 2001. It was during this period in the United States 
that the three architects met and befriended a group of avant-garde architects in 
China. Yet Liu, Meng and Wang seldom mention what exactly has been the influ-
ence of their first degree from the top university in China and second degree from 
Miami.
• From the East to the West
The architects’ background and education in China and the United States enables 
us to sketch out the East–West contours of power from two perspectives: the value 
exchange and linguistic capacity. First I will consider what they have gained in 
the clash of values between the West and the East: on one hand, they want to 
bring Western values such as democracy, civil liberties and individualism into 
their booming motherland, whose underlying values were and are being shaken 
dramatically; on the other hand, despite the differences between West and East 
experienced during their overseas education, they are still inspired to retain Chi-
nese values such as collectivism in the new projects.
Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan and Wang Hui grew up during the Cultural Revolution 
and became the first generation to have the opportunity to study at university after 
the revolution. “The education of our generation has a strong idealist hue and 
sense of social responsibility”,3 Meng noted. The complex factors informing their 
collective and idealistic view cannot be explained in a single observation, but a 
major influence comes from the age into which they were born. Ideologically, 
their teenage years in the idealistic Mao era were associated with a collective 
identity. Many idealistic decisions by Mao ended in failure or even in disaster and 
atrocity. However, this is a contemporary assessment within China. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, for many Chinese of that generation, the historical turbulences in 
Maoist China were not disastrous childish experiences. People’s communes were 
clearly an idealist communist reference for a physical entity as well. This opinion 
echoes many of the ideas championed by Chinese who were born in the 1950s 
and 1960s.
Soon after their school days in Tsinghua University, the URBANUS founders 
went to the United States and were exposed to Western democracy, individualism 
and consumerism. They read Western theory in books, but gained an understand-
ing in the United States. Liu summarised his generation’s trajectory in my inter-
view with him:
They were born in the 1960s in China, and received undergraduate degrees in 
the 1980s in China. The 1980s is a special period in China, one that has been 
dominated by idealist ideas. China’s intellectuals were active, and there were 
many pioneer voices in both the intellectual and cultural spheres in China. 
When they left China and arrived in America in the 1990s, they found that 
American was a country with a similar atmosphere to China of the 1980s. The 
intelligentsia had a serious sense of mission, especially in the universities. 
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The strong sense of social responsibility occupied a leading position in the 
social sphere.4
He used a term to describe this life experience from 1980s China to 1990s Amer-
ica: “seamless graft”.5 The considerable impact of study and work in America 
remains one of the pivotal points of their architectural narrative and discourse of 
democracy and civic liberties. When asked about the resistance they encountered 
when they wanted to express the concept of civic society or other similar attitudes 
in their designs, Liu stated that many people in China, throughout the whole social 
structure, from top to bottom, do not have such a consciousness regarding form-
ing a democratic society at the moment. Liu referred to the big civic square as an 
example: why is there no large-scale square designed without any installation in 
the current time? He speculated,
On the one hand, the government appreciates this grand view; but on the 
other hand, they do not want people to use it. The large scale square in the 
contemporary Chinese history indicates a place facilitating a pledge to those 
in power, not for a gathering of the people.6
In addition, the nostalgia originating from being “the other”7 in their overseas 
experience increased their desire to re-make and explain China. The period in 
which the three architects studied and worked in the United States was character-
ised by poor communications between China and the United States, and images 
and impressions related to China were usually demonised. Therefore, a long 
tradition of false images of China in Western culture further strengthened their 
ambition to explain China. According to Ouroussoff, that range of experience 
is doubtless what enables them to see the world through multiple lenses, a trait 
invaluable to architects, whose most onerous task is balancing what may seem 
like irreconcilable values.8
Second, the trans-national studies not only made them bilingual but also made 
them bilingual in architecture. Three architects with Chinese faces can talk about 
their designs in fluent English, and URBANUS has been invited to exhibitions 
worldwide and presented in prestigious newspapers and magazines, including 
The New York Times,9 Time + Architecture,10 World + Architecture,11 Architecture 
Record (USA),12 BLUEPRINT (Britain).13 Being educated in Tsinghua and Miami 
Universities, URBANUS represents a typical bilingual architects’ group in China. 
The diagrams they draw are always accompanied by text both in Chinese and 
English (Figure 5.1). Jianfei Zhu argues that Chinese bilingual scholars often read 
in both Chinese and foreign languages. Some worked and published in two lan-
guages, such as Chinese and English. He concluded that this pattern of bilingual 
work was revived after the 1980s among younger scholars.14 Furthermore, due to 
Chinese efforts to modernise, and the pressure to learn from the West, all modern 
Chinese intellectuals since 1990 have been fundamentally bicultural if not techni-
cally bilingual.15
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Figure 5.1 URBANUS, Dongmen Photography Plaza, Shenzhen, 2009. Diagram
The three architects began their architectural studies in Tsinghua University, one 
of the most famous universities in China. The School of Architecture of Tsinghua 
was initially established by Liang Sicheng, one of the founders of China’s mod-
ern architectural education: most importantly, he contributed to the implementa-
tion of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts curriculum in China’s architectural education, 
as described in Chapter Two. Emphasis was placed on drawing in the Ecole des 
Beaux-Arts. Hence virtuosity in drawing was inherited by successive generations of 
architects. It suggests that Liu, Meng and Wang had to go through a rigorous pro-
gression of advancement in the basic skills of architecture. In addition, Liang was a 
pioneer in the research of traditional Chinese architecture. By creating the discipline 
of architectural history in China, Liang initiated a new set of historical, research and 
aesthetic values based on careful documentation of the physical fabric and form of 
traditional buildings in China and their historical development. Regarding under-
standing of traditional Chinese culture and acquiring basic skills in drawing, the 
three members of URBANUS owe a debt to Tsinghua University’s strict training.
In addition, although both the generation of Liang Sicheng and the gen-
eration of Liu Xiaodu had the opportunity to understand Western society and 
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intellectual trends, and have brought their observations into their works in China, 
the URBANUS architects are independently thinking individuals compared to 
earlier generations. For example, Yang Tingbao’s architectural works, as well as 
his teaching, show a unique interplay between universal virtues and localities. 
Yang was never obliged to express regionalism or individual identity,16 but the 
URBANUS architects are more at liberty to express their individuality in archi-
tectural drawings.
It is equally important to remember that postgraduate education at the Univer-
sity of Miami extended their skills in expressing their ideas in a manner more 
acceptable to the West. URBANUS is the foremost exponent of the collage 
approach in architectural visualisation, in lieu of the mass production typical of 
China’s particular architectural rendering drawings (Figure 5.2). Marling noted,
In the West, we usually do not expect very much of Chinese drawing offices. 
Therefore, it is surprising to see several innovative and aesthetically beautiful 
projects carried out by the architects Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan and Wang Hui, 
proprietors of the URBANUS drawing office which has branches in Beijing 
and Shenzhen.17
It could be argued that the linguistic capacity makes them more sensitive to 
global trends, and they understand the importance of being part of it. Liu Xiaodu 
remarked, “If you admit globalization is one trend and you are happy with this 
trend, you should learn English. Regarding architecture, you should learn mod-
ernist language.”
Figure 5.2 URBANUS, Dafen Art Museum, Shenzhen, 2007. Rendering drawing
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• Back to the Pearl River Delta: a new context to work in
However, the trans-national dialogue between the East and the West was not pow-
erful enough to push their designs to the forefront. What finally gave their archi-
tectural practice an experimental flavour was the unusual high-speed urbanisation 
in the Pearl River Delta. Urban development in China since 1949 has been subject 
to close monitoring and careful planning as part of the strategy for national eco-
nomic development.18 The introduction of economic reform measures in 1978 
placed China at the dawn of rapid urbanisation, which is conventionally associated 
with socio-economic development and industrialisation. The Pearl River Delta, 
one of the most vigorous economic regions in China, covers nine prefectures of 
the province of Guangdong, namely Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Dongguan, 
Zhongshan, Foshan, Huizhou, Jiangmen and Zhaoqing. The Pearl River Delta 
has become the major manufacturing base for goods such as electronic products, 
toys, garments and textiles, plastic products and a range of other goods that China 
exports to the world. Much of this output is tied to investments by foreign enter-
prises and is geared to the foreign market. The Chinese government expected 
that manufacturing in Guangzhou would utilise its proximity to abundant capital 
resources. This has resulted in the massive migration of large numbers of the rural 
population towards cities. People in rural areas all over China swarmed into the 
Pearl River Delta during the development of industrial cities; generally they were 
paid only minimum wages.
The 2010/2011 State of the World Cities report, published by the United 
Nations Human Settlements Program, estimates the population of the Pearl River 
Delta region at 120 million people.19 However, as conservative estimates show, 
at the end of the 1990s, the volume of the “floating population” in the Greater 
Delta alone reached 10 million, with the most dynamic areas attracting the great-
est number of predominantly young female migrant workers.20 In many cities in 
the Delta, those in the floating population frequently outnumber the permanent 
population. In 1999, the municipality of Shenzhen had a floating population of 
2,850,000 people, compared to a permanent population of 1,250,000, while in 
1980, 90 percent of the fewer than 100,000 residents of Shenzhen were holders of 
a permanent household registration.21
The rate of urbanisation in the Pearl River Delta, being the greatest in China, 
is taking place at an unprecedented pace and will continue over the next decades. 
Furthermore, “floating” in a temporary situation affects a surprising portion of 
the population. The huge population and the immense pressure for urbanisation 
also made it difficult to sustain economic development in a stable manner. The 
level of urbanisation in China has risen from 18 percent in 1978 to 30 percent in 
1995 and to 39 percent in 2002.22 But more significantly, considerable numbers of 
new immigrants, including industry workers, construction labourers, and gradu-
ates from the universities, have all had the intention to pursue the integration of 
local long-term living in the city with the accelerating process of urbanisation. 
Increased industrial activities have created a need to accommodate them, which 
places tremendous pressure on housing supply and urban construction, including 
urban infrastructure and public buildings.
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In the Pearl River Delta, affordable housing became increasingly problematic 
in the new century. Since housing construction was limited under the centrally 
planned economy, housing demand remains, although large-scale real estate 
development has been carried out. Because marketisation and commoditisation 
have transformed the primary housing provider from the government to the mar-
ket (developer), the city government now makes little effort to provide low-rent 
housing. Moreover, since low-rent urban housing can only produce small mar-
gins, it is less attractive to real estate developers and relies heavily on government 
subsidies.23 Although the policy of affordable housing was launched several years 
ago, the city government has a lack of enthusiasm for implementing low margin 
housing construction.24
One distinctive conflict of the Pearl River Delta associated with the radial 
expansion of urban built-up areas lies in the new type of urban neighbourhood, 
namely the “urban village” (Chengzhongcun).25 These villages used to be located 
on the outskirts of the city, but with the expansion of the city, farmlands formerly 
cultivated by the villagers are compulsorily purchased and turned into urban land 
by the government; however, the villages themselves have been preserved. The 
urban village is a special urban form emerging in China’s political and economic 
transition. Although the notion of the “urban village” has been well explored to 
encourage social interaction in a balanced community in the West, an urban vil-
lage in China is a unique phenomenon and social form that is part of current 
urbanisation efforts. By the early 2000s these villages housed 60 percent of the 
“floating”, illegal workers attracted to the factories.26 There are an estimated 139 
urban villages in Guangzhou and 241 in Shenzhen.27 As a semi-urbanised com-
munity, the urban village usually functions as the springboard for migrants to 
be gradually integrated into urban society. In fact, the urban village shares the 
city government’s responsibility to provide migrants with housing and has made 
it possible for the city to take advantage of cheap and flexible labour without 
bearing the extra costs associated with labour relocation and so avoiding social 
instability.28 Consequently, these new emerging problems and new conditions of 
urbanisation in the Pearl River Delta gave URBANUS a new context to work in.
The market founded by Deng
The relationships between URBANUS and the social transition to market in the 
Pearl River Delta is epitomised by Shenzhen. The most relevant paper, From 
Opposition to Alienation, written by Yan Wang, attempts to embed the 1960s-born 
architects’ practice within the urbanisation process of Shenzhen and its changing 
social condition by using Shenzhen as an extreme example.29 The paper was par-
tially based on the literature documenting the social process of Shenzhen’s thirty 
years of urbanisation historically and partially based on the interview with Meng 
Yan, a principle architect of URBANUS, and Rao Xiaojun, recording this chang-
ing context.30 The interview clearly points out the changing supply and demand 
relation in the development of URBANUS and the macro environment, however, 
the historical and social narrative is not rich enough to complement the relations 
assessed, which this part intends to address.
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In illustrating the changing supply and demand relations, Wang divided the prac-
tice of URBANUS in his paper into two periods: 1999–2005 and 2005 onwards. 
In Wu’s paper “Critical Urban Practice in China (Learning from Shenzhen)”, he 
divided URBANUS’s development into three phases: “Development Phase One: 
Genesis in Shenzhen (1999–2003)”, “Project Phase Two: Shifting cities culture 
design experimentation (2003–2007)” and “Projection Phase Three: Addressing 
issues larger than architecture (2006–2009)”.31 In summary, firstly, both studies 
lack a critical exploration of URBANUS’s initial collaborative model with the 
government. Secondly, Wang’s research took the establishment of the URBANUS 
Beijing branch into account, which changes the direction of the analysis. The 
research in this part focuses specifically on Shenzhen. Therefore, my analysis will 
begin with a review of the period before the 1999 and propose the years around 
2005 as the crucial turning point.
• Before 1999
After 1990, the pace of reforms in all aspects of Chinese society was faster than 
even the highest point of reformation in the 1980s. In January 1992, Deng Xiaop-
ing paid an inspection tour to south China, where he delivered a series of speeches 
that aimed at clarifying the idea of whether the establishment of special economic 
zones are capitalist or socialist in nature. Shenzhen was established as China’s 
first special economic zone (SEZ) in 1980 and, to date, has been one of the most 
successful. Deng’s southern tour played a significant role in the formation of the 
radical attitude towards modernisation in Southern China, especially in the Pearl 
River Delta. Since economic liberalisation was implemented there, the Delta has 
become a major leading economic region attracting large sums of foreign capital.
Because the Pearl River Delta is far removed from the political centre of China, 
the ideology there appears less politics-dominated and characterised more by pure 
pragmatism. In the first ten years of China’s economic reform, industrial growth 
in Dongguan, a Pearl River Delta city between Guangzhou and Shenzhen SEZ, 
grew at more than 40 percent per year. “If you can make one dollar in Hong 
Kong you can make two dollars in Dongguan,” one official remarked.32 The fever 
of pragmatic expectations underlies an obsession with the modern image and a 
refusal to think about national identity. In the Pearl River Delta, identity is per-
ceived as an illusion, and greater importance is placed on getting rich. The issue 
could be summarised as not who I am, but whether I can play golf. However, from 
another perspective, the Pearl River Delta strictly follows the Red ideology. Wu 
commented: “Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was Deng Xiaoping’s brainchild 
in 1978, representing the Chinese Miracle since it was a city created from zero 
by both Chinese political ideology and international market mechanisms.”33 The 
political shift initiated by Deng during that period was also intended to secure the 
“planned commodity economy” in the modernisation of cities.
Shenzhen was once a sleepy border town, but in the first draft of the Master 
Layout Plan of Shenzhen created in August 1980, it was planned to “to develop 
Shenzhen into an industry-led modernized Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at the 
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border, based on the integration of agricultural and industrial development.”34 
Because there were not many historical streets, or architecture of conservation 
importance, the architects had considerable freedom in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Indeed, the rapid modernisation of architecture has provided a new order which 
blurs stylistic distinctions. The absence of prevailing archetypes in the area ren-
ders the Pearl River Delta totally modern and obviates the need to compensate 
for a lack of historical reference. It is a city without any particular identity, apart 
from its incredible growth rate, and its apparent restructuring and transformation 
in twenty-year cycles. Rem Koolhaas notes that communists’ fascination with the 
future has translated, during the twentieth century, into attempts to merge utopian 
visions with the realities of modern industrial cities. The image of the industrial 
city was adopted as a symbol of the class struggle: the socialist city was seen as 
an inverted twin of the capitalist metropolis.35 In twenty years, the industrial areas 
of Shenzhen have been transformed for new purposes.
The cities in the Pearl River Delta are remarkable for their “copy and paste” 
architecture in initial capital accumulation. Despite this, the quality of the design 
was not inferior to Beijing or Shanghai in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the late 
1990s, numerous architects from various national institutions of design in Bei-
jing and Shanghai were sent to Shenzhen, and many of them were assigned to 
the Shenzhen Office for Shenzhen’s development. For example, Cui Kai worked 
in Huasen Architectural & Engineering Design Consultants from 1985 to 1989, 
which was a constituent company of China Architecture Design & Research 
Group. Some architects individually went to Shenzhen seeking greater oppor-
tunities. Shenzhen in the 1980s and early 1990s offered ideal opportunities to 
pioneer architects, although the heavy workload outweighed the good pay and 
comfortable work conditions. However, the local national design institute, based 
on the old system, could not digest so many new projects, and so the introduction 
of liberal policies in Shenzhen, together with the growth in the urban infrastruc-
ture and the mechanism to cooperate with the government, all provided fertile 
ground for the development of private design firms. For example, the founder of 
Zhubo was active in the mid-1990s, and Zhubo Design Co., Ltd. was officially 
founded in 1996. Currently, Zhubo Design Co. Ltd. is made up of more than 1,600 
professional, technical and management employees, 25 percent of whom hold 
advanced degrees or PhDs.36 In 2012, it was officially incorporated into a joint 
stock company.
In an interview with Huang Weiwen, who worked in the Shenzhen City Plan-
ning Department, he observed:
In the mid-1990s Shenzhen lacked influential works or top works of foreign 
masters. . . . Over a period of time, Shenzhen was a leader in the nation’s house 
design. For example, it learned from Singapore and built the East China Sea 
Garden in 1990s, and was experimental with modern Chinese-style Sakata 
Garden the 5th in the 21st century. The office buildings here are behind Bei-
jing and Shanghai in terms of individual size and level, but their relations in 
the urban space are relatively sophisticated. In addition, without too many 
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limits, Shenzhen’s buildings have more possibilities, and at a higher level 
overall and therefore, more relaxed.37
China’s economic reforms introduced market forces to the domain of urban con-
struction. Architects in Shenzhen were pragmatic in their approach to the emerg-
ing market: “cross a river by feeling the stones”, to use a phrase from Deng.38 
A market evolved in Shenzhen in the 1990s that suggested that urban develop-
ment in China appears to resemble capitalist economies. The URBANUS founder 
architects were all working in the United States, with Meng Yan and Wang Hui 
licensed in New York State. They decided to return and form a private firm based 
in Shenzhen and could be seen as pioneers in detecting the possibilities in this 
market. Instead of focusing on a self-contained and mature US market, or serv-
ing the nation’s political requirement, Liu, Meng and Wang have a wider, inter-
national perspective, as well as local domestic awareness in China, where the 
domestic market and social conditions were constantly changing. In 1999, the 
private architect’s practice began to occupy its own position in the market, which 
was no longer dominated by huge state-owned or municipal design institutes. 
Their rich experiences as commercial architects in the United States laid the foun-
dation for their careers in Shenzhen, where China’s progressive architecture pro-
gramme was still under development.
• 1999–2005
Because of their well-known works, most of which are public buildings and urban 
designs, it may seem that Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan and Wang Hui have always been 
able to work in a refined manner, able to refuse the repetitive housing designs that 
might not give full scope to their potential in design. However, in Wang’s inter-
view with Meng, he stated,
In the early stage of URBANUS, they did not shun housing design, they knew 
that housing design in demand could bring a good income, and at the same 
time their professional intervention could possibly provide a slight change 
to the fast and rough residential construction. However, there was no big 
developer who commissioned any design services from them in that period. 
Only several brave businessmen who were significant in other professions, 
who sought to dabble in real estate came to them and commissioned them for 
some small business projects.39
URBANUS designed over 170 projects in its first 7 years, of varying scales and 
complexity.40 Yet most of them were commissioned by the government. Since 
they were the first “Haigui” generation after the economic reform, large develop-
ers did not have a clear of idea of what URBANUS could do, and to what extent 
they could handle the complexities of a large-scale project as a “Haigui architect”. 
The state-owned large design institute still held the advantage in their early years. 
The fast-expanding local private design enterprises also commanded a large pro-
portion of market share. Although in reality the market was a harsh environment 
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for them, they knew that urbanisation in the Pearl River Delta was the begin-
ning of a new chapter in a traditionally rural city. Despite the slow nature of the 
transformation which allowed many old institutions to remain effective, in time 
the architects of URBANUS transformed themselves into a model of cooperation 
with the local government. In URBANUS’ large-scale urban renovation plan for 
the city of Shenzhen in 1999, Diwang Urban Park (Shenzhen, 1999) was the only 
project executed.41
Jieming Zhu wrote in 2000: “Decision making is decentralized during the 
reform process to two entities: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local govern-
ments.”42 However, in Shenzhen, a brand new city, the state-owned enterprises did 
not have a long history or solid foundation in terms of scale and number compared 
to other big cities. Jieming Zhu commented that “The economic reforms gave rise 
to the decentralisation of property rights over state assets to local governments in 
making investment decisions for local growth.”43 URBANUS collaborated posi-
tively with the Shenzhen local government, which was empowered to carry out 
local development with a realignment of revenue distribution between the central 
government and localities in transformation. Reports at the time stated:
In the 1980s and 1990s, governments of many booming coastal cities nur-
tured the local property market under local government-enterprise coalitions; 
these coalitions, whether in the name of local state corporatism or local state 
entrepreneurialism, have helped facilitate the process from central planning 
to market orientation.44
In 1999, coincidentally, Shenzhen won the Sir Abercrombie Award at the Twen-
tieth UIA Congress in Beijing in 1999, which was the first time in forty years that 
this award was given to an Asian city. Driven by this award, Shenzhen local gov-
ernment made the decision to raise their urban design to a new level.
The high demand for design quality in urban spaces from the Shenzhen local 
government precipitated a coalition with URBANUS, who, at that time, did not 
have a foot in the Shenzhen real estate market. This coalition has helped facilitate 
the process from central planning to market orientation in Shenzhen. Ironically, 
the Diwang Urban Park I project was demolished just two years after it was com-
pleted and replaced by a large-scale business centre project that it planned to link 
with.45 The demolition reflects the quick process from central planning to market 
orientation. This measure also paved the way for further development in the firm of 
URBANUS. In addition, in 2003, the URBANUS Beijing Brand was founded after 
the 2008 Olympics were announced, which conveyed a new market signal. This 
indicates that they had achieved success in the primitive accumulation of capital 
and experience in the Chinese market, and their commissions gradually flourished.
• 2005 onwards
In Wang’s interview with Meng, he said, “In 2005, some developers began to 
see the completed buildings designed by URBANUS. The completion of the 
new Shenzhen Planning Bureau Headquarters in 2005 was a turning point for 
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URBANUS’s prestige in the market.”46 At that time, most of the mega-developers 
had accumulated working capital and moved into the stage of shaping and pro-
moting their brand image. The new demand from developers gave the URBANUS 
team more opportunities. Therefore, Meng defined the period from 2005 to 2007 
as URBANUS’s heyday. In 2006, they published their first design collection book 
documenting their works of 1999–2006. At this time, the Shenzhen Planning 
Building (Shenzhen, 2005), completed in 2005, still remained a symbol of plan-
ning power and a place of architectural discourse in Shenzhen.
In recent years, the Shenzhen government declared that their goal was to build 
a modern international city. Shenzhen local government does not only strive for 
recognition of authority from the central government but also desires to promote its 
image abroad. In Beijing, the Birds’ Nest by Swiss team Herzog & de Meuron, the 
National Grand Theatre by Paul Andreu from France, the CCTV by Dutch architect 
Rem Koolhaas and the Beijing Capital International Airport by Britain’s Norman 
Foster are not only architectural achievements themselves but part of Beijing’s strat-
egy to be a city of global importance. Apart from Beijing, cities of different sizes 
have launched a number of international architectural bids for a similar international 
image construction. Shenzhen is not an exception. At the same time, foreign archi-
tects also gradually realised that China was a place of opportunities for architectural 
design. With a new orientation for Shenzhen, URBANUS is confronting new prob-
lems in holding a market share. In Yan Wang’s interview with Meng, he noted,
In the recent Shenzhen-initiated local architectural bidding project, there was 
almost no local design institute involved. URBANUS has always been the 
last one to get invited. The competition is very international; URBANUS has 
to face many international figures in architectural design, including figures 
like Thom Mayne.47
It is difficult at this stage to say that the goal of becoming a global city is an ideo-
logical barrier to the systemic transformation, economic restructuring and social 
realignments of Shenzhen. URBANUS is still consolidating its position in the 
myriad changes in the relationship between the market and the state in China.
• Anti-market behaviour
Substantial investments have been made in buildings and infrastructure in Shen-
zhen since 1980.
The rapidly growing number of developers in cities of rapid marketization 
have been driven by the potential in the emerging property market and the 
existence of a great amount of pent-up demand accumulated over many years 
of central planning suppression.48
The rapidly growing number of developers demands great speed in complet-
ing designs. For most architectural firms, profit maximisation is a key factor 
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attributable to the genesis of this market-oriented industry. Incentives for profit 
maximisation are clearly present in marketplaces where architectural design ser-
vices, and developers’ demands, guarantee changeable prices. As previously dis-
cussed, URBANUS architects are not aloof from the market, but their prestige 
does not come from pursuing profit. In such a market-oriented industry, surpass-
ing even the capitalist market economy, I would argue that the uniqueness of 
URBANUS comes from specific anti-market projects and research. Urban Tulou 
(Guangzhou, 2008)49 is the best known example of their “anti-market behaviour” 
in architecture. From the marketing strategy side, Feng defined it as an “anti-real 
estate” real estate project.50
URBANUS received the commission of Urban Tulou from the Vanke Real 
Estate firm, which was aiming to undertake a project of low-income housing. 
Wang Shi, CEO of Vanke Real Estate, took a tour of an intact Fujian Tulou at the 
end of 2005 and saw an opportunity to build a more humanitarian architecture 
in this traditional residential type, proposing that the architectural form of the 
Tulou is close to the modern dormitory. Wang Shi asked URBANUS whether 
they could do some research on traditional housing and design a prototype for 
small-sized housing units.51 The partners in URBANUS strongly agreed with 
Wang Shi on the architectural value of Fujian Tulou and confirmed the feasibil-
ity of the project.
In order to have a better understanding of the current living conditions of the 
target customers, the main designer, Liu Xiaodu, visited the house of a cleaner 
who worked in the offices of URBANUS. It was a 30 m2, two-room apartment, 
without kitchen space, shared by four couples. They were all migrant workers 
and had no hope of staying in the city permanently. The majority of the migrant 
workers were accommodated in the urban villages. The average rent of tenure 
housing in urban villages is usually cheaper (around 10RMB per square metre per 
month) than that of the central urban districts (around 15RMB per square metre 
per month).52 “It is not unusual to see a family of three sharing a single rental room 
with no facilities and using a corner to set up a small cooking area with either a 
kerosene burner or propane stove.”53 In “Vanke Four Seasons Flowery City” a 
large, gated residential district near Urban Tulou, there are 5,000 households. The 
service staff, most of whom are migrant workers, number 1,000 to 2,000 people; 
they were the target inhabitants of the Urban Tulou envisaged by the architects. 
They work hard but are underpaid, and they have no hope of ever affording urban 
housing in Guangzhou or Foshan.
The remarkable and controversial aspect of this project was precisely that the 
target users are the low-income population, or the migrant workers in the city. As 
Weiping Wu points out, the general disadvantage experienced by migrants in the 
city is caused by the institutional restrictions of the Hukou system that outweigh 
the combined effects of socio-economic factors.54 Implemented since the mid-
1950s, the Hukou system requires each citizen to register in one, and only one, 
place of regular residence. It entails two related parts: place of registration and 
type of registration (urban versus rural).55 Due to the restriction of Hukou to local 
urban residents and permanent migrants, urban amenities are either priced low or 
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provided free. On the other hand, migrants without local Hukou have very limited 
or no access to local schools, citywide welfare programmes, state sector jobs, or 
the housing distribution system.56
From the point of view of providing an equitable share of items of personal 
and collective consumption, this would seem to be a regression from the ideals 
and fundamental beliefs of the socialist housing system. Under the traditional 
planned economy, all housing production was the responsibility of the State in 
China. Since 1949, China as a socialist country has adopted a welfare housing 
system where the production, allocation and maintenance of housing have been 
the responsibility of the relevant work unit (Danwei).57 Yet housing reform has 
been a crucial component of the overall economic reforms in urban China from 
the mid-1980s. In 1988, the government issued a major reform document, the Ten 
Year Reform Strategy. Its main objectives were to encourage urban residents to 
buy their houses, to formulate new housing finance arrangements and to restruc-
ture rents in the public sector. Since then, various central and local legislation and 
regulations for the privatisation of urban housing have been issued.58
To some extent Urban Tulou has been forced on the public by civic necessity. 
An analysis made by Weiping Wu shows that migrants are largely excluded from 
the mainstream housing distribution system, and recent reforms in urban housing 
provisions seem to overlook the needs of this population.59 In spite of housing 
reforms in China, a socially responsible government is required to play a domi-
nant role in protecting the vulnerable, low-income population, or “floating popu-
lation”, within the evolving political and financial systems. Because these migrant 
workers are largely employed in the manufacturing and construction industries, 
they provide the powerhouse of human force behind the urbanisation process. In 
this situation their needs have been ignored and exploited. The housing market 
has played a key role in the rapid growth of China in recent years. McKinsey 
Global Institute estimates that over the past decade land sales have contributed 
to more than 60 percent of the annual income of some Chinese cities.60 With the 
introduction of capitalist labour relations into China certain attitudes, competen-
cies and values associated with global capitalism seem to be increasingly valued.61 
The developments for industry have been overwhelming, but migrant workers 
have no understanding of how they might safeguard their rights and interests.
Crucial to implementing affordable housing was the investment costs, operat-
ing systems and methodology. When the project began operation, there was still 
a long struggle to make it a reality. The Vanke mass housing development was 
mostly based on the mature operation of a commercial residential building. Vanke 
owns its own property management division offering professional services, unlike 
most real estate corporations in China. Urban Tulou is no exception, and every 
resident has to comply with the commune rules laid out in the initial contract. 
All residents must undertake the cleaning together in the neighbourhood, so that 
they are exempt from Vanke’s property management fee. Urban Tulou started 
managing itself in 2008. The occupancy rate has stabilised around 92 percent. 
From my observation, the only vacant rooms in the Urban Tulou are the collec-
tive dormitories each accommodating four people, not suitable for the nuclear 
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household pattern. In the administration room, there are piles of application forms 
for living in Urban Tulou on the desk. There are some criteria for the applicants: 
the annual income should be under 30,000RMB, and the applicants should have 
neither house property nor own a car in Guangzhou and Foshan.
From the latest financial data provided by Vanke, the land cost of Urban Tulou 
is 12,810,000RMB, the development and construction cost is 32,400,000RMB, 
and the overall investment is 46,250,000RMB. The building cost per square metre 
is 3822RMB. Officially issued by a Board of Directors, the 15,000,000RMB 
enterprise citizenship fund was first allocated by Vanke Corporation. The rest of 
the prime investment had to be supplemented by the Guangzhou Vanke Corpora-
tion. Currently, Vanke has set the rent of Tulou as 450RMB to 500RMB per suite, 
similar to peasants’ houses in the urban village in the centre of the city, and a little 
higher than the rent of peasants’ houses nearby. Vanke forecast that the investment 
would be covered in fifty-seven years. From the residents’ reluctance to move and 
satisfaction of living conditions, we can safely say that Urban Tulou is operating 
comfortably under the supervision of Vanke, but it is a provocation from the per-
spective of commercial interests.
From this project, it should be noted that the initiator, executor and maintainer 
was neither local government nor state government, but a private company, and the 
technical supporter was a private design firm, URBANUS. Vanke as a private devel-
oper and URBANUS as a private design firm attempted to share the responsibility 
of the public housing project with the central and local governments, by developing 
a private project for public welfare. URBANUS and Vanke were both acting in their 
private capacities, and it is a pragmatic association. They had first put forwards a 
proposal to the relevant government, which suggested that the government should 
assist with Urban Tulou as a part of subsidies to extreme low-income people in the 
urban area. But being subject to several strong and often conflicting currents of 
social problems and public policies, the proposal was rejected. To what degree the 
three architects in URBANUS and the associates of Vanke Real Estate represent the 
interests of the tenants in this project is difficult to ascertain. But it was certainly 
developed with considerable effort. It is possible that their enthusiasm could be 
diverted towards constructing a new nexus between developers and government in 
the future. In this instance, the three architects in the URBANUS practice did not 
engage in the pursuit of profit, but they instead focused their creative and business 
energies on behalf of the groups most vulnerable in the social transition.
In general they are supported by two aptitudes in their “anti-market behaviour”: 
their capacity for critical thinking – they not only challenge social and urban con-
ditions but also challenge the existing Western model in urban design theory. In 
Weidong Ma’s interview with the three architects, Meng said,
Our popularity has increased; there is no great survival problem at the 
moment. So, we may have more opportunities to make choices: developing 
knowledge, maintaining consistency in concept design, or converting experi-
ence into design strength and quality through an objective process rather than 
continued reproduction of existing ideas.62
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Liu continued:
I feel our success also lies in our own self-criticism. Some designer will fol-
low only his or her own aspirations while turning a blind eye to critical prob-
lems and peer critiques. . . . Internally we three have a review system which 
formed spontaneously.63
The other capacity is their enthusiasm for research into emerging urban problems, 
such as the Urban Village phenomenon in Shenzhen, which later resulted in a 
commission to build the Dafen Art Museum (Shenzhen, 2007).64
The circular path: travelling architects and the wandering 
imagination of China
The influence of market and personal experiences in the work of URBANUS is 
clearly seen in the development of Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) (Figure 5.3). The 
outcome of other projects by URBANUS can be unfolded from these perspec-
tives as well, but multiple forces cannot usually be reconciled in one project. In 
all URBANUS’s works, the circular plan of Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) is their 
most incisive architectural expression conciliating multiple forces and influences 
– including the domestic market, the global market and many indicators from their 
life experiences and educational background.
Designed by the up-and-coming Chinese firm URBANUS, the Tulou is a 
centuries-old housing prototype, reworked for the hard realities of the global 
capitalist city. It reminds us that bold architecture can serve a good cause, 
acknowledging the dignity of people who are often treated as invisible.65
This impression of Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008), offered by The New York Times, 
also presented images of a nightmare labyrinth of residential buildings in China. 
In 2008, a row of Tulou study models was displayed in a glass case in the Cooper–
Hewitt National Design Museum (New York). The prototype of Urban Tulou 
(Nanhai, 2008) is the Fujian Tulou, defined as: “A large multi storey building in 
southeast Fujian mountainous region for large community living and defence, 
built with weight bearing rammed earth wall and wood frame structure.”66 Liu 
Xiaodu, Meng Yan and Wang Hui talk about Urban Tulou in English whenever 
it is exhibited on the international stage. While many reports and studies have 
been published on the subject of innovation of the traditional Chinese form, the 
consideration of traditional form is generally related to a region with a long his-
tory and many stories, for example, Beijing, Xi’an and Nanjing. But the renova-
tion of traditional form in this particular project does not convey its location’s 
actual regional culture, “Lingnanism”.67 So how and why did this architecture, 
which could be mistakenly categorised as pure regionalism, come from this par-
ticular group of young architects in the Pearl River Delta, at this particular histori-
cal moment? Feng argued that Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) is an example of the 
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neo-regionalism of Guangdong province: “It is an exercise to elevate Lingnan-
ism to an international level, thereby providing a non-Guangdong stage for the 
regionalism-restricted Guangdong.”68
In Fujian Tulou, the rectangular Tulou is an earlier design, whereas the circular 
ones are more recent. The rectangular Tulou is direction-oriented and has different 
lighting and ventilation characteristics, often resulting in damp and dark corners. 
Hence, these were slowly replaced by the circular design. Both designs are built 
around a central courtyard that allows light and ventilation and is designed to 
house livestock (some of the circular Tulous also have an inner circular single level 
building, within the compound). Mixed among square, rectangular, and elliptical 
shapes, circular Tulous appear in plain view as dramatic forms. Similar to its pro-
totype, the most remarkable and internationally recognised aspect of Urban Tulou 
is its nearly circular plan, instead of featuring a richly textured façade or having 
a social significant for the social transition. Regarding their choice of a circular 
plan, the URBANUS team have explicitly stated their attitude:
1. We do not deny the fact that we take Fujian Tulou as the prototype. 2. 
We believe that the radial units have very influential value of reference for 
a modern living model. 3. Traditional units in Urban Tulou are evenly laid 
Figure 5.3 URBANUS, Urban Tulou, Nanhai, 2008
140 Casting a civic shadow in the city
out along its perimeter, like modern slab-style dormitory buildings, but with 
greater opportunities for social interaction. 4. The sense of social cohesion 
and a sense of belonging are now gaining more attention in it. 5. The circular 
plan can result in better lighting and a larger usable floor area for each unit. 6. 
Tulou is not the only a circular dwelling pattern; it will also serve as the start 
of a series of research regarding low-income housing. 7. We hope that the 
circular design will help Tulou to become iconic architecture.69
Except for their own justification of the circular design in its functional and cul-
tural aspects, the reasons why the circular design was intuitively chosen and 
how it is further translated by the architects into its new context and accepted in 
international exhibitions have not been deeply investigated. The ethos of Urban 
Tulou’s (Nanhai, 2008) construction is part of the larger picture – the overseas 
education of the architects and the imagination underpinning China’s reconstruc-
tion in a globalised world. In considering which ends are served by translating the 
circular design, the perspectives of both the translator and the reader are necessary 
to explain how the circular represents an identity of the travelling nature of these 
architects, seen in a global context. Edward Said proposed the travelling theory 
and argued that cultural and intellectual life are usually nourished and often sus-
tained by this circulation of ideas, and
whether it takes the form of acknowledged or unconscious influence, creative 
borrowing, or wholesale appropriation, the movement of ideas and theories 
from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condi-
tion of intellectual activity.70
He stated that when ideas and theories move from one culture to another, it nec-
essarily involves processes of representation and institutionalisation in the new 
place, different from those at the point of origin. This complicates any account 
of the translation, transference, circulation and commerce of theories and ideas.71 
The three architects of URBANUS were nourished through travelling: as dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter, the circular plan takes the form of acknowledged 
or unconscious influence and creative borrowing along with the movement. The 
circular plan also involves the process of representation and institutionalisation 
different from those at the point of origin, which in fact was the large, defensive, 
circular building built between the thirteenth and twentieth centuries in Fujian.
• Weaving multiple values into a circular path
In order to identify the acknowledged or unconscious influences and creative bor-
rowing in the choice of this circular design, the remainder of this section looks at 
two summarised points that indicate the contours of power the group of architects 
proposed: first, they wished to bring Western values to China, but to simultane-
ously maintain Chinese values, and in this design, to better explain the old and 
new China. Second, they have the capacity to bilingually absorb and express the 
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architecture within an understandable language. In other words, a circular design 
is the clear physical manifestation of their socio-logical philosophy.
How then do the architects weave the values they are promoting into this cir-
cular design? From the beginning of the project, the notion of the circular design 
was associated with utopian visions, some social, some political, some purely spa-
tial and architectural. The sense of social cohesion and communal spirit revival 
in concentric housing functions as micro-utopias that arise easily in a socialist 
country. For example, if we pay close attention to the architectural drawings by 
URBANUS, as they compress the information and provide hints on the drawing 
in visual forms, we can identify the values they are promoting. The architectural 
drawing produced by URBANUS in the twenty-first century and the poster pro-
duced in pre-reform China share many aesthetic characteristics. The performance 
of the dragon’s dance and red banner on the entrance of the Urban Tulou in the 
architectural drawing are subtle evidence of their affective memories of their first 
youthful commitment to the ideals of collectivism (Figure 5.4). In contrast to 
the typical bland architectural drawings produced by professional rendering com-
panies, an understanding of China in drawings of Urban Tulou is captured by 
incorporating the vision of a lived experience from the early and mid-1970s. The 
figures wearing uniforms in the poster try to impress on the population how the 
working class sustained the speed of China’s recovery and further development, 
which is ideologically based on proletarian solidarity. The anciently hued picture, 
full of pleasure, corresponds to the architectural message of, and collective unity 
proposed by, URBANUS.
In Vanke Zhoukan, the case of Huang Yu, who lived in the Urban Tulou, gives 
a fairly vivid illustration of the communal life:
Huang Yu has rented one bedroom at level 3 in Zone C. The circular-shaped 
new Tulou is divided into several zones; each of them is isolated from others 
by partitions . . . The room has basic furniture, such as a bed and a wardrobe. 
Huang does not spend money on a washing machine. It is convenient to use 
the public laundry facility. He does not own a TV set because a computer 
is better entertainment. Public bathrooms can also be seen in the building. 
Though Huang is a tenant of Vanke Property, he rarely sees staff from Vanke 
in his routine life. The build is administrated by an elected commission. 
There are nearly 300 apartments. However, only a few months later, Huang 
knew his neighbours from the same floor, and evolved close relationships 
with them.
This description by a resident reveals that the sense of communal cohesion and 
a sense of belonging are now revived in this circular plan, which transcends the 
traditional clan, and re-establishes modern families into a single community. 
Traditional Tulou residential complexes provide structural and architectural 
confirmation of the importance of patrilineal clan organisation within single-
surname communities.72 All rooms in a traditional Tulou are of the same size. 
Each household has one room on each floor. The room on the first floor serves 
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Figure 5.4 URBANUS, Urban Tulou, Nanhai, 2008. Rendering drawing
as kitchen-cum-dining room, the one on the second floor as storeroom, and all 
the others above as bedrooms.73 Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) is by no means a 
traditional patriarchal community but a modern community based on contractual 
arrangements. The architects employed the idealised Tulou composition: the cir-
cular design was divided into blocks or units of space according to their purpose 
and then dynamically linked with corridors and bridges. The Urban Tulou (Nan-
hai, 2008) is by no means a collective proletariat housing design proposal. Yet the 
new Tulou complex provides architectural confirmation of the communal spirit 
from the socialist era of China, with different surnames living in one community. 
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It emphasises the spatial quality of traditional Tulou as much as its communal 
role, along with the new architectural elements of modern construction. The open 
staircase, natural lighting in the yard induced from above and the refined but con-
crete sensibility of the roof garden with planting covering the equipment – all 
contribute to the development of the circular spatial prototype.
• Weaving bilingual capacity into a circular path
Certain questions now arise: how do the architects utilise their bilingual capac-
ity between English and Chinese, and modernity and tradition within architec-
ture itself, in demonstrating and improving this circular design in the new global 
context? The properly assembled abstract vocabulary from the traditional Tulou 
façade, its security mesh, Chinese lattice window and clothes lines, reinforces the 
circular identity (Figure 5.5). Traditional Tulou draws on local resources includ-
ing cedar, sliced bamboo, tree branches, glutinous rice74 and so on, which results 
in the one-metre thickness of the exterior wall. The windowless feature is wrought 
on the first two-story exterior wall; the rest of the wall is punctured by small win-
dows. Walls are typically battered and have only a limited number of openings. 
Most Tulou have only a single entrance, although some have subsidiary gates 
Figure 5.5  URBANUS, Urban Tulou, Nanhai, 2008. Reinforcement for the circular identity
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approximately ninety degrees from the main gate.75 Hence the striking exterior 
wall is endowed with an effect of massiveness and integrity.
However, due to the requirement of privacy for modern family life, natural 
lighting in the kitchen and improvement in the sanitary conditions, many elements 
of a circular design are no longer suitable for modern life. The first step in their 
strategy is based on the deconstruction and realignment of traditional patterns, 
and reconstructing a different façade. It is necessary to note that cage-like secu-
rity meshes are widely adopted in the southern part of China. The final exterior 
face thus functionally echoes this element, at the same time giving enough light 
through the prefabricated concrete, which covers the balconies outside. The oper-
able shutters for each unit using denser fabric seem to frame a Chinese motif of 
an abstraction of timber grids, reminiscent of a lattice window. The initial random 
arrangements of different sized windows, a typical idiom in modern and contem-
porary architecture, were abandoned in the final scheme. Hence, the identity of the 
building is primarily constructed through a thoroughly modernist device of inte-
grating abstract forms and modern materials, which achieves a balance between 
a traditional sense of solidity and modern life’s requirement for privacy, light and 
ventilation. The abstract elements recall the image of the traditional Tulou and 
emphasise the circular form.
• The imagination of China as a circular path
In addressing the acknowledged or unconscious influence on the architects who 
translated the circular in the new context, it is necessary to address the acknowl-
edged or unconscious influence on the audience who respond to the circular 
design and recognise its significance. Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) achieved strik-
ing international success and gained overwhelming international attention, which 
has been reported by many international magazines and professional journals.76 
Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) reflects upon a traditional type and a modern transla-
tion of it; it is a prototype related to a mountainous region in Fujian province but 
relocated to the edge of Guangzhou. Therefore, Urban Tulou and the location of 
Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) lack a historical identity and a form. However, for 
the international audience, URBANUS provided an intriguing Chinese circular 
symbol. They expect to see exotica, “Chineseness”, both novelty and the modern 
world at the same time, all of which are demonstrated by this circular design. The 
unusual and even playful gestures of integrating a circular design into an alien 
environment bolster the consensus that the building ultimately represents both 
Chinese culture and a brand of avant-garde aesthetic, free of pomp. The main 
reason it captured the attention of international audiences is that it accommodates 
all identities as a generic signifier of both China and modernity.
The URBANUS architects are cautious when talking about Chineseness, or the 
Chinese identity. They quickly move to the contemporary quality of the building 
as one of the most important issues in the evolution of modern architecture in 
China. They refer to it as “Contemporaneity”, a term which can be traced through 
several of their essays.77 They emphasise the contemporary power of China – its 
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ability to represent an underlying series of new ideas or new movement in the field 
of architecture. Yan Meng commented,
We did not intentionally impose Chinese elements into our projects. I would 
call it the social condition of contemporary Chinese people, the special con-
ditions of a city which are manifested in architecture, even if it is imper-
fect, but it makes the contemporary Chinese moments stand out. It is difficult 
to describe this condition; however, we always believe that doing further 
research about it is more beneficial than simply doing a value judgment of 
the history.78
This appears, on one hand, to narrow down an extremely complex word China to 
a simpler question of contemporary urban condition, but on the other hand, they 
also provide no room for direct reference.
However, when URBANUS architects stand on the international stage, it is 
possible that Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan and Wang Hui benefit from their Chinese 
ethnicity because there are some specific kinds of expectations and projections 
of China by the world audience. When talking about Zhang Yimou, Liu Xiaodu 
pointed out that the upsurge of international interest in his movies in the 1990s 
coincided with a re-imagining of the past. But the inaccuracy of the re-imagining 
allowed emphasis to be placed on a more abstract and more specific movie lan-
guage, which situates it in an indeterminate phase of history. Liu argued that
Zhang’s films are not situated in the framework of regionalism. For example, 
in his film Ju Dou, the dyehouse looks like the “JiangNan (regions south of 
the Yangtze River)”, but many scenes in it make it look like northern China, 
which creates a mix of references. However, I think these discussions about 
its locality are not important; his films are definitely very Chinese.79
From this point of view, URBANUS’s expression of China is analogous to 
Zhang Yimou. For the international audience, the circular design of Tulou is both 
more abstract and more real than the heritage. In the project of Urban Tulou, from 
the very beginning the architects were concerned with cultural re-evaluation and 
social reality in the new social context rather than international appeal, but conse-
quently Urban Tulou achieved striking international success and approval.
How the emerging process of high-speed urbanisation in the Pearl River Delta 
gave URBANUS new space to work is also reflected in this case. As with other 
URBANUS projects, they identified the circular site plan as the most adaptable 
to the residual land left over by rapid urbanisation. In other words, the circular 
design is part of a new vision using the residual land from rapid urbanisation and 
scattered urban planning. In discussing their own project, URBANUS wrote,
Our experiments explored ways to stitch the Tulou within the existing urban 
fabric of the city-green areas, overpasses, expressways, and residual and left 
over spaces produced by urbanization. The cost of residual sites is quite low 
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due to incentives by the government, and this is an important factor in devel-
oping low-income housing.80
This strategy can also sharply reduce the budget of land for the private developer.
In addition, URBANUS’s choice of this idealist circular design coincides with 
their maturing role in the market. As previously noted, around 2005 URBANUS 
reached its high point in the market. Many developers or governmental officers 
were intrigued with URBANUS’s designs and commissioned them. Vanke Real 
Estate came to URBANUS at that time. Vanke, as a private firm, is currently the 
largest professional housing developer in China. In 2011, Vanke sold floor space 
totalling 10.75 million square metres, and sales reached RMB 121.5 billion, the 
largest in the global real estate industry.81 It could be said the largest player in the 
global real estate industry strikes a note of self-mockery in this “anti-real estate” 
project.
Therefore, similar to the circular design in Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008), 
URBANUS’s architectural expressions manifested the architects’ own travels and 
international projections of China and created an in-between identity, formed by 
juxtapositions of many regions and times, experiments in nostalgia for a grand 
landscape of experiences and heavily influenced by realignments, or new mar-
ket orientation, to facilitate the Pearl River Delta’s transformations into a vast 
conurbation.
Urbanised intervention and private/public anxiety
• Moving the public space ahead
In their first published design collection book, the architects of URBANUS 
categorised their designs into four groups, “Urban Intervention, Renovation & 
Regeneration, Urban Landmark, Urban Design & Research”.82 Urban interven-
tion is implemented in the projects Public Art Plaza (Shenzhen, 2000),83 Sales 
Centre for Grand Constellation Development (Beijing, 2003) and Vanke Experi-
ence Centre (Shenzhen, 2006). The strategy of renovation and regeneration with 
urban concern can be found in Dafen Art Museum (Shenzhen, 2007) (Figure 5.6), 
Tangshan Museum Park (Tangshan, 2008)84 (Figure 5.7) and OCT Loft North 
Area Renovation (Shenzhen, 2011)85 (Figure 5.8). Urban landmark is represented 
by Shenzhen Planning Building (Shenzhen, 2005),86 Digital Beijing (Beijing, 
2007)87 and Longgang Education Bureau Office Building (Shenzhen, 2005).88 
Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008), the study on the Fuxin Village and the study on the 
Gangxia Village represent Urban Design & Research. Laurence Wu summarised 
the 170 projects done in the first seven years of URBANUS into several urban 
categories: “Urban Intervention, Urban Edge, Urban Retention, Urban Anchors, 
Urban Landmark, Urban Public Space and Urban R&D”,89 part of which overlaps 
with URBANUS’s own classification. However, these classifications and sum-
maries are all based on architects’ solutions, rather than on investigating the prob-
lems that occur in the situation of urbanisation. To avoid a superficial analysis 
Figure 5.6 URBANUS, Dafen Art Museum, Shenzhen, 2007
Figure 5.7 URBANUS, Tangshan Museum Park, Tangshan, 2007
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Figure 5.8 URBANUS, OCT Loft North Area Renovation, Shenzhen, 2011
and in trying to expose the problems as they arose dealing with, I will analyse 
URBANUS in the context of contemporary China’s socio-political constructs and 
ideological struggles, resting on the distinction between private and public.
From the name of URBANUS, which derives from the Latin word of urban, 
it is possible to get the sense of their design approach: reading architectural pro-
gramme from the viewpoint of the urban environment in general.
When the founders tried to find a proper name for the new office, most 
thought that it should incorporate the concept of “city” in some way. One 
day Meng Yan, who was then working in New York, came across a word in 
his office dictionary, “urbanus”. In a country like China where the economic 
foundation is weak and the society is developing in a fast track manner . . . the 
city may bring endless joy, but it is also a source of pain and evil.90
The phrase “urban public space” has the highest frequency of occurrence in intro-
ductory design literature published by URBANUS. In one of their early designs, 
Public Art Plaza (Shenzhen, 2000), which is located in one of the most densely 
populated areas of downtown Shenzhen, URBANUS converted a shabby park-
ing lot into a semi-underground parking garage integrated with arts programmes, 
such as an outdoor display area, a gallery, a bookshop, a café, artist studios and 
a lecture hall. In URBANUS’s maturing stage, Tangshan Exhibition Park (Tang-
shan, 2007) addresses the public urban identity within a typical second-tier city 
in China, in an expiring post-industrial and banal setting. The park helps to rein-
force an urban confidence in exploring public spaces in this second-tier industrial 
city near Tianjing. The single building is no exception in taking the urban public 
space as the primary concern. In the Futian Library Complex (Shenzhen, 2001), 
URBANUS emphasised that the library becomes an impressive civic icon with 
a generous front plaza, and the sectional-visible architectural façade integrates 
the interior activities into the urban spaces outside. The urban public space has 
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been also reflected in the Tangshan Museum Expansion (Tangshan, 2011)91 (Fig-
ure 5.9), OCT Loft North Area Renovation (Shenzhen, 2011) (Figure 5.10), Dong-
men Photography Plaza (Shenzhen, 2009)92 (Figure 5.10), Jade Bamboo Cultural 
Plaza (Shenzhen, 2009),93 Wenjin Garden Plaza (Shenzhen, 2011)94 and Nanshan 
Marriage Registration Centre (Shenzhen, 2011)95 (Figure 5.11).
Figure 5.9 URBANUS, Tangshan Museum Expansion, Tangshan, 2011. Public space
Figure 5.10 URBANUS, OCT Loft North Area Renovation, Shenzhen, 2011. Public space
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Figure 5.11  URBANUS, Nanshan Marriage Registration Centre, Shenzhen, 2011, Public 
space
Furthermore, regarding urban public space, the URBANUS architects under-
took intensive research into the urban village and proposed several design 
solutions. In the urban village, without planning and development control, and 
stimulated by rental income, every villager tries to build a house as high and as big 
as possible. High-density construction in urban villages is technically illegal, but 
government administration in the urban village is less effective.96 Accommodat-
ing a large number of migrants and characterised by unplanned construction, the 
urban village actually becomes a public space and activity desert. Dafen Village 
is a typical urban village in the Pearl River Delta, which to a large degree is occu-
pied by a floating population. Best known for its replica oil painting workshops 
and manufacturers, its exports to Asia, Europe and America bring billions of RMB 
each year to the area. Before the reform in 1978, villagers in Dafen lived on farm-
ing and the annual income per person was less than 200 RMB. Except for a few 
old houses and ancestral temples in Dafen Village, there were no public spaces. 
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High-density buildings, narrow, engulfed streets and poor infrastructure are com-
mon features.
Dafen Art Musuem (Shenzhen, 2007), designed by URBANUS, emerges as a 
potential organisational catalyst for the chaos in the urban village. The architects 
created a hybridised mix of different activities, like art museums, oil painting 
galleries and shops, commercial spaces, rental workshops and studios under one 
roof. Dafen Village has some special features: high and low roofs, tall but nar-
row streets and diversification in colours. By carefully investigating the site 
and collecting first-hand information in Dafen Village, the architects considered 
that the village layout was analogous to gridiron plans in some American cities, 
for example, New York. Single buildings compose independent street blocks; 
however, there is little distinction between single buildings in high-density use 
and street blocks. The Barbican and the ancestral halls are still in the centre 
of the old village. Drawing on the village texture, the architects introduced an 
inversion of Dafen Village’s texture into the architecture of Dafen Art Musuem 
(Shenzhen, 2007).
The variation that Dafen Art Museum (Shenzhen, 2007) has brought to the 
urban village is the public space integrated into urban life. The first floor in the 
Dafen Art Museum (Shenzhen, 2007), which is open to an adjacent plaza, seeks 
to provide areas for local artists to sell their paintings, and also an auditorium for 
public events. This strategy aims to allow the plaza and part of the first floor to 
have the same commercial morphology as Dafen Village, and thus the museum 
is able to become a natural part of daily life in the village. An article titled “The 
Achievement of Good Urban Public Space” can be found in the official blog of 
URBANUS:
In 28th January 2010, an extraordinary event named “One Thousand Artists 
Painting” happened in the open plaza of Dafen Art Museum. This activity 
was held in cooperation with the exhibition in Shenzhen Pavilion in Shang-
hai World Expo. Every painter produces two oil paintings of small size, the 
paintings which will be displayed in Shenzhen Pavilion in some special way. 
The spectacular scene lasted for more than six hours: painters were working 
hard; some veteran painters dealt with the supervision seriously; volunteers 
in red waistcoats were busy with keeping order and offering services; many 
curious villagers gathered around; the children were rushing about among the 
painters. In the memories of villagers, Dafen has never had this kind of folk 
activities.97
The event demonstrates that the urban public space created by URBANUS began 
to play a significant role in improving urban life for the residents in the village. 
In the open plaza and outdoor public spaces on the third floor of the Dafen Art 
Museum, villagers can come together for various activities, such as commod-
ity exchanges, celebrations of festivals and social events, which are fundamen-
tal elements of urban life. However, what the URBANUS architects are striving 
for is more public space for vulnerable groups in society. However, with cities 
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expanding so fast, urban space is becoming privatised at an unprecedented speed 
in contemporary China.
• Private/public anxiety in contemporary China
Urban public space, the most frequent phrase in URBANUS’s discourse, to some 
extent implies its opposite, private space and the uncertain relationship between 
them.
The division of urban space into the public and private is a physical mani-
festation of the relationship between private and public spheres in society. In 
turn, these spheres are one reflection of the deeper relationship between the 
individual and society, between the self and the other.98
Individual citizens and their requirements, and their expectations regarding either 
private space or public space, have new manifestations in the changing urban con-
ditions in China. I would argue that the barrier to success of “Urban Intervention, 
Urban Edge, Urban Retention, Urban Anchors, Urban Landmark, Urban Public 
Space and Urban R&D”99 is the clash between individual and shared expectations 
of private/public space in the social transition.
The relationship between the private and public sectors can be usefully traced 
back to ideological development. The emergence of the market as a central legiti-
mising institution brought the public/private distinction into the core of legal dis-
course during the nineteenth century.100 However, China’s trajectory, which began 
from the pre-reform socialist regime of production and accumulation dominated 
by, and designed solely for, the state’s extensive socialist industrialisation pro-
gramme, then moved to a more market-based and uniquely hybridised system of 
production marked by quasi-public, quasi-private forms of ownership, production 
and accumulation.101 The private and public sectors have become combined and 
entangled together in complex ways, the complexity of which cannot be con-
ceptualised or explained by conventional socialist or market theories. The liberal 
perspective on the emergence and development of the modern state and modern 
capitalism is grounded in the distinction between the public and private sectors.102 
The assumption of the dominant neo-liberal ideology is that post-communist mar-
ket transitions will lead to and require a sharpening of the boundaries, both legal 
and practical, between the state and the expanding private sectors. However, the 
post-communist economic transitions belie these assumptions.103
Private society and its actors flourish, but they do not stand across a clearly 
delineated divide from the public. For example, in 1949, China, as a socialist 
country, adopted a welfare housing system where the production, allocation and 
maintenance of housing became the responsibility of the relevant work unit (Dan-
wei).104 In 1988, the government issued a major reform document, the Ten Year 
Reform Strategy. Its main objectives were to encourage urban residents to buy 
their houses, to formulate new housing finance arrangements and to restructure 
rents in the public sector. Since then, various central and local legislation and 
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regulations for the privatisation of urban housing have been issued.105 In other 
words, the residential space, which had been de-commodified to a public wel-
fare benefit in the communist victory, has been nominally re-privatised, but urban 
residents still only hold the right to use privately and sell privately for a limited 
number of years, rather than being freehold private property owners. That is to 
say, residents are still in public urban housing stock, with leasehold titles.
The active, intensive, unorthodox and opaque interaction between the public 
and the private sectors puzzles and entangles Chinese citizens. The transforma-
tion has affected all kinds of state entities – local and municipal governments, 
national ministries, the army, national and local public security bureaus, party 
organisations, universities and scientific research institutes – many of which have 
become profit-seeking players in the market who run their own extensive business 
empires.106 An ever-growing proportion of people feel anxious about the opaque 
cooperation between state agencies and private associations. According to Laur-
ance Ma’s analysis, the pursuit of entrepreneurial activities by state officials and 
newly emerging individuals has proven to be politically acceptable and economi-
cally rewarding; the most critical aspect pointed out by Ma is that this pursuit is 
socially admired.107
Therefore, the sense of ownership and the sense of place do not fall easily into 
the private-public dichotomy. This social anxiety has emerged among different 
social groups throughout Chinese society. Farmers feel anxious that their distrib-
uted and so-called privatised farmlands, formerly cultivated by themselves, can 
be compulsorily purchased and turned into urban land by the government at any 
time. Migrant workers have no chance to access urban housing in terms of eligi-
bility and affordability, because the emerging political and economic structure is 
not capable of providing public and urban welfare to a growing labour force from 
rural areas not covered by the traditional welfare system. The new middle class in 
the cities is not clear about which class of private-owned assets would be nation-
alised or de-commoditised within emerging policies.108
In contemporary China, people find that it is difficult to discern whether the 
state agencies are still involved in collective housekeeping, a situation that pre-
vailed for forty years before the 1990s, or are going to exploit them – in the man-
ner of a commercial enterprise. Since the emergence of a relatively autonomous 
private demand is irresistible, increasing numbers of people in China are urged 
to live in gated communities in seemingly secure privatised property and space. 
As urban sprawl rapidly increases, urban public space is being swallowed up by 
privatisation, and the urban form resulting from privatisation in the contemporary 
city is subject to gating. Gating is the manifestation of a psychological anxiety 
in confronting current ideological struggles, more specifically, a new expression 
of the growing enthusiasm for privatisation: increasingly a loss of confidence in 
collective house-keeping drives people to entrench privatised living in gated com-
munities in China.
The physical division between private and public spaces, and the enclosed form 
of the gated community, embody the sense that nobody wants to be disadvantaged 
again in the changing urban property regime. Therefore the gated form in China 
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seems to be the easiest urban strategy to address psychological discomfort. “Gates 
are reassuring in the face of anxiety levels heightened by economic, demographic, 
and social change. They shield us from a world we feel vulnerable.”109 Hence how 
the urban enclave addresses the anxiety, on one hand, is through this physical 
division and enclosed form which enhances the sense of ownership and privatisa-
tion, and on the other hand, the housing buyer in a Chinese gated community is 
not only the owner of his or her apartment but also the joint owner of the open 
space and community buildings. In this manner the eagerness for privatisation 
proliferates gated communities in the Chinese context, as people become more 
demanding in the sharp spatial division between private and public sectors, in 
order to ensure the stability of their personal space and assets. Furthermore, it also 
allows architects and urbanities to indulge in an easy solution: gated communities.
As a result, gated communities have now become the most prevalent and accept-
able urban housing settlements in China as a solution to maintaining boundaries 
between public and private spaces. Miao stated that almost all the added housing 
stock in China took the form of gated communities from around 2000, and gates 
have become the standard feature of master-planned new communities in subur-
ban areas, but they are also found in the central city. While national statistics are 
not available, there is no denying that gated residential districts or communities 
as the dominant pattern in the housing market has influencing both urban form 
and people’s lives in contemporary China.110 Bray observes that the appearance 
of huge numbers of gated residential communities has become the key feature 
of China’s urban transformation. The reason for the boom in gated communities 
in urban China can be attributed to a scarcity of land and population pressure, 
which has influenced planning authorities to promote high-rise and high-density 
development.111 The tolerance towards sharing space in such a neighbourhood is 
particularly low, and it is uncommon for domestic activities to encroach into the 
public space in a gated community. As a result, people usually do not know each 
other in one residential development, but they prefer to be zealously guarded and 
protected under property management control.
• Urban Tulou in the private/public whirlpool
Interestingly, Urban Tulou, targeting low-income groups, is a gated residence in 
URBANUS’s final proposal, which integrates living, storage, shopping, spiritual-
ity and public entertainment into one single building entity. In a broader perspec-
tive, Urban Tulou is an epitome of China’s gated residential district: Urban Tulou 
is enclosed by an outer circular block with a rectangular box within; both the 
circular and rectangular blocks contain small apartment units; the lower floors 
contain convenience shops, restaurants, a barber shop near the entrance and other 
community facilities including a reading room, sports room and entertainment 
room in a box form. Urban Tulou bears a resemblance to typical residential dis-
tricts in China, caused by general concerns for security and management. How-
ever, the target market for Urban Tulou is the migrant workers living in the city, 
who are still very much dependent on the control exercised by neighbourhood 
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institutions. Most migrant workers undertake jobs undesirable to the urban popu-
lation, and it is difficult for them to integrate into the urban life in the city, because 
they are generally excluded by the urban population. They constitute a class in 
themselves.
In a series of essays, URBANUS admitted that they had devised two plans at 
the very beginning:
We had two directions at first. The first one is that rounded Tulou rests on 
the meshed grouped buildings, which is influenced by the urban village. We 
were expecting this residential district would not be gated, but extremely 
active in the regional commercial development. It will be easy to merge into 
the urban context, achieving good urban features. The bottom of the build-
ing, street space, can ascend in the centre of Tulou, similar to the form of 
residential form in the Urban Village. As a result, this community will be 
ready to become a self-built, self-serviced and energetic place with good 
flexibility, adaptability, ductility and the ability to self-repair. Furthermore, it 
can build an information platform for job seekers or the employed. The sec-
ond direction drops the idea of first floor business, directly concentrating on 
the traditional composition. This method proved to be easily managed, size- 
controllable and close to circular. After a number of comparisons, we chose 
the second one.112
As a result, Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) is now an enclosed and gated structure, 
placed exactly in the void created by high-speed urbanisation. Although there is 
no clear explanation for the final choice of direction or strategy, the first option 
was abandoned.
A city’s streets, parks, squares and other shared spaces have been seen as 
symbols of collective well-being and possibility, expressions of achievement 
and aspiration by urban leaders and visionaries, sites of public encounter and 
formation of civic culture, and significant spaces of political deliberation and 
agonistic struggle.113
Based on this, the question can be asked: Would it be possible that rural migrants 
would be capable of enjoying more urban amenities and sharing more information 
if the URBANUS architects had chosen the first plan they worked on? Would it 
be possible for Urban Tulou to become an actual active entity assisting the new 
consciousness towards personal involvement with public affairs? In this scenario 
they would influence the public participation and sense of urban identity, as in the 
design of Dafen Art Museum (Shenzhen, 2007).
These kinds of constraints were highlighted in the process of locating this 
building. Regarding land use, it was not easy to find a suitable location for such an 
affordable housing project. The developer, Vanke Real Estate, originally locked in 
land beside a high-class residential neighbourhood “The Fifth Garden” in Shenz-
hen; however, the proposed affordable housing project was very strongly opposed 
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by the owners from the neighbourhood. They argued that the project would affect 
their life quality and depreciate their housing. Vanke had to cancel the plan and 
move the pilot project to its current location. The face of class struggle has taken 
on a new form. Regardless of any concern about the price of land, one issue could 
be detected: people have become increasingly concerned with their own property, 
although their private housing is different from private housing in most other 
market economies.
Both Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) and Urban Village serve as fundamen-
tal organisational units for a migrant rural population in an awkward position. 
Ironically, Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008) creates friction with urban dwellers in 
the wider context. The struggles in the project of Urban Tulou and the awkward 
location of the Urban Village all reflect the steady erosion of public space for 
the underclass and social inequality, when cities in China are struggling with the 
redistributive framework of centralised welfare. Confronting the new relation-
ship between the private and public sectors, between the private space and public 
spaces, it is apparent that URBANUS architects have tried but failed to control the 
chaos in the urban struggles in this societal transformation.
The implications of gating in the Urban Tulou again confirm the anxiety in 
the elapsing of the sense of collectivism and dynamic relationships between the 
private and public in current ideological struggles. Evidently, the visions had out-
stripped the aspirations of architects and developers of settling the rural migrants 
into the city. Urban Tulou, as inserted into the city, could be innovative from the 
perspective of architecture, but they still lack flexibility to accommodate con-
flicting urban contexts and the conflicts arising through the increasing separation 
of the private and public. However, I argue that the balance between enclosure 
and openness in the Urban Tulou can be read as an analogy for the relationship 
between the rural migrants and society at large. In the final chosen configuration, 
the cut of the circular form in the composition does more than suggest open-
ness and accessibility; it suggests mutual dependence in a wait-and-see attitude 
between the individual and society.
Civil justice and the commercialisation of space
The liberalisation policies from 1978 gave these three architects opportunities 
to be educated overseas and to experience the nostalgia originating from being 
situated elsewhere and assuming the identity of “the other”. The liberalisation 
policies from 1978 also spurred remarkable rates of economic development and 
urbanisation in the Pearl River Delta which attracted the “Haigui architects” back 
to China and simultaneously gave architects massive opportunities in architec-
ture. They had come to understand the market in a capitalist country. However, 
the fluctuating and unclear relationships between the market and the state in the 
early stage of market transition in China often placed the “Haigui architects” in an 
uneasy position. They initially aligned with the Shenzhen local government and 
personally experienced the process from central planning to market orientation in 
Shenzhen. The growing market also brought negative effects to the lives of the 
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residents, for example, the widening gulf between the extremes of high-income 
and low-income groups, born of pragmatism and unprincipled expediency. Yet in 
the maturing stage of the market transition, URBANUS’s efforts in anti-market 
projects show their unique role in working for civil justice, while confronting the 
commercialisation of space.
By examining the translations of traditional circular designs into the new urban 
context, three architects demonstrate the paradoxical nature of maintaining iden-
tity during trends of migration and globalisation in the contemporary world. For 
these three architects, the circular design was translated through a complex of 
amalgamation and contradiction: the amalgamation of the architects’ intercultural 
study and practice, as well as the contradictions implicit in how they locate them-
selves geopolitically and architecturally. From the perspective of the translator of 
this circular design, it expresses a combination of old China and new China, tol-
erating numerous identities, and readers’ imaginations regarding China. The crea-
tion of an ideal circular design in the market also confirms the architects’ idealism 
in establishing a position between the state and market with integrity.
Architectural designs in response to urban issues during the transition emerged 
with private/public anxiety, which gives the architecture an unexpected quality: 
gating. My analysis shows that the ideological transformation between private 
and public sectors creates a psychological shift towards a growing enthusiasm for 
privatisation, which quickly edged out collectivism in the urban spread, prompt-
ing people to secure their private property and space in a move associated with 
the loss of confidence in the collective mindset, and finally dragging the cities 
into an unhealthy social condition. URBANUS’s massive efforts in urban public 
space are erected between areas of privatisation and the traditional collective or 
civil society; although, by examining the case of Urban Tulou (Nanhai, 2008), we 
can see that the architects themselves cannot fully resolve these conflicts through 
architecture. However, the urban space they created can be seen as a unique cel-
ebration of the “expanding area between the absolute state and the classical civil 
society”.114 Regardless of innovation in design, this “anti-market” behaviour and 
their attempts in the urban public space all indicate a potential position in the third 
realm between the state and the market.
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This book examines the conflicting ideologies of China’s market transition and 
their impact on architects and architectural design. The micro-analysis of specific 
architects and architectural designs complements the macro-perspective of exist-
ing urban research on cities. It demonstrates that architecture itself is an impor-
tant and accurate reflection of the societal transformation of China from Mao to 
market. People who define Chinese ideologies from the perspective of East vs 
West or socialist vs capitalist antipathies are limiting themselves. Contemporary 
Chinese architects have drawn inspiration from both the East and West, but they 
are creating an identity that moves beyond this binary. Contemporary architecture 
in China does not fit easily into recent terminologies: modernism, postmodernism, 
avant-garde, post-avant-garde, structuralism or deconstruction. Nor does it reject 
all traditional forms.
I have designated different architectural designs as “untamed”, “rational” and 
something epitomised by the “circular form” – terms which may sound like an 
intuitive assessment, but which arise from a close scrutiny of the combined influ-
ence of the architect’s subjectivity and the new social conditions. The concept of 
being “untamed” reflects Liu Jiakun’s choice of continual dialogue in architec-
ture, between self-expression and commercial interest in exploiting rapid marketi-
sation. In contrast, Cui Kai prefers to adapt the art of composition and aesthetics 
to the new requirements of nationalism, sometimes achieving a higher degree 
of complexity in his designs, other times achieving a higher degree of rational 
simplicity in his designs. By intuitively tapping into the circular design from the 
perspectives of both the translator and reader of Urban Tulou, the URBANUS 
architects’ travelling life experiences, travel-enhanced professional capacities and 
wandering imagining of China, a maturing third realm between state and society 
converge into something epitomised by the “circular” design. They confront the 
socio-political challenges and the socio-economic problems of the transitional 
period. They not only break with the conventional imagining of modernity, but 
they also enrich the architectural discourse on the convergence of this imagined 
modernity and the actual socio-political environment.
The significance of these three stories should be reviewed within the context of 
the three common, deep-seated misconceptions highlighted at the beginning: “Is 
Money the Only Language?”; “Has China Forgotten Mao?”; and “Do People Just 
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Want to Be the Individuated Self?” The value of each case study is situated in the 
context of the real socio-political conditions in contemporary China and unsolved 
conflicts in the societal transformation. Each case study primarily addresses one 
misconception, with supplementary references to combined issues that cannot be 
detangled, allowing us to reconsider the alternative manifestations of modernity 
in China.
First, China is an economic miracle. China’s hyper-rapid growth has already 
lasted three times longer than a typical transformative episode in in other coun-
tries in world history. Chinese people who enjoy the fruits of this economic mira-
cle desire China to join the group of the countries in the West that benefit from a 
developed market economy. Yet money is not the only language in contemporary 
China, despite what may be commonly imagined. The fundamental conflicts at 
an ideological level began with the people’s challenge of the tradition “inside the 
system”, that continued to enjoy unchallenged power in the twenty-first century. 
Chinese people identified unambiguously the lack of open institutions, transpar-
ent government and a just legal system that they could observe operating in West-
ern countries.
The discussion of Cui Kai and his works in the context of “Is Money the Only 
Language?” reveals that the culture of hierarchy, and long-term shared values 
and beliefs in the state-owned enterprise, impart a certain tone to the market-
oriented designs. Cui Kai unconsciously dispenses high culture in his works. Yet 
his dual role does not allow him to focus on high culture as a confirmation and 
legitimation of state government. The market also encourages Cui Kai to give 
importance to popular cultures. To balance his sense of mission for the nation, 
and the demand from the market, his designs have become a shared medium or 
shared atmosphere that tie the diversified, locality-tied, popular cultures accepted 
by the market, and integrate them into high culture. An architectural language for 
bureaucratic communication satisfying the state, and communication with Chi-
nese residents in Cui Kai’s designs, provided an appropriate way of mediating 
this conflict around “inside the system”. Cui Kai’s architecture is an interesting 
example of its own kind of modernity in terms of China’s state governance. I am 
not suggesting it would be a new paradigm, but it is an architectural outcome 
evolving from the functioning of the state into an increasingly market-oriented 
economy while maintaining its stability and dynamism. I cannot give an answer 
to how far the socio-political reform in China can go, but it shows the alternative 
implementation of national policies and the alternative reception and assimilation 
of the national willingness.
Second, I would argue that China has not forgotten Mao, but the relationship 
has grown psychologically complex. In the Mao era, people wore Mao’s badge, 
and Mao’s ideology was felt everywhere – in the workplace, on the streets, in the 
classroom, in the media and in every aspect of the nation’s cultural life. But the 
current opinions of the people about the pre-reform era, and even to the grimy 
architecture dominant in the Mao era, is less straightforward and remains a sensi-
tive issue. Apart from the documents of the People’s Congress, and nostalgia for 
the Maoist era portrayed by certain artists, for example, in the 798 Art District, 
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Mao’s image is absent from contemporary Chinese cities. Discussion of Mao is 
absent from conversations, especially between people who experienced the era. 
There is a pervading ignorance of the architecture of the Mao era, especially in the 
first-tier and second-tier cities.
“The Necessity of Being Real” discussed how Liu Jiakun as an architect avoids 
evoking the awkward side of his generation’s youth, but legitimises the psycho-
logical acceptance of the new dynamics in the architecture, which are based on the 
reinterpretation of a collective memory of Mao, even the collectively traumatic 
memories. Liu Jiakun’s architecture confirms that socialism under the planned 
economy was a significant, though often forgotten, part of Chinese history and 
the people’s collective memory. This section argues that architecture designed by 
Liu Jiakun is a vehicle provoking Chinese people to confront their memories and 
is a strong indicator of China’s struggles over the tensions between communist 
and capitalist versions of modernity. Although Liu Jiakun is not intended to be 
associated with the socialist rhetoric, his concern about the collective memory, 
manifested in his design, gives a clear demonstration of how the Chinese psyche 
is processing the socialist rhetoric and socialist production of the built environ-
ment in a post-Mao China.
Third, the misconception, “Do People Just Want to Be the Individuated Self?” 
reflects the conflict between individual ambitions and public service. From 1949 
until 1978, the Communist Party required that personal sacrifices be made by its 
members and by the population in the campaign for a socialist construction. How-
ever, in the shift from Mao to market, a process that encourages individualism, 
private goals run counter to a socialist policy. “Urban Intervention and the Private/
Public Anxiety”, shows that the ideological conflict between private and public 
attitudes created a psychological shift towards a growing enthusiasm for priva-
tisation, which quickly edged out collectivism. The opening provided by urban 
expansion accompanied by the loss of confidence in the collective viewpoint, 
pushed people to secure their private property and space, a process that instilled a 
negative trend in new cities.
URBANUS worked positively on the public space, not only from the perspec-
tive of a designer, but also from the perspective of a social worker. My research 
opens new lines of enquiry on URBANUS’s urban strategies by highlighting the 
ideological shifts between the private and public sectors. The architecture of both 
Liu Jiakun and URBANUS reveal that modernity, in its struggle between socialist 
and capitalist beliefs, between public service and the individuated self, is attempt-
ing to connect with the inner life of Chinese people. This has proved challenging, 
because Chinese society changed dramatically in such a short time, and many 
people are unable to experience a separate identity in the movement towards mod-
ernisation. For example, Chinese people are aware that socialist the movement 
betrayed its founding principle in 1989, but they do not want to debate whether 
this failure implies a deeper betrayal of the individual. After the sudden loss of 
confidence in the collective viewpoint, the idea of individualism is complicated 
by a negative interpretation of “selfishness”. In this unique situation, it is evident 
that “individualism” needs to be clearly defined for the people, specifically in 
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relation to Chinese modernity, and in this context, such a definition has mani-
fested in contemporary Chinese architecture.
In general, from this book, Chinese contemporary architecture has manifested 
the proliferation of modernity in its multiplicity and increasingly defined itself 
following its own social, historical and political logic. Chinese contemporary 
architecture moves beyond existing scholarship’s interpretation of modernity. The 
audience of China’s contemporary architecture is not confined to China but has 
expanded to the global stage. The image of architecture can easily go viral on the 
Internet in a global professional circular, and the architecture itself will be glazed, 
experienced or even occupied by people from diverse backgrounds, with diverse 
perspectives. However, whether the original Western viewpoint continues to serve 
as the global reference point is a doubt. There is no intention to justify a “Chinese 
way” of dealing with everything, yet it is imperative to map the different histori-
cal trajectories in the unfolding of modernity in China, from a largely European-
oriented perspective to an inclusive global perspective.
Furthermore, this study argues that the changing interactions between the mar-
ket and the state are in fact the source of architectural innovations. Liu Jiakun’s 
innovations derive from his insight into the between individual designs and the 
expectations of an immature market. Cui Kai’s innovations emerge from his com-
promise between individual efforts to follow the market mechanism, while retain-
ing a high level of social responsibility subordinate to the emergent society and to 
popular taste. URBANUS’s innovations come from the tension between impulses 
towards the market and critical thinking about the market. The mix of “Mao” 
and “market” has created a modern Chinese vernacular that has been true both in 
the sense of complying with the demands of the state and also deeply rooted in 
the nature of the capitalist market. The tense dialogue between neo-liberal logic 
and socialist sovereignty is reconfiguring contemporary China, and furthermore 
reconfiguring China’s contemporary architecture, all of which contributes to the 
idea that the innovation and uniqueness of contemporary architectural design 
is not driven solely by the state, nor by the market, but rests with the struggle 
between the state and the market.
Each of these architects has evolved a mediated codified language. Cui Kai’s 
designs provide an acceptable way of mediating people’s disquiet with the sta-
tus quo by operating within the official institutes. Architecture designed by Liu 
Jiakun becomes an architectural medium to reconcile the differences in the per-
ception of Mao and his era between those who support pre-reform China and 
those who share enthusiasm for China’s market-driven capitalism. URBANUS’s 
urban strategies attempt to resolve the conflict evident in a planned vs a market 
economy in the city, by assuming a halfway position that includes elements of 
private goals and of public service.
These architects also share a common vision, which enables them to see back-
wards and forwards at the same time in dealing with issues of modernity, so that 
the pursuit of progress has manifested through resourceful and ingenious archi-
tectural developments. In the foreword to the 2012 edition of Liquid Modernity 
Revisited, Zygmunt Bauman wrote, “It was the formlessness of the oozing, leaking 
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and flowing liquid that prompted the efforts at cooling, damping and moulding.”1 
Challenged by dramatic economic growth, how far could the socio-political sys-
tem be reformed in China? In the face of capitalism and rapid change, how much 
longer could the socialist version of modernity persist in China? In the light of 
claims about the abuse of human rights, how far would an individual advance in 
China? This research cannot give satisfying answers to these big questions. But it 
prompts us to reflect how to effectively take over the oppressive functions of state 
powers and how to escape the pursuit of a consumerist lifestyle, by understanding 
the example set by the multiple outcomes of Chinese architecture. As well as the 
necessity of charting the many different faces of modernisation, it is important to 
recognise the evolving convergence and divergence between China and the world, 
in both economic and architectural forms.
For architects, in general, the emerging market is a new site for the latent com-
mercialisation that gradually provided alternative resources for an individual 
architect, like Liu Jiakun and the three architects in URBANUS. Cui Kai’s idi-
osyncratic position in a national design institute, and also in a burgeoning mar-
ket, provided even more chances to include national projects and private projects 
of various scales. Gone are the days when only one or two Chinese architects 
were visible on the international stage. China’s engagement with the international 
economy and a burgeoning market has created a requirement for architects with 
a broader education and new skills. There is now a sustained interest overseas 
in news of contemporary architecture in China. International exhibitions and the 
development of the market create architect celebrities. International exhibitions 
in Europe, the United States and in China, devoted to Chinese architects, expand 
their professional networks with their peers and in the overseas media. This situa-
tion complicates personal goals that might have been considered risky in the Mao 
era and early post-Mao. However, some of the risks that might be associated with 
the architects’ projects, like URBANUS’s personal fight for the vulnerable group 
of migrant workers, or Liu Jiakun’s works in engaging with ordinary people after 
Wenchuan earthquake, have been mitigated by their connection with their peer 
overseas, and with attention in overseas media, assisting the architects to expand 
their personal architectural discourse. But this approach is more or less limited to 
the individual architects who operate outside the government system.
However, it is difficult for architects to find a systematic and coordinated path 
between the ideological conflicts emerging from the transition from central plan-
ning to the market economy. The process from Mao to market can be simply 
read as the reordering of power relations in the whole society. The old locus 
of power is suspect, and the old value judgement system has also lost efficacy. 
The architecture by itself is not powerful enough to improve social adjustment 
to the uncertain nature of the transition. However, architects already started to 
affect civil justice and to spread the idea of civil liberties through their profes-
sional activities. They reflect a third voice emerging between the state and the 
market in contemporary Chinese society. Currently, when an individual archi-
tect confronts authority, resorting to contacts “inside the system” is still the most 
effective route to a resolution. However, if the Chinese government stays on 
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its course of reform, the third voice will have more room to move in the future, 
and architect’s professional approach might assist in coordinating some of the 
ideological conflicts emerging from the societal transition. If the party continues 
to succeed in bringing prosperity to the population, and to remain in power as a 
consequence, they must at least be seen to tolerate the pursuit of professional and 
personal objectives by those architects who are instrumental in achieving this 
prosperity. With the development of the architectural discipline, architecture is no 
longer categorised as only engineering, and architects increasingly appear to be 
profiled profile as independently minded intellectuals. Therefore, any attempt by 
the party to coerce these architects into mirroring its policies would prove a tough 
undertaking.
The Communist Party certainly recognises this dilemma, and could make a 
genuine attempt to make political life more transparent. It could also reinforce the 
independence of the courts. In this case, would Chinese architecture undergo a 
metamorphosis of its own? The historical epoch of communist ideology, shifting 
government policies and changing land policies have dominated Chinese think-
ing for a long time. Hence it is hard to foresee what kind of ideological evolution 
will emerge in China. However, it should be noted that the Party has been able 
to counter any criticism of its position as guardian of political ideologies by ref-
erence to the impressive development of recent times. Similarly, contemporary 
Chinese architecture has been able to counter any criticism of its position as the 
most exciting location for global architects. But will this position be sustained if 
the wave of prosperity ends?
The atmosphere in the architectural industry is volatile. Many architects have 
been spoiled by the high demand for production in recent years. In less than two 
decades, several important industries have changed from dormant to active, and 
several have changed from active to dormant in China. The new conditions have 
cast a sober atmosphere on the architectural industry. How the dynamics of archi-
tecture will continue to play out in the uneasy interactions between the state and 
the market must be left to a future study. I think the focus will be placed on the 
developments of architectural practices. For example, whether the rise of an inde-
pendent professional practice in China can be associated with integral control of 
the design process, and whether the rise of an independent professional practice 
would enable technological pathways of relevance for the building environment 
in China will be studied in the future.
One of my architect colleagues, facing the uncertain future of the architectural 
industry in China, ironically quoted the communist manifesto, “Proletarians of 
the world, Unite”. It is difficult to see how a union of “proletarians” might bolster 
the architectural industry at this time, after it has enjoyed international success.
Note
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